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Abstract
Artificial Intelligence (AI) approaches to problem-solving and decision-making are becom-
ing more and more complex, leading to a decrease in the understandability of solutions.
The European Union’s new General Data Protection Regulation tries to tackle this prob-
lem by stipulating a “right to explanation” for decisions made by AI systems. One of
the AI paradigms that may be affected by this new regulation is Answer Set Program-
ming (ASP). Thanks to the emergence of efficient solvers, ASP has recently been used
for problem-solving in a variety of domains, including medicine, cryptography, and biol-
ogy. To ensure the successful application of ASP as a problem-solving paradigm in the
future, explanations of ASP solutions are crucial. In this survey, we give an overview of
approaches that provide an answer to the question of why an answer set is a solution to
a given problem, notably off-line justifications, causal graphs, argumentative explanations
and why-not provenance, and highlight their similarities and differences. Moreover, we
review methods explaining why a set of literals is not an answer set or why no solution
exists at all. Under consideration in Theory and Practice of Logic Programming (TPLP)
KEYWORDS: answer set, explanation, justification, debugging
1 Introduction
With the increasing use of Artificial Intelligence methods in applications affecting
all parts of our lives, the need for explainability of such methods is becoming ever
more important. The European Union recently put forward a new General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) (Parliament and Council of the European Union
2016), outlining how personal data may be collected, stored, and – most impor-
tantly – processed. The GDPR reflects the current suspicion of the public towards
automatic methods influencing our lives. It states1 that anyone has the right to re-
ject a “decision based solely on automated processing” that “significantly affects”
this person. This new regulation may not come as a surprise since most Artificial
Intelligence methods are ‘black-boxes’, that is, they produce accurate decisions,
but without the means for humans to understand why a decision was computed.
According to Goodman and Flaxman (2016), an implication of the GDPR is that,
in the future, automatically computed decisions will only be acceptable if they are
explainable in a human-understandable manner. The GDPR states that such an
explanation needs to be made of “meaningful information about the logic involved”
in the automatic decision-making and should be communicated to the person con-
cerned in a “concise, intelligible and easily accessible form” (Goodman and Flaxman
2016).
A popular Artificial Intelligengce paradigm for decision-making and problem-
solving is Answer Set Programming (ASP) (Brewka et al. 2011; Lifschitz 2008). It
has proven useful in a variety of application areas, such as biology (Gebser et al.
2011), psychology (Inclezan 2015; Balduccini and Girotto 2010), medicine (Erdem
and O¨ztok 2015), and music composition (Boenn et al. 2011). ASP is a declarative
programming language used to specify a problem in terms of general inference rules
and constraints, along with concrete information about the application scenario.
For example, Ricca et al. (2012) present the problem of allocating employees of the
large Gioia Tauro seaport into functional teams. To solve this problem, rules and
constraints are formulated concerning, amongst others, team requirements and em-
ployees’ shift constraints, along with factual knowledge about available employees.
The reasoning engine of ASP then infers possible team configurations, or more gen-
erally, solutions to the problem. Such solutions are called stable models or answer
sets (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991). Since the compu-
tation of answer sets relies on a ‘guess and check’ procedure, the question as to
why an answer set is a solution to the given problem can – intuitively – only be
answered with “because it fulfils the requirements of an answer set”. Clearly, this
explanation does not provide “meaningful information about the logic involved”,
as required by the GDPR.
In ASP, the need for human-understandable explanations as to why an answer set
was computed, was recognised long before the new GDPR was put forward (Brain
and De Vos 2008). Explanation approaches for ASP have thus been developed for
the past twenty years, each focusing on different aspects. Some explain why a literal
is or is not contained in an answer set, using either the dependencies between literals
or the (non-) application of rules as an explanation. Other approaches provide
explanations of the whole logic program, in other words, the explanation is not
specific to one particular answer set. We will here refer to such explanations of
logic programs that have some (potentially unexpected) answer set as justifications.
A different type of explanation is given by debugging approaches for ASP, which
focus on explaining errors in logic programs. Such errors become apparent either if
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an unexpected answer set is computed or if the answer set computation fails, i.e.
if the logic program is inconsistent. Debugging approaches thus aim to answer the
question why an unexpected answer set is computed or why no answer set exists
at all.
In this survey paper, we outline and compare the most prominent justification
approaches for ASP, notably, off-line justifications (Pontelli et al. 2009), LABAS
justifications (Schulz and Toni 2016), causal justifications (Cabalar et al. 2014; Ca-
balar and Fandinno 2016), and why-not provenance (Dama´sio et al. 2013). Further
related approaches outlined here are the formal theory of justifications (Denecker
and De Schreye 1993; Denecker et al. 2015) and rule-based justifications (Be´atrix
et al. 2016). We will see that justifications obtained using these approaches sig-
nificantly differ due to their ideological underpinnings. For example, causal justi-
fications are inspired by causal reasoning, LABAS justifications by argumentative
reasoning, why-not provenance by ideas from databases, and off-line justifications
by Prolog tabled computations (Roychoudhury et al. 2000). These ideological differ-
ences manifest themselves in the construction and layout of justifications, leading
to variations in, for instance, the elements used in a justification (e.g. rules ver-
sus literals) and the treatment of negation (e.g. assuming versus further explaining
negation-as-failure literals).
Besides explanation approaches for consistent logic programs under the answer
set semantics, i.e. justification approaches, we review and discuss approaches for
explaining inconsistent logic programs under the answer set semantics, i.e. debug-
ging approaches, notably, spock (Brain et al. 2007b; Brain et al. 2007a; Gebser
et al. 2008), Ouroboros (Oetsch et al. 2010), the interactive debugging approach
by Shchekotykhin (2015) that is built on top of spock, dwasp (Alviano et al. 2013;
Alviano et al. 2015), and stepping (Oetsch et al. 2018). We will see that these
approaches form three groups, which use different strategies for detecting errors in
a logic program causing the inconsistency. These strategies also lead to different
types of errors being pointed out to the user. spock, Ouroboros and the inter-
active spock approach use a program transformation to report unsatisfied rules,
unsupported atoms, and unfounded atoms. In contrast, dwasp makes use of the
solve-under-assumption and unsatisfiable core features of the wasp solver (Alviano
et al. 2013; Alviano et al. 2015), indicating faulty rules causing the inconsistency.
The stepping approach uses the third strategy, namely a step-wise assignment of
truth values to literals until a contradiction arises, which is then pointed out to the
user.
The paper is structured as follows. We recall some background on logic programs
and their semantics in Section 2. We then review ASP justification approaches
in Section 3 and ASP debugging approaches in Section 4. In Section 5, we give
a brief historical overview of justifications for logic programs and discuss related
work. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper, pointing out some issues with current
approaches that provide interesting future work for the ASP community.
2 Syntax and Semantics of Logic Programs
In this section, we review the syntax and notation for disjunctive logic programs.
We also review the stable and the well-founded semantics for this class of programs,
which will be the basis for the works presented through the rest of the paper.
We assume the existence of some (possibly empty or infinite) set of atoms At and
an operator not, denoting negation-as-failure (NAF)2. Lit def= At ∪ { not a
∣∣ a ∈ At }
denotes the set of literals over At. Literals of the form a and not a are respectively
called positive and negative. Given a literal l ∈ Lit, by l , we denote its complement,
that is, l def= not a iff l = a and l def= a iff l = not a. A rule is an expression of the
form
h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hk ← b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn ∧ not c1 ∧ . . . not cm (1)
where each hi , bi and ci is an atom. Given some rule r of the form of (1), by
head(r) def= {h1, . . . hk}, we denote the set of head atoms of the rule r . Similarly,
by body+(r) def= {b1, . . . bn} and body
−(r) def= {c1, . . . ck}, we respectively denote the
positive and negative body of r . For a set of atoms M ⊆ At we denote the negative
literals corresponding to atoms in M by notM def= { not a
∣∣ a ∈ M }. Furthermore,
by body(r) def= body+(r) ∪ not body−(r), we denote the body literals of r . A rule is
called normal if it satisfies head(r) = {h1} and positive if body
−(r) = {} holds. A
positive normal rule is called definite. If body(r) = {}, the rule is called a fact3 and
we usually represent it omitting the symbol ← . We therefore sometimes use the
term ‘fact’ to refer to the literal(s) in a fact’s head. When dealing with normal rules,
we sometimes denote by head(r) the atom h1 instead of the singleton set {h1}. A
rule with head(r) = {} is called constraint.
A (logic) program P is a set of rules of the form of (1). A program is called normal
(resp. positive or definite) iff all its rules are normal (resp. positive or definite).
Given a set of atoms M ⊆ At, we write M def= At\M for the set containing all
atoms not belonging to M . We say that an atom a is true or holds w.r.t. M ⊆ At
when a ∈ M , we say that it is false otherwise. Similarly, we say that a negative
literal not a is true or holds w.r.t.M ⊆ At when a /∈ M and that it is false otherwise.
A rule r ∈ P is applicable w.r.t. M ⊆ At iff body+(r) ⊆ M and body−(r)∩M = {},
that is, when all body literals are true w.r.t. M . A rule r is satisfied by M iff
head(r) ∩M 6= {} whenever r is applicable. M ⊆ At is closed under P iff every
rule r ∈ P is satisfied by M .
Answer set semantics. Intuitively, for an atom a, the literal not a expresses that
a is false by default, i.e. unless it is proven to be true. The following definition of
reduct and answer set (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1988) capture this intuition.4 The
2 sometimes called ‘default negation’ in the literature
3 This includes disjunctive facts of the form h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hk .
4 Gelfond and Lifschitz (1988) define ‘stable models’ rather than answer sets. Later, Gelfond
and Lifschitz (1991) extended this definition to logic programs with explicit negation and with
disjunction in the head, introducing the terms ‘answer set’. Since then, both terms are frequently
used interchangeably. We will here use the term answer set.
reduct of a program P w.r.t. a set of atoms M ⊆ At, in symbols PM , is the result
of applying the following two steps:
1. removing all rules r such that a ∈ M for some a ∈ body−(r),
2. removing all negative literals from the remaining rules.
The result is a positive program PM . Then, a set of atoms M ⊆ At is an answer set
of a program P iff it is a ⊆-minimal closed set under PM . A logic program is called
consistent if it has at least one answer set, and inconsistent otherwise. Intuitively,
a set of atoms is an answer set if all atoms in it are justified by the rules of the
program under the assumption that all negative literals are evaluated w.r.t. this
answer set.
Example 1
Let P1 be the logic program consisting of the following rules:
p ← q ∧ not r
r ← not p
s ← t
t ← s
q
and let M1 be the set of atoms {p, q}. Then, the reduct of P1 w.r.t. M1 is the
program PM11 :
p ← q s ← t
t ← s
q
whose ⊆-minimal closed set is precisely {p, q}. Hence, M1 is an answer set of P1.
Intuitively, q is in the answer since it is a fact in the program, while p is in the
answer set due to the rule p ← q∧not r and the fact that q is true and r is assumed
to be false w.r.t. M1. Note that s and t mutually depend on each other, so there
is no reason to believe either of them, and consequently neither is contained in the
answer set. It is easy to check that program P1 has a second answer set {q , r}. 
Well-founded model semantics. We introduce a definition of the well-founded model
semantics for normal logic programs in terms of the least fixpoint of a ΓP oper-
ator (Van Gelder 1989) which is, though equivalent, slightly different from the
original definition by Van Gelder et al. (1988) and Van Gelder et al. (1991). Given
a normal logic program P , let ΓP be the function mapping each set of atoms M to
the ⊆-minimal closed set of the program PM and let Γ2P be the operator mapping
each set M to ΓP (ΓP (M )). Then, ΓP and Γ
2
P are antimonotonic and monotonic,
respectively, and, consequently, the latter has a least and greatest fixpoint, which
we respectively denote by lfp(Γ2P ) and gfp(Γ
2
P ). We also respectively denote by
WF+P
def= lfp(Γ2P ) and WF
−
P
def= (At\gfp(Γ2P )) the set of true and false atoms in the
well-founded model of P . The well-founded model of P can then be defined as the
set of literals: WFP
def= WF+P ∪notWF
−
P . The well-founded model is said to be com-
plete iff WF+P ∪WF
−
P = At. We say that an atom a is true w.r.t. the well-founded
model if a ∈WFP , false if not a ∈WFP , and undefined otherwise.
It is easy to see that, by definition, the answer sets of any normal program P
coincide with the fixpoints of ΓP and, thus, every stable model is also a fixpoint
of Γ2P . Hence, every stable model M satisfies: WF
+
P ⊆ M and WF
−
P ∩M = {}. In
other words, the well-founded model semantics is more sceptical than the answer set
semantics in the sense that all atoms that are true (resp. false) in the well-founded
model are also true (resp. false) in all answer sets.
Example 2 (Ex. 1 continued)
Continuing with our running example, it is easy to see that P
{}
1 is:
p ← q
r ←
s ← t
t ← s
q
and that its ⊆-minimal model is {p, q , r}. Hence, we have that ΓP1({}) = {p, q , r}.
In a similar way, it can be checked that Γ2P1({}) = Γ
4
P1
({}) = {q} is the least
fixpoint of the Γ2P1 operator. Hence, we have that WFP1 = {q , not s, not t}. As
expected, q is true in all answer sets of P1 while s and t are false in all of them.
Furthermore, p and r are true in one answer set but not in the other and are left
undefined in the well-founded model. Note that it is possible that an atom is true in
all answer sets, but undefined in the well-founded model. For instance, M1 = {p, q}
is the unique answer set of P1 ∪ {u ← r ∧ not u}, but p is still undefined in its
well-founded model. 
Explicit negation. In addition to negation-as-failure, we use the operator ¬ to de-
note explicit negation. For an atom a, ¬a denotes the contrary of a. By ¬S def=
{ ¬a
∣∣ a ∈ S } we denote the explicitly negated atoms of a set S ⊆ At and, by
Atext
def= At ∪ ¬At we denote the set of extended atoms consisting of atoms and
explicitly negated atoms. By Litext
def= Atext ∪ { not a
∣∣ a ∈ Atext }, we denote the
set of extended literals over At. As for logic programs without explicit negation,
extended literals ¬a and not¬a are respectively called positive and negative.
An extended rule is an expression of the form (1) where each hi , bi and ci is an
extended atom. An extended (logic) program is a set of extended rules. The notions
of head, body, etc. directly carry over from rules without explicit negation. Note
that we say that a program is positive when it does not contain negation-as-failure,
even if it contains explicit negation.
The definition of answer sets and well-founded model5 are easily transferred to
extended logic programs by replacing M ⊆ At with M ⊆ Atext. If an answer set
(resp. the well-founded model) contains both an atom a and its contrary ¬a, the
answer set is called contradictory (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991; Gelfond 2008). In
some works (Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991), a contradictory answer set is only an
answer set if the program has no other answer set and is, by definition, Atext.
5 Even though this simply transfer is sufficient for the purpose of this paper, for the well-founded
model semantics the property ensuring that the explicit negation of a formula implies its default
negation is lost. For a detailed study and solution of this problem we refer to the work of Pereira
and Alferes (1992).
Example 3
Let P2 be the logic program consisting of the following rules:
p ← q ∧ not r
r ← not p
¬p
q
and let M2 be the set of extended atoms {¬p, q , r}. Then, the reduct of P2 w.r.t.
M2 is the program P
M2
2 :
r ←
¬p
q
whose ⊆-minimal closed set is precisely {¬p, q , r}. Hence,M2 is an answer set of P2.
Note that there is a second answer set {p,¬p, q} which is contradictory. According
to the definition of Gelfond and Lifschitz (1991), M2 is thus the only answer set. 
3 Justifications of Consistent Logic Programs
In this section, we review the most prominent approaches for explaining consistent
logic programs under the answer set semantics. All approaches reviewed here, ex-
cept for the formal theory of justifications (Section 3.5.2), aim to provide concise
structures called justifications that provide a somewhat minimal explanation as to
why a literal in question belongs to an answer set.
We start by introducing off-line (Section 3.1; Pontelli et al. 2009; Pontelli and
Son 2006), LABAS (Section 3.2; Schulz and Toni 2016; Schulz and Toni 2013) and
causal justifications (Section 3.3; Cabalar et al. 2014; Cabalar and Fandinno 2016).
In these three approaches, justifications are represented as different kinds of depen-
dency graphs between literals and/or rules. Next, we review why-not provenance
justifications (Section 3.4; Dama´sio et al. 2013), which represent justifications as
propositional formulas instead of graph structures. It is interesting to note that
why-not provenance and causal justifications share a multivalued semantic defini-
tion based on a lattice. Finally, we sketch the main idea of rule-based justifications
(Be´atrix et al. 2016) and the formal theory of justifications (Denecker and De Schr-
eye 1993; Denecker et al. 2015) in Section 3.5.
3.1 Off-line Justifications
Off-line justifications (Pontelli et al. 2009; Pontelli and Son 2006) are graph struc-
tures that describe the reason for the truth value of an atom with respect to a
given answer set. In particular, each off-line justification describes the derivation of
the truth value (that is, true or false) of an atom using the rules in the program.
Each vertex of such a graph represents an atom and each edge the fact that the
two vertices that it joins are related by some rule in the program, with the edge
pointing from the head of the rule to some atom in its body. Atoms that are true
with respect to a given answer set are labelled ‘+’, whereas atoms that are false
with respect to it are labelled ‘−’ (see condition 3 in Definition 1 below). Similarly,
edges labelled ‘+’ represent positive dependencies while those labelled ‘−’ repre-
sent negative ones. This is reflected in conditions 5a (a true atom is supported by
a true atom through a positive dependency and by a false atom through a negative
dependency) and condition 8 of Definition 1 below (a false atom is supported by a
false atom through a positive dependency and by a true atom through a negative
dependency).
Before we technically describe off-line justifications, we need the following no-
tation: for any set of atoms S ⊆ At, the sets of annotated atoms are defined
as Sp def= { a+
∣∣ a ∈ S } and Sn def= { a− ∣∣ a ∈ S }. Furthermore, given
an annotated atom a± (that is, a± = a+ or a± = a−), by atom(a±) = a
we denote the atom associated with a±. Given a set of annotated atoms S , by
atoms(S ) def= { atom(a±)
∣∣ a± ∈ S }, we denote the set of atoms associated with
the annotated atoms in S .
Definition 1 (Off-line Explanation Graph)
Let P be a normal logic program, let M ,U ⊆ At be two sets of atoms, and let
a± ∈ (Atp ∪Atn) be an annotated atom6. An off-line explanation graph of a±
w.r.t. P , M and U is a labelled, directed graph G = 〈V ,E 〉 with a set of ver-
tices V ⊆ (Atp ∪Atn ∪ {assume,⊤,⊥}) and a set of edges E ⊆ (V ×V × {+,−}),
which satisfies the following conditions:
1. a± ∈ V and every b ∈ V is reachable from a±,
2. the only sinks in the graph are: assume, ⊤ and ⊥,
3. atoms(V ∩Atp) ⊆ M and atoms(V ∩Atn) ⊆ (M ∪U ),
4. The set of edges E satisfies the following two conditions:
(a) { c
∣∣ (b+, c−,+) ∈ E } ∪ { c ∣∣ (b+, c+,−) ∈ E } = {} and
(b) { c
∣∣ (b−, c+,+) ∈ E } ∪ { c ∣∣ (b−, c+,−) ∈ E } = {},
5. every b+ ∈ V satisfies that there is a rule r ∈ P with head(r) = b s.t.
(a) body(r) = { c
∣∣ (b+, c+,+) ∈ E } ∪ { not c ∣∣ (b+, c−,−) ∈ E }, or
(b) both body(r) = {} and (b+,⊤,+) is the unique edge in E with source b+,
6. every b− ∈ V with b ∈ U satisfies that (b−, assume,−) is the only edge with
source b−,
7. every b− ∈ V with b /∈ U and no rule r ∈ P with head(r) = b satisfies that
(b−,⊥,+) is the only edge with source b−,
8. every b− ∈ V with b /∈ U and some rule r ∈ P with head(r) = b satisfies that
S = { c
∣∣ (b−, c−,+) ∈ E }∪{ not c ∣∣ (b−, c+,−) ∈ E } is a minimal set of liter-
als such that every rule r ′ ∈ P with head(r ′) = b satisfies body(r ′) ∩ S 6= {}. 
Intuitively, M represents some answer set and U represents a set of assumptions
with respect to M . These assumptions derive from the inherent ‘guessing’ process
involved in the definition and algorithmic construction of answer sets. In this sense,
6 Off-line justifications were defined without using explicit negation, so we here stick to logic
programs without explicit negation. However, it is easy to see that they can be applied to
extended logic program by replacing At by Atext.
p+ q−
q−
assume assume
−
−
−
Fig. 1: Off-line justifications of p+ and q− w.r.t. M3 = {p} in Example 4. The
assumption is {q}.
the truth value of assumed atoms has no further justification while non-assumed
atoms must be justified by the rules of the program. This is reflected in condition 6
of Definition 1. Note also that this condition ensures that true elements are not
treated as assumptions, which follows from the intuition that any true atom in
an answer set must be justified. Condition 4 ensures that a labelled atom is not
supported by the wrong type of relation.
The following example illustrates how assumptions are used to justify atoms that
are false w.r.t. an answer set in question.
Example 4
Let P3 be the program containing the following two rules:
p ← not q q ← not p
Program P3 has two answer sets, namely M3 = {p} and M4 = {q}. Figure 1 depicts
the off-line explanation graphs justifying the truth of p (annotated atom p+) and
the falsity of q (annotated atom q−) with respect to the program P3, the answer
set M3 and the set of assumptions {q}. Note that the falsity of q is assumed in both
justifications. 
To ensure that the set of assumptions is meaningful with respect to the answer
set being explained, it needs to be restricted. In particular, it will be restricted
to a subset of atoms that are false w.r.t. the answer set and undefined w.r.t. the
well-founded model. As mentioned above, assumptions are restricted to be false
atoms to follow the intuition that any true atom in an answer set must be justified.
Restricting the set of assumptions further to only those that are undefined w.r.t.
the well-founded model ensures that false atoms that are also false w.r.t. to the
well-founded model are justified by the constructive process of the well-founded
model rather than being assumed. The following notation is needed to achieve this
restriction:
Definition 2
Given a normal program P , by NANT(P) def= { b ∈ At
∣∣ ∃r ∈ P s.t. b ∈ body−(r) },
we denote the set of atoms that occur negated in P . 
Definition 3 (Negative Reduct)
Given a normal program P , by NR(P ,U ) def= { r ∈ P
∣∣ head(r) /∈ U }, we denote
the negative reduct of P w.r.t. some set of atoms U ⊆ At. 
p+
q+
+ +
q+
p+
+ +
Fig. 2: Off-line explanation graphs of p+ and q+ w.r.t. {}, which are not off-line
justifications.
Definition 4 (Assumptions)
Let P be a normal program and M an answer set of P . Let us denote by
TAP(M )
def= { a ∈ NANT(P)
∣∣ a ∈ M and a /∈ (WF+P ∪WF−P ) }
the tentative assumptions of P w.r.t. M . Then, an assumption w.r.t M is a set of
atoms U ⊆ TAP(M ) such thatWF
+
NR(P,U ) = M . The set of all possible assumptions
of P w.r.t. M is denoted by Assumptions(P ,M ). 
An interesting observation to make is that TAP(M ) is always an element of the
set Assumptions(P ,M ) and, therefore, the latter is never empty. Intuitively, an
assumption is a set of atoms that are false w.r.t. the considered answer set and
that, when ‘forced to be false’ in the program, produces a complete well-founded
model that coincides with this answer set. The negative reduct (see Definition 3),
removing all rules whose head belongs to the assumption, can be interpreted as
‘forcing atoms to be false’ since it results in all atoms in the assumption being false
in the well-founded model. Then, since the computation of the well-founded model
is deterministic, no guessing is necessary. Justifications relative to the well-founded
model can thus be used for the explanation w.r.t. an answer set by adding edges
that point out which atoms in the assumption were used to obtain the answer set.
This is formalised as follows:
Definition 5 (Off-line Justification)
Let P be a normal program, M an answer set of P , U ∈ Assumptions(P ,M )
an assumption w.r.t M and P , and a± ∈ (Atp ∪ Atn) an annotated atom. Then,
an off-line justification of a± w.r.t. P , M and U is an off-line explanation graph
w.r.t. P , M and U (Definition 1), which satisfies that for all b ∈ At, (b+, b+) does
not belong to the transitive closure of { (c, e)
∣∣ (c, e,+) ∈ E }. 
The last condition of Definition 5 ensures that true atoms are not justified through
positive cycles, thus ensuring that justifications of true atoms are rooted in some
rule without positive body, that is, either facts or rules whose body is a conjunction
of negative literals. We may also interpret the latter type of rules as a kind of ‘facts
by default’.
Example 5
Let P4 be the program containing the following two rules:
p ← q q ← p
It has a unique answer set that coincides with its complete well-founded model:
M5 = WF
+
P4
= {}. Figure 2 depicts two cyclic off-line explanation graphs of p+
and q+, which, as can be expected, are not off-line justifications since p and q
are false w.r.t. M5 and since positive cycles are allowed in explanation graphs,
but not in off-line justifications. Figure 3 depicts two cyclic off-line justifications
p−
q−
+ +
q−
p−
+ +
Fig. 3: Off-line justifications of p− and q− w.r.t. M5 = {} and assumption {}.
explaining that p and q are false w.r.t. M5 because they positively depend on each
other. Note that cycles between negatively annotated atoms are allowed in off-line
justifications. 
The following example illustrates how off-line justifications are built for a more
complex program that has a complete well-founded model, in which case the unique
assumption is the empty set. Example 4 is continued later, in Example 8, where
it is shown that the off-line explanation graphs in Figure 1 are in fact off-line
justifications. Note that the program discussed in Example 4 has a non-complete
well-founded model and, thus, some atoms will need to be assumed to build the
off-line justifications.
Example 6
Let P5 be the program consisting of the following rules:
p ← q q ← r ∧ s r ← not t s
This program has a unique answer set M6 = {p, q , r , s}, which coincides with
its complete well-founded model. As a result, we have an empty set of tentative
assumptions TAP5(M6) = {} and the empty set as the only valid assumption, that
is, Assumptions(P5,M6) = {{}}. Figure 4a depicts the unique off-line justification
of p+ w.r.t. program P5 and answer set M6. Intuitively, the edge (t
−,⊥,+) points
out that t is false because there is no rule in P5 with t in the head. Then, as a
consequence of the closed world assumption, t is considered to be false. Similarly,
edge (s+,⊤,+) indicates that s is true because it is a fact. Edge (p+, q+,+) (resp.
(r+, t−,−)) indicates that p (resp. r) is true because it positively (resp. negatively)
depends on q (resp. t) which is true (resp. false). Finally, edges (q+, r+,+) and
(q+, s+,+) together point out that q is true because it positively depends on both
r and s, which are true. It is also worth noting that the subgraphs of this off-line
justification rooted in q+, r+ and s+ constitute the off-line justifications of q , r
and s being true w.r.t. P5 and M6. Similarly, the subgraph rooted in t
− represents
the off-line justification for the atom t being false. 
In the above example, there is a unique off-line justification for each true or false
atom. The following examples show that several justifications may exist for a given
atom w.r.t. a given answer set.
p+
q+
r+ s+
t−
⊥ ⊤
+
+ +
−
+
+
(a)
p+
q+
r+ s+
t−
⊥
+
+ +
−
+
−
(b)
Fig. 4: Off-line justifications of p+ w.r.t. P6, M6, and assumption {}. Figure 4a is
also an off-line justification w.r.t. P5, M6, and {} (see Examples 6 and 7).
Example 7 (Ex. 6 continued)
Let P6 be the result of adding rule s ← not t to program P5. It is easy to check
that M6 is also the unique answer set of P6 (and {} the unique assumption), but
now there is a second way to justify the truth of s, namely in terms of the falsity
of t . As a result, there are two off-line justification of p+, respectively depicted in
Figures 4a and 4b. 
Example 8 (Ex. 4 continued)
In contrast to P5 and P6, program P3 does not have a complete well-founded model.
In fact, its well-founded model leaves all atoms undefined. Thus, q ∈ NANT(P3)
implies that TAP3(M3) = {q} which, in turn, implies Assumptions(P3,M3) ={
{q}
}
. Note that {} is not a valid assumption because the well-founded model
of NR(P , {}) is not complete. Then, since there is no cycle in Figure 1, it follows
that these two off-line explanation graphs are also off-line justifications. Note that
edge (q−, assume,−) captures that atom q is false because of the inherent guessing
involved in the definition of answer sets. 
In Example 5, we already illustrated the difference between off-line explanation
graphs and off-line justifications. The following example shows this difference in a
program without cycles.
Example 9
Let P7 be the program containing the single rule p ← not q . Program P7 has a
complete well-founded model, which consequently coincides with the unique answer
set: M7 = WF
+
P7
= {p}. As in Example 4, it easy to see that graphs depicted in
Figure 1 (also depicted in Figure 5a to ease the comparison) are off-line explanation
graphs of p+ and q− with respect to the program P7, the answer set M7 and the
assumption {q}. Moreover, since the well-founded model is complete, there are no
tentative assumptions, that is, TAP7(M7) = {} and Assumptions(P7,M7) =
{
{}
}
.
p+ q−
q−
assume assume
−
−
−
(a)
p+ q−
q−
⊥ ⊥
−
−
−
(b)
Fig. 5: Off-line justifications of p+ and q− w.r.t. M3 = M7 = {p} in Examples 4
and 9, respectively. Note that the assumption is respectively {q} and {} in subfig-
ures 5a and in 5b.
Therefore, the off-line explanation graphs in Figure 5a are not valid off-line justi-
fications. Figure 5b depicts the off-line justifications of p+ and q− with respect to
program P7, the answer set M7 and the assumption {}. Note that, since there is no
rule with q in the head, the falsity of q can be justified without assumptions. 
By adding the rule q ← not p to program P7 (Example 9) we create an even-
length negative dependency cycle, that is, not only p is dependent on q being false,
but also q is dependent on p being false (note that this is exactly program P3 from
Example 4). This has the effect of replacing the edge (q−,⊥,−) by (q−, assume,−)
in the off-line justifications of p+ and q− (see Figure 5). In other words, rather than
q being false by default, it is now assumed to be false w.r.t. the answer set {p}.
As shown by the following example this change from default to assuming is not
always the case when creating an even-length negative dependency cycle: for some
programs, this may have the effect of introducing additional justifications.
Example 10
Let P8 be the program
p ← not q r ← not p s ← not r
As in Example 9, this program has a complete well-founded model and, thus, a
unique answer set that coincides with the well-founded model:M8 = WF
+
P8
= {p, s}.
Then, we have that TAP8(M8) = {} and Assumptions(P8,M8) =
{
{}
}
. Figure 6a
depicts the unique off-line justification of s+ with respect to program P8, the answer
set M8 and assumption {}. Let now P9 = P8 ∪{q ← not p}. As in Example 4, this
program also has two answer sets, namely M9 = {p, s} and M10 = {q , r}, and an
empty well-founded model WF+P9 = WF
−
P9
= {}. Then, it follows that TAP9(M9) =
{q , r} and Assumptions(P9,M9) =
{
{q}, {q , r}
}
. Figures 6b and 6c depict the
two off-line justifications of s+ with respect to program P9, M9 and assumptions
{q} and {q , r}, respectively. As opposed to what happens in Example 9, adding the
rule q ← not p, and thus creating an even-length negative dependency cycle, not
only has the effect of replacing the edge (q−,⊥,−) by (q−, assume,−), but it also
produces a second off-line justification in which r− is assumed (Figure 6c). This
difference disappears if we only take into account off-line justifications with respect
to ⊆-minimal assumptions, in which case only Figures 6b would be a justification. 
s+
r−
p+
q−
⊥
−
−
−
−
(a)
s+
r−
p+
q−
assume
−
−
−
−
(b)
s+
r−
assume
−
−
(c)
Fig. 6: Off-line justifications of s+ w.r.t. M8 = M9 = {p, s} and the assumption {}
(Subfigure 6a), {q} (Subfigure 6b), and {q , r} (Subfigure 6c) in Example 10.
r+
p−
q−
⊥
−
+
+
(a)
r+
p−
− −
(b)
Fig. 7: Off-line justifications of r+ w.r.t. M11 = {r} and assumption {} in Exam-
ple 11.
As mentioned above, the last condition of Definition 5 ensures that true atoms are
not justified through positive cycles (those in which all edges are labelled ‘+’). Still,
there exist off-line justifications in which true atoms are justified by (non-positive)
cycles, as illustrated by the following example.
Example 11
Let P10 be the program containing the following two rules:
p ← q ∧ not r r ← not p
This program has a complete well-founded model, which coincides with its unique
answer set WF+P10 = M11 = {r}. Then, Assumptions(P10,M11) =
{
{}
}
. Figure 7
depicts the two off-line justifications of r+ with respect to program P10, the answer
set M11 and the assumption {}. 
Though at first sight, cyclic justifications (like the one in Figure 7) may seem to
contradict the intuition that the justifications of true atoms must be rooted in a
rule without positive body (facts or rules whose body is a conjunction of negative
literals), we note that the existence of an acyclic off-line justification (Figure 7a) in
Example 11 is not accidental. In fact, for every true atom, there always exists at
least one acyclic justification (Pontelli and Son 2006, Proposition 2).
3.2 LABAS Justifications
LABAS justifications (Schulz and Toni 2016; Schulz and Toni 2013) explain the
truth value of an extended literal with respect to a given answer set of an extended
normal logic program.7 They have been implemented in an online platform called
LABAS Justifier.8 In contrast to off-line justifications, where every rule applica-
tion step used to derive a literal is included in a justification, LABAS justifications
abstract away from intermediate rule applications in the derivation, only pointing
out the literal in question and the facts and negative literals occurring in rules used
in the derivation. In addition, the truth of negative literals not l is not taken for
granted or assumed, but is further explained in terms of the truth value of the
respective positive literal l .
LABAS justifications have an argumentative flavour as they are constructed from
trees of conflicting arguments.9
Definition 6 (Argument)
Given an extended logic program P , an argument for l ∈ Litext is a finite tree,
where every node holds a literal in Litext, such that
• the root node holds l ;
• for every node N
— if N is a leaf then N holds either a negative literal or a fact;
— if N is not a leaf and N holds the positive literal h, then there is a rule
h ← b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn ∧ not c1 ∧ . . . not cm in P and N has n + m children,
holding b1, . . . , bn , not c1, . . . not cm respectively;
• AP is the set of all negative literals held by leaves;
• FP is the set of all facts held by leaves.
An argument is denoted A : (AP ,FP) ⊢ l , where A is a unique name, AP is the
set of assumption premises, FP the set of fact premises, and l the conclusion. 
Intuitively, an argument is a derivation where each rule is used and where only
negative literals and facts are recorded. Note however, that arguments are not
necessarily minimal derivations and that they allow the repeated application of a
rule.
7 For simplicity, we use the term ‘literal’ instead of ‘extended literal’ throughout this section.
8 http://labas-justification.herokuapp.com/
9 Schulz and Toni (2016) define arguments and attack trees with respect to the translation of a
logic program into an Assumption-Based Argumentation (ABA) framework (Dung et al. 2009).
For simplicity, we here reformulate these definitions with respect to a logic program. Due to the
semantic correspondence between logic programs and their translation into ABA frameworks
(Schulz and Toni 2016; Schulz and Toni 2015), these definitions are equivalent to the original
ones.
pq not r
(a) Argument A1
p
q not r
q
(b) Argument A2
p
q not r
q
...
q
(c) Argument An
Fig. 8: Different arguments with conclusion p.
Example 12
Let P11 be the following logic program:
p ← q ∧ not r q ← q q
There are infinitely many arguments for p (and q) since the second rule can be used
infinitely many times before using the fact q . Figure 8a illustrates the argument A1
where the second rule is not used at all, Figure 8b illustrates the argument A2
where the second rule is used once, and Figure 8c illustrates arguments where the
second rule is applied various times (indicated by the dots). Note that all arguments
with conclusion p differ in their name and their tree representation, but they are
all denoted ({not r}, q) ⊢ p in the shorthand notation. 
An argument for a literal only exists if all literals in the rules used in the derivation
have an argument themselves. That is, for a logic program with only one rule
p ← q , there is no argument for either p or q (q is neither a negative literal nor a
fact, so it cannot be the leaf of an argument tree).
If the conclusion of an argument is a positive literal l then it attacks every
argument that has not l in its assumption premises. In other words, a derivation
for l provides a reason against any derivation using not l .
Definition 7 (Attack)
An argument (AP1,FP1) ⊢ l1 attacks an argument (AP2,FP2) ⊢ l2 iff l1 is a positive
literal and not l1 ∈ AP2. 
Note that attacks do not arise due to the existence of an atom a and its contrary
¬a in two arguments.
Example 13 (Ex. 4 continued, page 9)
Four arguments can be constructed from P3:
A1 : ({not p}, {}) ⊢ not p A3 : ({not p}, {}) ⊢ q
A2 : ({not q}, {}) ⊢ not q A4 : ({not q}, {}) ⊢ p
A3 attacks A2 and A4 since its conclusion q is the complement of the assumption
premise not q in the two attacked arguments. Similarly, A4 attacks A1 and A3. 
3.2.1 Attack Trees
LABAS justifications are constructed from trees of attacking arguments.
Definition 8 (Attack Tree)
Given an extended program P , an attack tree of an argument A : (AP ,FP) ⊢ l
w.r.t. an answer set M of P , denoted attTreeM (A), is a (possibly infinite) tree such
that:
1. Every node in attTreeM (A) holds an argument, labelled '+' or '−'.
2. The root node is A+ if ∀not l ′ ∈ AP : l ′ /∈ M , or A− otherwise.
3. For every node B+ and for every argument C attacking argument B , there
exists a child node C− of B+.
4. Every node B− has exactly one child node C+ for some argument
C : (APC ,FPC ) ⊢ lC attacking argument B and satisfying that ∀not l
′ ∈ APC ,
l ′ /∈ M .
5. There are no other nodes in attTreeM (A) except those given in 1-4. 
The intuition for labelling arguments in an attack tree is as follows: If an argument
A is based on some negative literal not l (i.e. it has not l as an assumption premise)
such that l ∈ M , then some rule used to construct A is not applicable w.r.t. M
(namely the rule in which not l occurs), so argument A does not warrant that its
conclusion is in M . Therefore, argument A is labelled '−'. Otherwise, all rules used
to construct A are applicable, so the conclusion of argument A is in M . Thus,
argument A is labelled '+'.
Example 14 (Ex. 13 continued)
The unique attack trees of A3 and A4 w.r.t. M3 = {p} are displayed in Figure 9a
and 9b, respectively. When inverting all '+' and '−' labels in the trees, the attack
trees w.r.t. M4 = {q} are obtained. 
An attack tree is thus made of layers of arguments for literals that are alternately
true and false w.r.t. the answer set M . Note the difference in Definition 8 between
arguments labelled '+', which have all attackers as child nodes, and arguments
labelled '−', which have only one attacker as a child node. This is in line with the
definition of answer sets. To prove that a literal l is in M , all negative literals not l ′
used in its derivation (i.e. in the argument B in condition 3) need to be true, so for
all l ′ there must not be a derivation that concludes that l ′ is true. Thus, all such
derivations for l ′ (i.e. all arguments C attacking B in condition 3) are explained
in an attack tree. In contrast, to prove that a derivation of a literal l (argument
B in condition 4) does not lead to l being true w.r.t. M , it is sufficient that one
negative literal not l ′ used in this derivation is false, i.e. l ′ is in M , so there exists
some derivation for l ′ (argument C in condition 4) that warrants that l ′ is true
w.r.t. M .
A−3 : ({not p}, {}) ⊢ q
A+4 : ({not q}, {}) ⊢ p
A−3 : ({not p}, {}) ⊢ q
A+4 : ({not q}, {}) ⊢ p
...
(a)
A+4 : ({not q}, {}) ⊢ p
A−3 : ({not p}, {}) ⊢ q
A+4 : ({not q}, {}) ⊢ p
A−3 : ({not p}, {}) ⊢ q
...
(b)
Fig. 9: Attack trees of arguments A3 and A4 w.r.t. M3 of P3.
Example 15
Let P12 be the following logic program:
p ← not q ∧ not r q ← not s s
r ← s ∧ not p r ← not s
Program P12 has two answer sets, namely M12 = {s, p} and M13 = {s, r}. The
argument A1 : ({not q , not r}, {}) ⊢ p has one attack tree w.r.t. M12 and one
w.r.t. M13, depicted in Figures 10a and 10b, respectively. Note that in the attack
tree of A1 w.r.t. M13, A2 and A4 cannot be chosen as the child nodes of A1, even
though they attack A1, since they both have not s as an assumption premise, where
s is contained in the answer set M13 (they thus violate condition 4 in Definition 8).
These arguments thus do not provide explanations as to why r is true w.r.t. M13
and consequently cannot be used to explain why p is false. 
Attack trees are not only used to construct LABAS justifications, as explained
in the following, but in fact constitute justifications of literals in their own right.
Definition 9 (Attack Tree Justification)
Let M be an answer set of an extended program P , l ∈ Litext, and A an argument
with conclusion l .
• If l is true w.r.t. M , then an attTreeM (A) is a justification of l if the root node
is A+.
• If l is false w.r.t. M , then an attTreeM (A) is a justification of l if the root node
is A−. 
In fact, in the second case any attack tree for an argument with conclusion l
will have its root node labelled '−' (Schulz and Toni 2016, from Theorem 3 and
Lemma 5).
Attack trees justify literals in terms of dependencies between arguments. Next,
we explain how dependencies between literals are extracted from attack trees to
construct a justification in terms of literals.
A+1 : ({not q , not r}, {}) ⊢ p
A−2 : ({not s}, {}) ⊢ q A
−
3 : ({not p}, {s}) ⊢ r A
−
4 : ({not s}, {}) ⊢ r
A+5 : ({}, {s}) ⊢ s A
+
1 : ({not q , not r}, {}) ⊢ p A
+
5 : ({}, {s}) ⊢ s
...
(a)
A−1 : ({not q , not r}, {}) ⊢ p
A+3 : ({not p}, {s}) ⊢ r
A−1 : ({not q , not r}, {}) ⊢ p
...
(b)
Fig. 10: Attack trees of argument A1 w.r.t. M12 and M13.
3.2.2 Constructing LABAS Justifications
Labelled ABA-Based Answer Set Justifications (“ABA” stands for “Assumption-
Based Argumentation”), short LABAS justifications, are constructed from attack
trees by extracting the relations between literals in arguments. That is, literals
occurring as assumption or fact premises in an argument of the attack tree are
supporting the conclusion literal, whereas the conclusion l of an attacking argument
attacks the negative literal not l occurring as an assumption premise of the attacked
argument.
As a first step of the LABAS justification construction, an attack tree is trans-
formed into a labelled justification. A labelled justification is a set of labelled rela-
tions between literals, which can thus be represented as a graph. Each literal in a
relation is labelled as '+', meaning that it is true w.r.t. the answer set in question,
or '−', meaning that it is false w.r.t. the answer set in question. Support and attack
relations are labelled the same as the respective source literals of the relation. The
label '+' represents that the source label is able to effectively attack or support the
target literal, whereas '−' represents an ineffective relation. In addition, a literal
is labelled with fact or asm if it is a fact or assumption premise, or else with its
argument’s name.
Definition 10 (Labelled Justification)
Let M be an answer set of an extended program P , A an argument and Υ =
attTreeM (A) an attack tree of A w.r.t.M . For any node B
+/− in Υ, children(B+/−)
denotes the set of child nodes of B+/− and conc(B+/−) the conclusion of argu-
ment B . The labelled justification of Υ, denoted just(Υ), is obtained as follows:
just(Υ) def=⋃
B+:(AP,FP)⊢l in Υ
{supp rel+(not p+asm , l
+
B ) | not p ∈ AP\{l}} ∪
{supp rel+(f +fact , l
+
B ) | f ∈ FP\{l}} ∪
{att rel−(k−C , not k
+
asm) | C
− ∈ children(B+), conc(C−) = k} ∪
⋃
B−:(AP,FP)⊢l in Υ
{supp rel−(not p−asm , l
−
B ) | not p ∈ AP\{l}, children(B
−) = {C+},
conc(C+) = p} ∪
{att rel+(f +fact , not f
−
asm) | children(B
−) = {C+ : ({}, {f }) ⊢ f }} ∪
{att rel+(k+B , not k
−
asm) | children(B
−) = {C+ : (APC ,FPC ) ⊢ k},
APC 6= {} or FPC 6= {k}} 
Note that a labelled justification does not extract all relations from an attack
tree but only those deemed relevant for justifying the conclusion of argument A.
For example, for an argument B− in the attack tree, only one negative literal is
extracted as supporting the conclusion, namely the one that is attacked by the child
node C+ of B−, since this negative literal provides the reason that the conclusion
of B is not in the answer set.
Infinite attack trees, as for example shown in Figures 9a and 9b, may be repre-
sented by finite LABAS justifications as re-occurring arguments in an attack tree
are only processed once (note that justifications are sets).
Example 16 (Ex. 14 continued)
Since the two attack trees attTreeM3(A3) and attTreeM3(A4) (Figures 9a and 9b)
comprise the same nodes, their labelled justifications are the same, namely:
{supp rel−(not p−asm , q
−
A3
), att rel+(p+A4 , not p
−
asm),
supp rel+(not q+asm , p
+
A4
), att rel−(q−A3 , not q
+
asm)} 
As illustrated by Example 16, it is not obvious from a labelled justification,
which literal is being justified. A LABAS justification thus adds the literal being
justified to labelled justifications. It furthermore defines a justification in terms of
one labelled justification if a literal contained in the answer set is justified and
in terms of all labelled justifications if a literal not contained in the answer set is
justified. This is based on the idea that if a literal can be successfully derived in
one way, it is in the answer set, but that it is not in the answer set only if all ways
of deriving the literal are unsuccessful.
Definition 11 (LABAS Justification)
Let M be an answer set of an extended program P and l ∈ Litext.
1. Let l be true w.r.t. M , let A : (AP ,FP) ⊢ l be an argument, and attTreeM (A)
an attack tree with root node A+. Let lab(l) def= l+asm if l is a negative literal,
lab(l) def= l+fact if FP = {l} and AP = {}, and lab(l) = l
+
A else. A (positive)
LABAS justification of l with respect to M is:
justLABAS+M (l)
def= {lab(l)} ∪ just(attTreeM (A)).
2. Let l be false w.r.t. M , let A1, . . . ,An be all arguments with conclusion l , and
Υ11, . . . ,Υ1m1 , . . . ,Υn1, . . . ,Υnmn all attack trees of A1, . . . ,An with root node
labelled '−'.
(a) If n = 0, then the (negative) LABAS justification of l with respect to M is:
justLABAS−M (l)
def= {}
(b) If n > 0, then let lab(l1)
def= l−asm , . . . , lab(ln)
def= l−asm if l is a negative literal
and lab(l1)
def= l−A1 , . . . , lab(ln)
def= l−An else. Then the (negative) LABAS
justification of l with respect to M is:
justLABAS−M (l)
def= {{lab(l1)} ∪ just(Υ11), . . . , {lab(ln)} ∪ just(Υnmn )}. 
Note that there may be various LABAS justifications of a literal that is true w.r.t.
the answer setM , but only one LABAS justification of a literal that is false w.r.t.M .
Example 17 (Ex. 16 continued)
Since there exists only one argument with conclusion q /∈ M3, namely A3, and since
this argument has a unique attack tree attTreeM3(A3), only the labelled justification
from Example 16 has to be taken into account for the LABAS justification of q
w.r.t. M3. That is,
justLABAS−M3(q) = {{q
−
A3
, supp rel−(not p−asm , q
−
A3
), att rel+(p+A4 , not p
−
asm),
supp rel+(not q+asm , p
+
A4
), att rel−(q−A3 , not q
+
asm)}}
Similarly, the only LABAS justification of p w.r.t. M3 is
justLABAS+M3(p) = {p
−
A4
, supp rel−(not p−asm , q
−
A3
), att rel+(p+A4 , not p
−
asm),
supp rel+(not q+asm , p
+
A4
), att rel−(q−A3 , not q
+
asm)}
Note that the first is a set of sets, whereas the second is a simple set. 
LABAS justifications can be represented as directed graphs, where the justified
literal is depicted as the top node of the graph, and all literals occurring in a
relation as the other nodes. Support and attack relations form two different arcs:
here, dashed arcs represent support, whereas solid arcs represent attack. Both types
of arcs are labelled according to the label in the LABAS justification.
Example 18 (Ex. 17 continued)
The graphical representations of the LABAS justifications in Example 17 are re-
spectively illustrated in Figures 11a and 11b. Unsurprisingly, they have the same
nodes and arcs. However, the respective orientation of the graph indicates the lit-
eral being justified. Note the difference between the LABAS justification graphs
and the off-line justifications in Figure 1. In particular, the LABAS justification
q−A3
not p−asm
p+A4
not q+asm
+
−
+
−
(a)
p+A4
not q+asm
q−A3
not p−asm
+
−
+
−
(b)
Fig. 11: LABAS justifications of q and p w.r.t. M3: dashed arcs represent support,
whereas solid arcs represent attack.
graphs explain the truth values of non-fact positive literals in terms of negative
literals needed to derive the positive literal. Furthermore, the truth values of neg-
ative literals, which do not occur in off-line justifications at all, are explained in
terms of their complement’s truth value. Also note that q being false w.r.t. M3 is
explained as a truth value being assumed in the off-line justifications, whereas its
truth value is further explained in terms of the ineffective support by not p in the
LABAS justifications. 
Example 19 (Ex. 15 continued)
Figures 12a and 12b illustrate the LABAS justifications of p w.r.t. M12 and M13 of
P12 (see Example 15). The first demonstrates the importance of labelling literals
by their arguments for distinction. If these labels did not exist, r−A3 and r
−
A4
would
collapse into one node r−. The resulting graph would give the impression that
there is only one derivation for r , which uses both not p and not s. In contrast, the
distinction achieved by labelling literals with their argument names (Figure 12a),
expresses that there are two derivations for r , one using not p and one using not s.
Note that off-line justifications use a non-labelling strategy, leading to the previously
explained collapse of the two nodes holding atom r , as shown in Figures 13a and 13b.
Figure 12a, and in particular node r−A3 , furthermore shows that for nodes labelled
'−' in an attack tree, fact premises are not included in the LABAS justification (A3
has a fact premise s). In contrast, Figure 12b, and in particular node r+A3 , shows
that for nodes labelled '+' in an attack tree, all assumption and fact premises are
included in a LABAS justification. Furthermore, for nodes labelled '−' only the
assumption premise that is attacked by the child node is included (only assumption
premise not r of p is included and assumption premise not q is neglected). 
Comparing the LABAS justification in Figure 12a and the off-line justification
in Figure 13b, we observe various similarities: Deleting the nodes holding negative
p+A1
not q+asm not r
+
asm
q−A2 r
−
A4
r−A3
not s−asm not p
−
asm
s+fact
+ +
− −−
− −
+
−
+
(a)
p−A1
not r−asm
r+A3
s+fact not p
+
asm
−
+
++
−
(b)
Fig. 12: LABAS justifications of p w.r.t. M12 and M13.
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s+
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Fig. 13: Off-line justifications of p w.r.t. M12.
literals in the LABAS justification and collapsing the two nodes of atom r results
in the same nodes as in the off-line justification. Note that this is because all
derivations of atoms are “one-step” derivations, i.e. there is no chaining of rules
involved. If the derivation of some atom involved the chaining of various rules,
the off-line justification would include more nodes than the LABAS justification,
even if nodes holding negative literals were deleted (see for example Figures 17a
and 17b). Furthermore, ‘rerouting’ the attack edges in the LABAS justification
from the attacked negative literal to the atom supported by this negative literal
(e.g. ‘rerouting’ the attacking edge from p+ to not p instead to atom r , which is
supported by not p) and then reverting them results, in this example, in the same
edges as in the off-line justification. Note however that the labelling of edges is
different in LABAS and off-line justifications.
The following examples point out some further differences between LABAS and
off-line justifications. In particular, LABAS justifications do not explicitly contain
information about all rules applied in a derivation and there is no LABAS justi-
fication for literals that have no argument, i.e. literals that cannot be successfully
derived.
Example 20 (Ex. 7 continued, page 12)
Figures 14a and 14b show the LABAS justifications of p w.r.t. M6 of P6. The
p+A1
not t+asm s
+
fact
+ +
(a)
p+A2
not t+asm
+
(b)
Fig. 14: The two LABAS justifications of p w.r.t. M6 of P6.
difference between the two derivations of p is not as explicit as in the off-line
justifications illustrated in Figures 4a and 4b (page 12). It is merely indicated by
the different argument labels of p. 
Example 21 (Ex. 11 continued, page 14)
There are two off-line justifications of r w.r.t. P10 and M11 (see Figures 7a and 7b
on page 14). In contrast, there is only one LABAS justification of r , shown in
Figure 15. The reason is that there is no argument with conclusion p, since no
rule with head p exists. Thus, not p is not further explained as there is no way to
prove p. 
As previously pointed out, infinite attack trees may be represented by finite
LABAS justifications. However, this is only the case if the infinity is due to the
repetition of the same arguments. Instead, if the infinity is due to the existence of
infinitely many arguments with the same conclusion, a LABAS justification may
be infinite too.
r+A1
not p+asm
+
Fig. 15: The unique LABAS justification of r w.r.t. M11 of P10.
A+p1 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p
A−q1 : ({not p}, {r}) ⊢ q A
−
q2 : ({not p}, {r}) ⊢ q
. . .
A+p1 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p A
+
p1 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p
...
...
(a)
p+Ap1
not q+asm r
+
fact
. . . q−Aq2
q−Aq1
not p−asm
+ +
−−−
−−−
+
(b)
Fig. 16: One of the infinite attack trees and LABAS justifications of p w.r.t. M14
of P13.
Example 22
Let P13 be the following program with answer sets M14 = {p, r} and M15 = {q , r}:
p ← not q ∧ r q ← not p ∧ r r ← r r
Note first that there are infinitely many arguments with conclusion r of the form
Ari : ({}, {r}) ⊢ r , each applying the third rule a different number of times. For the
same reason, there are infinitely many arguments with conclusion p, of the form
Apj : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p, and with conclusion q , of the form Aqk : ({not p}, {r}) ⊢ q .
Since there are infinitely many arguments with conclusion p (resp. q), there are also
infinitely many attack trees explaining p (resp. q) with respect to either of the two
answer sets. Similarly to the attack trees illustrated in Figures 9a and 9b, all attack
trees for p and q are infinite in depth. In addition, they are infinite in breadth
since any of the Apj attacks every Aqk and vice versa. This means that whenever
an argument for p (resp. q) is labelled '+' in an attack tree, all infinitely many
arguments with conclusion q (resp. p) are child nodes labelled '−'. Figure 16a
illustrates an attack tree of one of the arguments with conclusion p w.r.t. M14.
Note that in this particular attack tree, the argument A+p1 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p
is re-used to attack all the arguments with conclusion q attacking the root node.
By exchanging any occurrence of A+p1 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p by another argument
with conclusion p, e.g. A+p2 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p, a different (infinite) attack tree
explaining p is obtained. We observe that any of these attack trees yields an infinite
LABAS justification. For example, the attack tree from Figure 16a results in a
LABAS justification with infinitely many relations of the form att rel−(q−Aqk
, p+Apj
)
relations. Assuming that the only argument with conclusion p used in the attack tree
in Figure 16a is A+p1 : ({not q}, {r}) ⊢ p, we obtain the infinite LABAS justification
in Figure 16b. 
This behaviour of infinity is dealt with in the LABAS Justifier by disallowing
the repeated application of a rule when constructing an argument (Schulz 2017).
In Example 22, the LABAS Justifier thus only constructs two different arguments
for p and q .
3.3 Causal Graph Justifications
In contrast to the two previously discussed approaches (off-line and LABAS jus-
tifications), whose main purpose is to explain why a literal is (not) contained in
an answer set, the approach outlined in this section – called causal graph justifica-
tions (Cabalar et al. 2014; Cabalar and Fandinno 2016) – is a reasoning formalism
in its own right, which can additionally be used to explain why a literal is con-
tained in an answer set: the main goal of the causal justification approach is to
formalise and reason with causal knowledge, so that sentences like “whoever causes
the death of somebody else will be imprisoned” can be represented in an elaboration
tolerant10 manner (McCarthy 1998). An online tool providing causal justifications
and allowing this reasoning with causal knowledge (Fandinno 2016a) is available at
http://kr.irlab.org/cgraphs-solver/nmsolver.
The semantics used for causal justifications is a multi-valued extension of the
answer set semantics, where each (true) literal in a model is associated with a set
of causal values expressing causal reasons for its inclusion in the model. Each of
these causal values represents a set of causal justifications, each of which, in turn,
can be depicted as a causal graph. Regarding the causal literature, a causal graph
can be seen as an extension of Lewis’s notion of causal chain: “let c, d , e, . . . be
a finite sequence of actual particular events such that d causally depends on c, e
on d , and so on throughout. Then, this sequence is a causal chain.” (Lewis 1973;
see also Hall 2004 and Hall 2007). The following example illustrates the connection
between causal chains and justifications in ASP.
Example 23
Consider a scenario in which Suzy pulls the trigger of her gun, causing the gunpow-
der to explode. This causes the bullet to leave the gun at a high speed, impacting
10 We recall that a representation is elaboration tolerant if modifications of it can easily be taken
into account.
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Fig. 17: Off-line justification, LABAS justification, causal justification and causal
chain of dead in Example 23.
on Billy’s chest, provoking a massive haemorrhage and, consequently, Billy’s death.
We can model this scenario as the following positive logic program P14:
dead ← haemorrhage (2)
haemorrhage ← impact (3)
impact ← bullet (4)
bullet ← gunpowder (5)
gunpowder ← trigger(suzy) (6)
trigger(suzy) (7)
Then, trigger(suzy) · gunpowder · bullet · impact · haemorrhage · dead is a causal
chain connecting trigger(suzy) with dead. 
This example suggests an intuitive correspondence between causal chains and
the idea of justification. In particular, the causal chain that connects the fact
trigger(suzy) with dead can be written as the graph in Figure 17d. It is easy
to see the correspondence between this graph and the off-line justification of dead,
depicted in Figure 17a. For comparison, Figures 17b and 17c depict the LABAS
justification and the causal graph (which will be defined later) of dead. Recall that
LABAS justifications focus on facts and negative literals, precisely abstracting from
the causal chain, which will be the focus of causal justifications. In contrast, the
causal graph expresses the same information as the causal chain. This is due to the
fact that no atom depends on more than one other atom. More generally, causal
chains coincide with the paths in causal graphs.
In addition to the idealogical differences between causal justifications, which treat
logic programs as causal knowledge, and off-line and LABAS justifications, which
treat logic programs as declarative problem descriptions, causal justifications allow
for causal reasoning, as they are based on a causal extension of the answer set
semantics. More precisely, causal justifications are defined in terms of the causal
value that each causal answer set associates to atoms (causal answer sets assign
causal values instead of truth values to each atom). These causal values form a
completely distributive (complete) lattice that serves as the basis for a multi-valued
extension of the answer set semantics.
Let us introduce causal terms as a suitable syntax to write causal values.
Definition 12 (Causal Term)
Given a set of atoms At and a set of labels Lb, a (causal) term t is recursively
defined as one of the following expressions
t ::= l
∣∣∣
∏
S
∣∣∣
∑
S
∣∣∣ t1 · t2
where l ∈ (Atext ∪ Lb) is an extended atom or a label, t1, t2 are in turn terms, and
S is a (possibly empty and possibly infinite) set of terms. 
When S = {t1, . . . , tn} is a finite set, we write t1 ∗ . . .∗ tn and t1+ . . .+ tn instead
of
∏
S and
∑
S , respectively. The empty sum and empty product are respectively
represented as 0 and 1. We assume that application ‘·’ has higher priority than
product ‘∗’ and, in turn, product ‘∗’ has higher priority than addition ‘+’. Intu-
itively, product ‘∗’ represents conjunction or joint causation, sum ‘+’ represents
alternative causes, and application ‘·’ is a non-commutative product that builds
causal chains by capturing the successive application of rules.
Associativity
t · (u·w) = (t ·u) · w
Absorption
t = t + u · t · w
u · t · w = t ∗ u · t · w
Identity
t = 1 · t
t = t · 1
Annihilator
0 = t · 0
0 = 0 · t
Indempotence
l · l = l
Addition distributivity
t · (u+w) = (t ·u) + (t ·w)
(t + u) · w = (t ·w) + (u·w)
Product distributivity
c · d · e = (c · d) ∗ (d · e) with d 6= 1
c · (d ∗ e) = (c · d) ∗ (c · e)
(c ∗ d) · e = (c · e) ∗ (d · e)
Fig. 18: Properties of the operators: t , u,w are terms, l is a label or an extended
atom and c, d , e are terms without addition ‘+’. Addition and product distributivity
are also satisfied over infinite sums and products. A kind of absorption over infinite
sums and products can also be derived from the finite absorption above and infinite
distributivity.
Definition 13 (Causal Value)
(Causal) values are the equivalence classes of terms under the axioms for a com-
pletely distributive (complete) lattice with meet ‘
∏
’ and join ‘
∑
’ plus the axioms
in Figure 18. The set of values is denoted by VLb. Furthermore, by CLb we denote
the subset of causal values with some representative term without addition ‘
∑
’. 
As an example, the causal value [a] = {a, a ∗ a, a + a, a·a, a ∗ (a + b), . . . } is
the (possibly infinite) set of causal terms that are equivalent to a under the axioms
for a completely distributive lattice with meet ‘
∏
’ and join ‘
∑
’ plus the axioms
in Figure 18. Note that there are no causal terms equivalent to 0 or 1 besides
themselves, that is, [0] = {0} and [1] = {1}. By abuse of notation, we will use any
causal term belonging to a causal value to represent the value, that is, we write a
instead of [a], 0 instead of [0], and so on.
Note that all three operations ‘∗’, ‘+’ and ‘·’ are associative. Product ‘∗’ and
addition ‘+’ are also commutative, and they satisfy the usual absorption and dis-
tributive laws with respect to infinite sums and products of a completely distributive
lattice. As usual, the lattice order relation is defined as:
t ≤ u iff t ∗ u = t iff t + u = u
An immediate consequence of this definition is that the ≤-relation has the product
as greatest lower bound, the addition as least upper bound, 1 as top element and 0
as bottom element. The term 1 represents a value that holds by default, without
an explicit cause, and will be assigned to the empty body. The term 0 represents
the absence of cause or the empty set of causes, and will be assigned to falsity.
Furthermore, applying distributivity (and absorption) of products and applica-
tions over addition, every term can be represented in a (minimal) disjunctive normal
form in which addition is not in the scope of any other operation and every pair
of addends are pairwise ≤-incomparable. As we will see in Example 31, this nor-
mal form emphasises the intuition that addition ‘+’ separates alternative causes.
Moreover, applying product distributivity, this normal form can be further rewrit-
ten into a graph normal form in which the application operator ‘·’ is only applied
to pairs of labels or extended atoms, thus representing the edges of a graph: v ·v ′
with v , v ′ ∈ (Atext ∪ Lb). For instance, applying priority rules, the causal terms
a ∗(((b·c)·e)+d) and ((a ∗((b·c)·e))+(a ∗d) can be rewritten as a ∗(b·c·e+d) and
a ∗ b·c·e + a ∗ d , respectively. Furthermore, it is easy to see that these two terms
represent the same causal value since the former can be rewritten as the latter by
applying distributivity of products over sums. The latter is in disjunctive normal
form and can be further rewritten in graph normal form as a ∗ b·c ∗ c·e + a ∗ d by
applying distributivity of application over products.
Given any causal term without sums c ∈ CLb in graph normal form, we can
associate a graph Gc = 〈V ,E 〉 where V is the set of labels and extended atoms
occurring in c and E contains an edge (v , v ′) for every subterm of the form v ·v ′. By
graph(c) we denote the transitive and reflexive reduction11 of Gc . Given this rela-
tion between application ‘·’ and edges in such graphs it follows that application ‘·’
must be non-commutative. For any causal term in normal form t , by graphs(t) we
denote the set containing a graph graph(c) for each addend c in t .
11 Recall that the transitive and reflexive reduction of a graph G is a graph G′ whose transitive
and reflexive closure is G. A causal graph (see Definition 16), in which every cycle is a reflexive
edge, has a unique transitive and reflexive reduction.
Example 24 (Ex. 23 continued)
The causal chain of Example 23 is in disjunctive normal form (since it does not
contain products nor sums), but not in graph normal form. Using product distribu-
tivity, this causal chain can be rewritten in graph normal form as (trigger(suzy) ·
gunpowder) ∗ (gunpowder · bullet) ∗ (bullet · impact) ∗ (impact · haemorrhage) ∗
(haemorrhage · dead). In this form, every subterm of the form (v ·v ′) corresponds
to an edge in Figure 17d. 
So far, we have introduced causal values, which will be the semantic building
blocks of causal justifications and the associated causal graphs. In the following,
we define how these causal values are assigned to each atom to form causal answer
sets and how causal justifications and graphs are obtained.
3.3.1 Causal Semantics for Programs without Negation-as-Failure
Semantics for logic programs usually assign truth values to atoms. In contrast, for
the causal semantics of logic programs, causal interpretations assign causal values
to atoms. Based on this, causal models and causal answer sets are defined. Causal
justifications are then extracted using the causal value of atoms in a causal answer
set corresponding to a standard answer set.
A (causal) interpretation is a mapping I : Atext −→ VLb assigning a value to
each extended atom and satisfying I (a) = 0 or I (¬a) = 0 for every atom a ∈ At.
By Atoms(I ) def= { a ∈ Atext
∣∣ I (a) 6= 0 } we denote the set of extended atoms in
an interpretation I . For any pair of interpretations I and J , we write I ≤ J to
represent the straightforward causal ordering, that is, I (a) ≤ J (a) for every atom
a ∈ Atext and we write I ⊑ J when either I ≤ J or Atoms(I ) ⊂ Atoms(J ). That
is, I ⊑ J is a weaker partial order, since apart from the cases in which I ≤ J
holds, it also holds when true atoms in I are a strict subset of true atoms in J . As
usual, we write I < J (resp. I ⊏ J ) iff I ≤ J (resp I ⊑ J ) and I 6= J . Note that
Atoms(I ) ⊂ Atoms(J ) implies I 6= J and so I ⊏ J . We say that an interpretation
I is ≤-minimal (resp. ⊑-minimal) satisfying some property when there is no J < I
(resp. J ⊏ I ) satisfying that property. Note that there is a ≤-bottom and ⊑-bottom
interpretation 0 (resp. a ≤-top and ⊑-top interpretation 1) that stands for the
interpretation mapping every extended atom a to the causal value 0 (resp. 1). It is
easy to see that ⊑-minimal models are also ≤-minimal models, though the converse
is not necessarily true, as will be illustrated by Example 30 (see page 33). For
every rule r in the program, we assign a label denoted by label(r). We assume that
label(h) = h for every definite fact h and that label(r) 6= label(r ′) for every pair of
distinct rules r and r ′. We also assume that Lb contains all rule labels.
Definition 14 (Causal Model)
An interpretation I satisfies a positive rule r of the form (1) (with m = 0) iff
(
I (b1) ∗ . . . ∗ I (bn)
)
· ri · hj ≤ I (hj ) (8)
for some atom hj ∈ head(r) and where ri = label(r) is the label associated with
rule r . We say that an interpretation I is a (causal) model of a positive extended
program P , in symbols I |= P , iff I satisfies all rules in P . 
Example 25 (Ex. 23 continued)
Let us assume that rules of P14 are respectively labelled as r1, r2, r3, r4, r5
and trigger(suzy). Then, it is easy to check that the model I of P14 must sat-
isfy
I (trigger(suzy)) ≥ trigger(suzy) · trigger(suzy) = trigger(suzy)
I (gunpowder) ≥ trigger(suzy) · r5 · gunpowder 
Observation 1
If r is a definite fact h, that is, it has the form (h ← ), then label(r) = h and, thus,
I |= r iff I (A) ≥ h·h = h (by idempotence of application on labels). 
Based on the definitions of causal values and models, the causal extension of the
answer set semantics is defined as follows.
Definition 15 (Causal Answer Set without Negation-as-Failure)
Let P be a positive extended program. A model I of P is a causal answer set iff it
is ⊑-minimal among the models of P . 
Example 26 (Ex. 25 continued)
Continuing with our running example, note that there is only one rule with atoms
trigger(suzy) and gunpowder in the head. Then, any ⊑-minimal model I1 of P14
must satisfy equality instead of ≥, that is,
I1(trigger(suzy)) = trigger(suzy) · trigger(suzy) = trigger(suzy)
I1(gunpowder) = trigger(suzy) · r5 · gunpowder
Note that any ⊑-minimal model must also be a ≤-minimal model and, thus, I1(A)
must be equal to the least upper bound of the terms corresponding to all rules with
the atom A in the head. Since here we only have one rule for each atom, this least
upper bound coincides with the value corresponding to that rule. 
Definition 16 (Causal Justification and Causal Graph)
Given a logic program P and an answer set M of P , a term without sums c is a
causal justification of some atom a w.r.t. P and M if there is some causal answer
set I of P such that Atoms(I ) = M and c is an addend in the minimal disjunctive
normal form of I (a). For any causal justification of a w.r.t. P and M , graph(c) is
a causal graph (justification). 
Notation 1
In causal justifications, we will write rai instead of ri ·a when ri ∈ Lb is a rule label
and a ∈ Atext is an extended atom occurring in the head of the rule labelled ri .
Similarly, in causal graphs we write a single vertex rai instead of two vertices ri and
a and an edge connecting them. 
Example 27 (Ex. 26 continued)
Assuming the above notation, we may rewrite the causal value associated with
gunpowder, which is also its unique causal justifications, as I1(gunpowder) =
trigger(suzy) · rgunpowder5 . Similarly, it is also easy to check that
I1(dead) = trigger(suzy) · r
gunpowder
5 · r
bullet
4 · r
impact
3 · r
haemorrhage
2 · r
dead
1
Figure 17c depicts the causal graph associated with the causal justification I1(dead).

Next, we give an example of causal justifications for non-normal programs taken
from (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016):
Example 28
Assume that Harvey throws a coin and only shoots when he gets tails. This scenario
can be modelled as the following logic program P15:
r1 : dead ← shoot (9)
r2 : shoot ← tails (10)
r3 : head ∨ tails ← harvey (11)
harvey (12)
where r1, r2 and r3 represent the labels associated with the corresponding rules.
Then, this logic program has two (standard) answer sets: M16 = {harvey, head}
and M17 = {harvey, tails, shoot, dead}. Similarly, this program also has two causal
answer sets satisfying
I16(harvey) = harvey
I16(head) = harvey·r
head
3
I16(tails) = 0
I16(shoot) = 0
I16(dead) = 0
I17(harvey) = harvey
I17(head) = 0
I17(tails) = harvey·r
tails
3
I17(shoot) = harvey·r
tails
3 ·r
shoot
2
I17(dead) = harvey·r
tails
3 ·r
shoot
2 ·r
dead
1
Here, the I17(dead) represents the causal justification of dead w.r.t. M17 while
I16(dead) = 0 states that there is no causal justifications for dead w.r.t. M16. 
Example 28 illustrates that a causal answer set assigns the value 0 (that is, the
absence of a justification) to an atom iff the atom is false in its corresponding
standard answer set.
It is also worth to note that, for normal logic programs, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between the standard answer sets of a program and their causal
answer sets. For programs with disjunctive rules, there also exists a one-to-one cor-
respondence, but in this case it relates each standard answer set with a class of
causal answer sets that represent the same truth assignments, but different jus-
tifications (see Example 29 below). Furthermore, in the case of disjunctive rules,
the superindex of a disjunctive rule’s label in the causal answer set indicates the
disjunct that has been effectively applied. For instance, in Example 28, term r tails3
points out that the disjunct tails in r3 has been effectively applied. In the case of
normal rules, the superindex is somehow superfluous, as it is fully determined by
the rule, and could easily be omitted as in (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016). Never-
theless, we decide to keep them to ease the comparison with the other justification
approaches, whose vertices are literals.
Example 29
Consider a program P16 consisting of the following rules
r1 : a ∨ b ← r2 : a ← b r3 : b ← a
which has a unique (standard) answer set M18 = {a, b}, but two causal ones that
satisfy:
I18(a) = r
a
1
I18(b) = r
a
1 ·r
b
3
I ′18(a) = r
b
1 ·r
a
2
I ′18(b) = r
b
1
As we can see, the true atoms in both models, Atoms(I18) = Atoms(I
′
18) = {a, b},
coincide with the unique (standard) answer set M18, but their justifications differ.
In I18, atom a is a (non-deterministic) effect of the disjunction r1, while b is derived
from a through r3. Analogously, I
′
18 makes b true because of r1 and then obtains a
from b through r2. It is interesting to point out that I
′′
18 with
I ′′18(a) = r
a
1 + r
b
1 ·r
a
2
I ′′18(b) = r
b
1 + r
a
1 ·r
b
3
is also a model of the program, but not a ⊑-minimal one because we have I18 ⊏ I
′′
18.
Intuitively, I ′′18 would represent a scenario in which both a and b are justified by
rule r1, which does not fit the intuitive understanding that rule r1 can only justify
one of its head atoms. 
Let us also recall that, for normal programs, (Cabalar et al. 2014) defining causal
answer sets as ≤-minimal models instead of ⊑-minimal ones. These two definitions
agree for normal logic programs (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016) with the former being
preferred for its simplicity.12 On the other hand, for disjunctive programs, there are
≤-minimal models that do not correspond to any standard stable model, thus the
need for the latter. This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 30
Let P17 be the following logic program:
r1 : head ∨ tails head
which has two ≤-minimal models, one in which I17(head) = head + r
head
1 and
I17(tails) = 0, plus another in which I
′
17(head) = head and I
′
17(tails) = r
tails
1 .
However, only the former is a ⊑-minimal one. Note that this corresponds to the
set of atoms Atoms(I17) = {head} which is the unique standard answer set of the
program. 
12 This definition is also used in Section 3.3.3 where the syntax is restricted to normal programs.
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Fig. 19: Causal graph and off-line justification of p w.r.t. the unique answer set of
P18 (see Examples 31 and 31).
The following example illustrates the fact that ‘∗’ is used to represent joint causa-
tion, or in other words, that two or more atoms are needed to justify the conclusion
of some rule.
Example 31
Consider the logic program P18 consisting of the following rules:
r1 : p ← q r2 : q ← r ∧ s r s
This program has a unique causal answer set I2 that satisfies:
I2(p) = (r ∗ s)·r
q
2 ·r
p
1
I2(q) = (r ∗ s)·r
q
2
I2(r) = r
I2(s) = s
As shown in Observation 1, we have I2(r) ≥ r ·r = r . Then, the value of I2(r) follows
from the fact that causal answer sets are ≤-minimal models. Similar reasoning
applies for the atom s. Furthermore, from Definition 14, it follows that I2(q) ≥
(r ∗s)·rq2 and, by minimality, that I2(q) = (r ∗s)·r
q
2 . In a similar way, we obtain for p
that I2(p) = I2(q)·r
p
1 = (r ∗s)·r
q
2 ·r
p
1 . Figure 19a depicts the causal graph associated
with I2(p). Note that product ‘∗’ is translated in this causal graph (Figure 19a)
as two incoming edges to the vertex rq2 . The causal graph associated with some
causal value can be easily constructed by rewriting the causal value in graph normal
form and representing each term of the form v1·v2 with an edge from v1 to v2. In
particular, we can obtain the causal graph in Figure 19a by rewriting (r ∗ s)·rq2 ·r
p
1
in graph normal form as follows:
(r ∗ s)·rq2 ·r
p
1 = r ·r
q
2 ·r
p
1 ∗ s·r
q
2 ·r
p
1
= r ·rq2 ∗ r
q
2 ·r
p
1 ∗ s·r
q
2 ∗ r
q
2 ·r
p
1
= r ·rq2 ∗ r
q
2 ·r
p
1 ∗ s·r
q
2
Then, the three edges of the causal graph in Figure 19a correspond to the three
subterms of the form v1·v2 (that is, r ·r
q
2 , r
q
2 ·r
p
1 and s·r
q
2 ) in the above causal term.
For comparison, Figure 19b depicts the off-line justification of p+. It is easy to see
that this particular off-line justification can be obtained from the causal graph by
replacing each vertex rai by a, reversing edges, adding the label ‘+’ to each vertex
and resulting edge and adding edges of the form (a,⊤,+) for each resulting sink a.

Next, we illustrate that ‘+’ is used to separate alternative causal justifications
and the importance of addition distributivity to obtain such behaviour.
Example 32
Consider the logic program P19 consisting of the following rules:
r1 : p ← q r2 : q ← r r3 : q ← s r s
This program has a unique causal answer set I3 that satisfies:
I3(p) = r ·r
q
2 ·r
p
1 + s·r
q
3 ·r
p
1
I3(q) = r ·r
q
2 + s·r
q
3
I3(r) = r
I3(s) = s
As in Example 31, we have that I3(r) = r and I3(s) = s. Furthermore, in this case,
Definition 14 implies I3(q) ≥ r ·r
q
2 and I3(q) ≥ s·r
q
3 . Then, the value of I3(q) follows
from the fact that causal answer sets are ≤-minimal models and the fact that ‘+’ is
the least upper bound of the ≤ relation. Finally, I3(p) = I3(q)·r
p
1 = (r ·r
q
2 +s·r
q
3 )·r
p
1
follows in similar way. The value of I3(p) shown above is the disjunctive normal
form of this term, and it is obtained by applying addition distributivity. Here, both
addends in I3(p), that is r ·r
q
2 ·r
p
1 and s·r
q
3 ·r
p
1 , are causal justifications of p w.r.t. the
unique answer set of the program. 
3.3.2 Causal Semantics for Programs with Negation-as-Failure
We now extend the causal answer set semantics to logic programs with negation-
as-failure. For this, the closed world assumption is directly translated into the lan-
guage of justifications, assuming that everything that has no justification is false
by default. Accordingly, negative literals are assumed to hold by default, without
requiring further justification. This contrasts with the previously presented off-line
and LABAS justifications, which further explain why negative literals hold. The
next section shows how causal justifications can be extended in order to provide
such information. Let us start with an example motivating why omitting the jus-
tification of negative literals, thus treating them as defaults, may provide intuitive
explanation in some scenarios.
Example 33 (Ex. 23 continued)
Consider a variation of the scenario of Example 23 in which shooting the victim
may fail in several ways: the victim may be wearing a bulletproof vest, the gun-
powder may be wet, etc. This is an instance of the well-known qualification prob-
lem (McCarthy 1977): any comprehensive knowledge base for general commonsense
reasoning may contain hundreds or thousands of exceptions to any rule, which may
also be impossible to list in advance. As usual in answer set programming, this
problem can be solved by adding abnormality predicates to the body of all rules.
In particular, rules (2-7) are rewritten as follows:
r1 : dead ← haemorrhage ∧ not ab1 (13)
r2 : haemorrhage ← impact ∧ not ab2 (14)
r3 : impact ← bullet ∧ not ab2 (15)
r4 : bullet ← gunpowder ∧ not ab3 (16)
r5 : gunpowder ← trigger(suzy) ∧ not ab4 (17)
trigger(suzy) (18)
Then, exceptions can be added in an elaboration tolerant manner by adding new
rules as follows:
r6 : ab2 ← bulletproof (19)
r7 : ab4 ← wet (20)
Let P20 be the program containing rules (13-20). 
For justifications, Example 33 sets out a new challenge: a justification for the
lack of all exceptions may be much bigger than the justification for the conclusion
without exceptions. Furthermore, from a causal perspective, saying that the lack
of an exception is part of a cause (e.g., for dead) may seem rather counterintuitive.
It is not the case that the victim is dead because the gunpowder was not wet, or
because the victim was not wearing a bulletproof vest, or whatever other possible
exception might be added in the future.
This is a well-known problem in the causal literature (Maudlin 2004; Hall 2007;
Halpern 2008; Hitchcock and Knobe 2009): in particular, Hitchcock and Knobe
(2009) provides an extended discussion with several examples showing how people
ordinarily understand causes as deviations from a normal or default behaviour. In
this sense, by understanding falsity of exceptions as the default situation, we obtain
that, when no exception is true with respect to the causal answer set, the causal
justifications for dead in programs P14 and P20 are the same. This interpretation
of negation-as-failure can be captured by the following definitions:
Definition 17 (Causal Program Reduct)
The (causal) reduct of an extended program P with respect to a causal interpreta-
tion I , in symbols P I , is the result of
1. removing all rules such that I (b) 6= 0 for some b ∈ body−(r),
2. removing all the negative literals from the remaining rules. 
Definition 18 (Causal Answer Set)
We say that a causal interpretation I is a causal answer set of an extended pro-
gram P iff I is a causal answer set of the positive program P I . 
Example 34 (Ex. 33 continued)
Let I4 be an interpretation such that I4(A) = I1(A) for all literals A occurring in the
program P14, and I4(A) = 0 for all other literals occurring in program P20. Then,
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Fig. 20: Causal graph and off-line justification of p w.r.t. the unique answer set of
P5 (see Example 6 on page 11 and Example 35).
it is easy to see that P I420 = P14 ∪ {(19), (20)} and, thus, that I4 is the ⊑-minimal
model of P I420. Note that 0 is the bottom value and there are no rules assigning
greater values to bulletproof or wet and, thus, neither to any of the abi . That is,
the unique answer sets of programs P14 and P20 agree on the causal values assigned
to all literals they have in common. 
We note that the behaviour of causal justifications in Example 33 is similar to
LABAS justifications in the sense that, in the latter, the defaults are not further
explained either. This happens because there are no derivations for any abnormality
atom abi . On the other hand, if exceptions could be derived, then the behaviour
would be different. For instance, let P21 be the program obtained from P20 by
replacing rule (19) by the following two rules
r6 : ab2 ← bulletproof ∧ not ab5 (21)
r8 : ab5 ← damaged (22)
plus the facts bulletproof and damaged. In this case, ab2 is still false, so the causal
justification of dead remains the same. However, now there is a derivation for ab2
which is ‘attacked’ by damaged, so a LABAS justification further justifies the fal-
sity of exception ab2 in terms of damaged. The following example illustrates some
similarities and differences between causal and off-line justifications.
Example 35 (Ex. 6 continued, page 11)
Let us now consider the program P5 and the following labelling of its rules
r1 : p ← q r2 : q ← r ∧ s r3 : r ← not t s
Then, the unique causal answer set I5 of program P5 satisfies:
I5(p) = (r
r
3 ∗ s)·r
q
2 ·r
p
1
I5(q) = (r
r
3 ∗ s)·r
q
2
I5(r) = r
r
3
I5(s) = s
I5(t) = 0
Figure 20a depicts the causal graph associated with I5(p), while Figure 20b depicts
the off-line justification of p+ for the sake of comparison. Note that the causal
graph can be obtained from the off-line justification by removing the ⊥, ⊤ and all
negatively labelled vertices plus all the edges connected to these vertices (where
the edges are inverted). Note that the only change in the causal justification of p
in this example with respect to that in program P18 is the renaming of the node r
as r r3 , while off-line justifications of the two programs further differ in the subgraph
rooted in r+. 
Example 36
Let us consider a scenario where there is a light bulb that turns on whenever the
switches a and b are pushed at the same time, and off whenever the switches c
and d are pushed at the same time. Assume also that the light is currently off and
the switches a and b are pushed (situation 0). This problem can be easily formalised
r
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11
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Fig. 21: Causal justifications of the truth of on1 and on2.
as a logic program P22 consisting of rules
13:
r1t+1 : ont+1 ← swat ∧ swbt r2t+1 : offt+1 ← swct ∧ swdt (23)
for t ≥ 0, plus the facts off0, swa0 and swb0. As usual, inertia is represented by the
following pair of rules:
i1t+1 : ont+1 ← ont ∧ not offt+1 (24)
i2t+1 : offt+1 ← offt ∧ not ont+1 (25)
for t ≥ 0. We also have an integrity constraint
← ont ∧ offt (26)
ensuring that on and off cannot hold at the same time. This program has a complete
well-founded model and, thus, a unique answer set, in which ont holds for every
time t > 0. Figures 21a and 21b respectively depict the causal justifications of on1
and on2 w.r.t. that answer set. 
13 For the sake of simplicity, we avoid introducing a first order language here and indirectly use
the propositional logic program that is produced through grounding.
As illustrated by the above example, understanding negation-as-failure as a de-
fault (which does not need to be further explained), allows that causal justifications
are ‘preserved’ by inertia in the following sense: at any situation t + 1 if nothing
happens, then the causal justification of ont+1 can be obtained by adding to the
causal justification of ont , an edge from i
ont
1t to i
ont+1
1t+1 . True persistence of justifi-
cations, that is, exactly the same justification preserved by inertia, can be obtained
by selecting some rule labels, in this case the labels associated with inertia (i1t+1
and i2t+1), as not forming part of the causal justifications, and thus of the causal
graphs. In such case, the causal graph for ont at any situation t would be the one
depicted in Figure 21a. In contrast, the number of off-line and LABAS justifications
grows exponentially with the number of situations in which nothing happens. This
will be discussed in more detail in Section 3.6.
3.3.3 Explaining Negative Literals in Causal Justifications
As we have seen, one major difference between causal justifications and the two
previous approaches, off-line and LABAS justifications, is the way in which all
negative literals that are true w.r.t. the answer set in question are assumed to hold
by default, so they do not need further justification. This behaviour allows to get
an important reduction in the number of justifications in examples that involve
exceptions or defaults like inertia (as was illustrated in Example 36). On the other
hand, there are scenarios in which justifications for negative literals are valuable.14
Consider, for instance, the following example from (Cabalar and Fandinno 2017):
Example 37
A drug d in James Bond’s drink causes his paralysis p provided that he was not
given an antidote a that day. We know that Bond’s enemy, Dr. No, poured the
drug and that Bond is daily administered an antidote by the MI6, unless it is a
holiday h:
r1 : p ← d , not a (27)
r2 : a ← not h (28)
d (29)
Then, {a, d} is the unique answer set of the program consisting of rules (27-29).
Since p is false with respect this answer set, the causal value associated to it is 0,
that is, it has its value by default without further explanation. On the other hand,
Figures 22a and 22b respectively depict the off-line and LABAS justifications ex-
plaining that p does not hold because a is somehow preventing it. The exten-
sion of causal justifications, presented in this section, associates the causal value
(∼ra2 ∗ d)·r
p
1 to p in this scenario, pointing out that rule r2 (and, thus a) is what
prevents p from becoming true. A causal reading of this expression is that “a has
prevented (through rule r2) d to cause p (through rule r1)” or, equivalently, “if it
was not for rule r2 (implying a), d would cause p through rule r1”. Suppose now
14 A more detailed elaboration of this argument can be found in Section 3.6.
p−
a+
h−
⊥
−
−
−
(a)
p−A1
not a−asm
a+A2
not h+asm
−
+
+
(b)
p+
d+ a−
h+
⊤
+ −
−
+
+
(c)
p+A1
d+fact not a
+
asm
a−A2
not h−asm
h+fact
+ +
−
−
+
(d)
Fig. 22: Off-line and LABAS justifications of p w.r.t. the unique answer set of Ex-
ample 37.
that it is a holiday, so fact h is added to the program (27)-(28). Then, a is itself
disabled and d is free to cause p. The causal justification of p in this case is d ·rp1
(which corresponds to the graph with a single edge from d to rp1 ), which reflects the
fact that d has caused p, but without keeping any record about the fact that h has
also been necessary for this to happen. On the other hand, we can see in Figures 22c
and 22d that both off-line and LABAS justifications keep track of this dependency.
The extended causal justifications also keep track of this dependency and associate
the casual value (∼∼h ∗ d)·rp1 + (∼r
a
2 ∗ d)·r
p
1 with p. Here, the first addend can be
informally read as “h has allowed d to cause p (through rule r1).” Double negation
in front of h is introduced to distinguish between the philosophically distinct con-
cepts15 of productive cause (in this case d) and other contingently counterfactual
dependencies (in this case h), though this distinction is not of particular relevance
in the context of justifications. As before, the second addend can be informally read
as “if it was not for rule r2 (implying a), d would cause p through rule r1” (even
without the presence of h). 
In order to introduce information about negative literals in causal justifications,
Cabalar and Fandinno (2017) extended causal justifications with a negation inspired
by why-not provenance justifications (see Section 3.4; Dama´sio et al. 2013). We now
review this extension, starting with the introduction of negation in causal terms as
follows:
Definition 19 (Extended Causal Terms)
Given a set of atoms At and a set of labels Lb, an extended (causal) term (e-term
15 A productive cause is an event connected to its effect by a causal chain as explained at the
beginning of Section 3.3. For a thorough philosophical explanation about the differences between
productive causes and contingently counterfactual dependencies we refer to (Hall 2004; Hall
2007).
Pseudo-complement
t ∗ ∼t = 0
∼∼∼t = ∼t
De Morgan
∼(t+u) = (∼t ∗∼u)
∼(t ∗u) = (∼t+∼u)
Weak excl. middle
∼t + ∼∼t = 1
appl. negation
∼(t · u) = ∼(t ∗ u)
Fig. 23: Properties of the ‘∼’ operator.
for short), t is recursively defined as one of the following expressions
t ::= l |
∏
S |
∑
S | t1·t2 | ∼t1
where l ∈ Lbext
def= { rai
∣∣ ri ∈ Lb and a ∈ Atext }, t1, t2 are in turn terms, and S
is a (possibly empty and possibly infinite) set of terms. An e-term is elementary if
it has the form l , ∼l or ∼∼l with l ∈ Lbext being an extended label. 
Definition 20 (Extended Causal Values)
An extended (causal) value (e-value for short) is each equivalence class of e-terms
under axioms for a completely distributive (complete) lattice with meet ‘∗’ and join
‘+’ plus the axioms of Figures 18 and 23. The set of e-values is denoted by ELb. 
As with causal values, we will use any of the members of the class as repre-
sentative of the extended casual value. Note that [0] = {0, ra1 ∗ ∼r
a
1 , . . . , } and
[1] = {1,∼ra1 +∼∼r
a
1 , . . . } are no longer singleton sets. The definition of disjunc-
tive and graph normal form is now strengthened by requiring that negation ‘∼’ or
double negation ‘∼∼’ only occurs in front of labels and extended atoms. Similarly,
the graph normal form also requires now that negation ‘∼’ or double negation ‘∼∼’
only occurs in front of labels and extended atoms.
Interpretations are extended in a straightforward way: an e-interpretation is a
mapping I : Atext −→ ELb assigning an e-value to each extended atom such that
I(a) = 0 or I(¬a) = 0 for every atom a ∈ At. For interpretations I and J we
say that I ≤ J when I(a) ≤ J (a) for each atom a ∈ Atext. As above, there is a
≤-bottom e-interpretation 0 (resp. a ≤-top e-interpretation 1) that stands for the
e-interpretation mapping each extended atom a to 0 (resp. 1). The value assigned
to a negative literal not a by an e-interpretation I, denoted as I(not a), is defined as
I(not a) def= ∼I(a), as expected. Similarly, for any e-term t , its valuation I(t) def= [t ]
is the equivalence class of t .
To define the semantics of logic programs for extended causal justifications a
slight extension in the syntax is also needed: we allow that b1, . . . , bn in (1), are
not only extended atoms, but also e-terms. For instance, p ← q ∧ (a ∗ ∼b), with
p, q ∈ Atext and a, b ∈ Lb, is a valid rule in this extended syntax. Furthermore,
only normal logic programs are considered.
Definition 21 (E-Model)
A e-interpretation I satisfies a rule like (1) with k = 1 iff
(
I(b1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(bn) ∗ I(not c1) ∗ . . . ∗ I(not cm)
)
· rh1i ≤ I(h1) (30)
and I is an e-model of P , written I |= P , iff I satisfies all rules in P . 
Definition 22 (E-Reduct)
Given a normal program P and an interpretation I, by PI we denote the positive
program containing a rule of the form16:
h1 ← b1, . . . , bn , I(not c1), . . . , I(not cm) (31)
for each rule of the form (1) in P . 
Program PI is positive and it has a ≤-least e-model17. By ΓˆP (·), we denote
the operator18 mapping each e-interpretation I to the ≤-least e-model of pro-
gram PI . Furthermore, Γˆ2P (·) denotes the operator over e-interpretations resulting
of applying ΓˆP to the result of is its application to any e-interpretation, that is,
Γˆ2P (I)
def= ΓˆP (ΓˆP (I)). This operator Γˆ
2
P is monotonic and so, by Knaster-Tarski’s
theorem, it has a least fixpoint LP and a greatest fixpoint UP
def= ΓˆP (LP ). These
two fixpoints respectively correspond to the justifications for true and for non-false
(that is, either true of undefined) extended atoms in the (standard) well-founded
model. To capture justifications with respect to answer sets, we use the negative
reduct from Definition 3.
Definition 23 (Extended Causal Answer Sets)
Given a normal extended program P one of its standard answer sets M , and a set
of assumptions U ⊆ M such that WFNR(P,U ) = M , the extended causal answer set
(e-answer set) corresponding to M and U is a function mapping each literal to an
e-value as follows:
MU (a)
def= LQ(a) MU (not a)
def= ∼UQ(a)
with Q = NR(P ,U ). 
The notion of causal justification is extended as expected.
Definition 24 (Extended Causal Justification)
Given a logic program P , an answer set M of P and a set of assumptions U ⊆ M , a
term without sums c is an extended causal justification of some literal l ∈ {a, not a}
w.r.t. P , M and U if c is an addend in the minimal disjunctive normal form of
MU (l). For any causal justification of l w.r.t. P , M and U graph(c) is an extended
causal graph (justification). 
Example 38 (Ex. 37 continued)
Let P23 be the logic program containing rules (27-28). This program has a complete
well-founded model which coincides with its unique answer set:M19 = {a, d}. Then,
the possible assumptions with respect to this answer set are those U such that
16 Note that I(not ci ) is a possibly infinite causal term for each ci .
17 Here, we take ≤-minimal models instead of ⊑-minimal models as in earlier sections. These two
concepts coincide for normal programs, so we use the former for simplicity.
18 The operator ΓˆP (·) is analogous to the operator ΓP (·) defined in Section 2, but using e-
interpretations instead of sets of atoms.
U ⊆ {h}, that is, {} and {h}. Usually ⊆-minimal assumptions are used and, thus,
we have that P23 = NR(P23, {}) and that
ΓˆP23(0)(p) = d ·r
p
1
ΓˆP23(0)(d) = d
ΓˆP23(0)(a) = r
a
2
ΓˆP23(0)(h) = 0
Γˆ2P23(0)(p) = (∼r
a
2 ∗ d)·r
p
1
Γˆ2P23(0)(d) = d
Γˆ2P23(0)(a) = r
a
2
Γˆ2P23(0)(h) = 0
Γˆ3P23(0)(p) = (∼r
a
2 ∗ d)·r
p
1
Γˆ3P23(0)(d) = d
Γˆ3P23(0)(a) = r
a
2
Γˆ3P23(0)(h) = 0
Note that Γˆ2P23(0) = Γˆ
3
P23
(0) also implies that Γˆ2P23(0) = Γˆ
4
P23
(0) and, thus, Γˆ2P23(0)
is the least fixpoint of the Γˆ2P23(0) operator. Note also that Γˆ
2
P23
(0)(p) = (∼ra2 ∗d)·r
p
1
is precisely the causal justification shown in Example 37 to be associated with p
in this scenario. Let now P24 = P23 ∪ {h}, which also has a complete well-founded
model and unique answer set: M20 = {p, d , h}. In this case, we have
ΓˆP23(0)(p) = d ·r
p
1
ΓˆP23(0)(d) = d
ΓˆP23(0)(a) = r
a
2
ΓˆP23(0)(h) = h
Γˆ2P23(0)(p) = (∼r
a
2 ∗ d)·r
p
1
Γˆ2P23(0)(d) = d
Γˆ2P23(0)(a) = ∼h·r
a
2
Γˆ2P23(0)(h) = h
Γˆ3P23(0)(p) = . . .
Γˆ3P23(0)(d) = d
Γˆ3P23(0)(a) = ∼h·r
a
2
Γˆ3P23(0)(h) = h
with Γˆ4P23(0)(p) = Γˆ
3
P23
(0)(p) = (∼∼h ∗ d)·rp1 + (∼r
a
2 ∗ d)·r
p
1 as also mentioned in
Example 37. 
An extended causal justification is said to be inhibited when it contains a negated
label (non-double negated). Inhibited justifications point out derivations that could
have justified the truth value of the atom, but that have been prevented to do so.
The negated subterms are the inhibitors of the extended causal justification. Actual
extended causal justifications are those that only contain non-negated and double
negated subterms. In Example 38, the casual term (∼∼h∗d)·rp1 represents the actual
extended causal justification of p, while (∼ra2 ∗d)·r
p
1 is an inhibited extended causal
justification that points out that “had it not been for rule r2, then d would cause p
to be true through rule r1 (without the need of h)”. Note that the presence of the
negated subterm ∼ra2 in the inhibited extended causal justification (∼r
a
2 ∗ d)·r
p
1 is
similar to the attack from the argument with conclusion a to the argument with
conclusion p in the attack tree used to construct the LABAS justification.
Example 39 (Ex. 36 continued)
Continuing with the problem introduced in Example 36 (page 38), we can see
that ΓˆiP22(0)(on1) = (swa0 ∗ swb0)·r11 for all i ≥ 1. That is, the extended causal
justification of on1 has precisely the same graph as the (non-extended) causal jus-
tification depicted in Figure 21a (page 38). We also have that ΓˆiP22(0)(off1) =
(∼swa0 ∗off0)·i22+(∼swb0 ∗off0)·i22+(∼r11 ∗off0)·i22 for all i ≥ 2. This points out
that off1 would be true by inertia (rule i22) if any of the facts swa0 or swb0 or the rule
r11 had not been in the program. It can be checked that (swa0 ∗ swb0)·r11·i12 is the
extended causal justification of on2. Recall that this is the (non-extended) causal
justification of on2, whose corresponding causal graph is depicted in Figure 21b
(page 38). 
Example 40 (Ex. 38 continued)
Recall that, in the unique answer set M19 = {d , a} of program P23, the atom p is
false. Extended causal justifications also allow to justify negative literals and we
have that not p is explained by the causal value ∼∼ra2 + ∼d + ∼r
p
1 . Here, ∼∼r
a
2
is the actual extended causal justification explaining why p is false, while ∼d and
∼rp1 are inhibited extended causal justifications that point out that p would also
be false if either d or r1 were removed from the program. 
Note that in Example 40 the application operator ‘·’ does not appear in the
extended causal justification of not p. In fact, this is the general case for negative
literals and, thus, extended causal justifications for negative literals do not keep
track of the derivation order among rules. An algebraic treatment that allows to
keep track of this derivation order is still an open topic. It is also an open topic to
explain negative literals for disjunctive programs.
3.4 Why-not Provenance Justifications
Why-not provenance (Dama´sio et al. 2013) is a declarative logical approach, which
extracts non-graph based justifications for the truth value of atoms with respect to
the (complete) well-founded model of normal logic programs. It can furthermore
be used to explain the truth value of atoms with respect to the answer set seman-
tics. The approach has been implemented in a meta-programming tool (Dama´sio
et al. 2015) available at http://cptkirk.sourceforge.net. As mentioned in Sec-
tion 3.3.3, the way extended causal justifications have been defined is inspired by
this approach, therefore, we here just introduce the differences between these two
approaches, avoiding the overlapping material.
As already mentioned, the first major difference compared to extended causal
justifications (and the other justifications approaches reviewed in Section 3) is the
non-graph nature of why-not provenance. Instead, why-not provenance justifica-
tions are sets of annotations, each one expressing a possible modification of the
program to achieve a particular truth value of the justified atom w.r.t. the well-
founded model (of the modified program). In other words, why-not provenance
computes justifications expressing how the atom can be made true, false, or unde-
fined w.r.t. the well-founded model or the answer set semantics. The justifications
for the actual truth value of the atom are those that do not imply any modification
on the program. This can be achieved by adding the axiom
(t ·u) = (t ∗ v) (32)
to those defining e-values (Definition 20). That is, the non-commutative operator ‘·’
is replaced by the commutative one ‘∗’, effectively removing the order of application
of rules from the justifications.
The second difference compared to extended causal justifications is that why-not
provenance does not distinguish between productive causes and other counterfactual
dependencies, which is achieved by adding the double negation elimination axiom:
∼∼t = t (33)
Definition 25 (Why-Not Provenance Values)
A why-not provenance value (w-value for short) is each equivalence class of e-terms
(Definition 19, page 19) under axioms for a completely distributive (complete) lat-
tice with meet ‘∗’ and join ‘+’ plus the axioms of Figures 18 and 23 and the axioms
(t ·u) = (t ∗ v) and ∼∼t = t . The set of w-values is denoted WLb. 
Due to the addition of axioms (32) and (33), w-values form a free boolean alge-
bra19 generated by Lb. The definitions of w-interpretation, w-model and reduct are
analogous to the ones in Section 3.3.3, but replacing e-values by w-values. We will
use I˜, J˜ and their variations to denote w-interpretations. By Γ˜P (I˜) we denote the
least w-model of program P I˜ and by Γ˜2P (I)
def= Γ˜P (Γ˜P (I)) we denote the result of
applying Γ˜P to the result of its application to I˜. Let us denote by TP and TUP ,
the least and greatest fixpoint of the operator Γ˜2P .
Notation 2
In order to closely follow the notation used in (Dama´sio et al. 2013), we will repre-
sent the meet as conjunction ‘∧’ instead of as product ‘∗’ and the joint as disjunction
‘∨’ instead of ‘+’ when representing w-values. We will also write negation as ‘¬’
instead of ‘∼’ to strengthen the fact that it now acts as classical negation and omit
the superindex of labels. 
Note that the intuition of the two former operators is as before: conjunction ‘∧’
indicates joint interaction, disjunction ‘∨’ represents alternative justifications. On
the other hand, now negation ‘¬’ denotes hypothetical changes to the program (ei-
ther removal or addition) that may lead to the literal belonging to the well-founded
model.
Example 41 (Ex. 10 continued)
Let us label each rule in the program P8 as follows
r1 : p ← not q r2 : r ← not p r3 : s ← not r
As mentioned in Example 10, this program has a complete well-founded model:
M8 = {p, s}. We also have that the following extended causal justifications:
ΓˆP8(0)(p) = r
p
1
ΓˆP8(0)(q) = 0
ΓˆP8(0)(r) = r
r
2
ΓˆP8(0)(s) = r
s
3
Γˆ2P8(0)(p) = r
p
1
Γˆ2P8(0)(q) = 0
Γˆ2P8(0)(r) = ∼r
p
1 ·r
r
2
Γˆ2P8(0)(s) = ∼r
r
2 ·r
s
3
Γˆ3P8(0)(p) = r
p
1
Γˆ3P8(0)(q) = 0
Γˆ3P8(0)(r) = ∼r1·r
r
2
Γˆ3P8(0)(s) = ∼∼r1·r
s
3 +∼r
r
2 ·r
s
3
and, it can be checked that, Γˆ4P8(0) = Γˆ
2
P8
(0). Then, applying the above two ax-
19 In fact, the original definition relies on a free boolean algebra instead of causal terms and
assumes the notation of logical formulas to represent its values (see Notation 2 below).
ioms (32-33) and the rewriting of Notation 2, we have that
Γ˜4P8(0)(p) = r1
Γ˜4P8(0)(q) = 0
Γ˜4P8(0)(r) = ¬r1 ∧ r2
Γ˜4P8(0)(s) = r1 ∧ r3 ∨ ¬r2 ∧ r3
The intuition behind r1 ∧ r3 is similar to the one in extended causal justifications,
but without derivation order, distinction between productive causes and other con-
tingently counterfactual dependencies: r1 ∧ r3 means that “s is true because both
r1 and r3 are in the program”. 
In other words, the least fixpoint of Γ˜2P can be obtained from the least fixpoint of
Γˆ2P by replacing applications ‘·’ by products ‘∗’, removing every double negation
symbols ‘∼∼’ and, then, applying the rewriting of Notation 2. More formally, let
λ : ELb −→WLb be this transformation from e-values to w-values, that is, λ is
defined in the following recursive way:
λ(t) def=


λ(u) ∧ λ(w) if t = u ⊙ v with ⊙ ∈ {∗, ·}
λ(u) ∨ λ(w) if t = u + v
¬λ(u) if t = ∼u
l if t = l with l ∈ (Lb ∪Atext)
with t in graph normal form.
Note that, similar to LABAS justifications, there are no extended causal jus-
tifications for atoms for which there is no derivation. For instance, there is no
justification for the atom p w.r.t. to a program consisting of a single rule p ← q .
On the other hand, as in off-line justifications, there are why-not provenance justi-
fications for those atoms. In our running example, p is associated with the why-not
provenance information ¬not(p) ∨ r1 ∧ ¬not(q) where r1 is the label associated
to the rule p ← q . This difference is due to the use of an extended program to
compute why-not provenance information.
Definition 26 (Provenance Program)
Given a normal program P , the why-not provenance program is P(P) def= P ∪ P ′,
where P ′ contains a labelled fact of the form (¬not(a) : a) for each extended atom
a ∈ Atext not occurring as a fact in P . 
We write P instead of P(P) when the program P is clear from the context. To
compute the why-not provenance information of some normal program P , we will
be interested in the least and greatest fixpoints of the Γ˜2P operator with respect to
the provenance program P (corresponding to P), instead of those of P itself. That
is, we will use the least and greatest fixpoints TP and TUP. It is also worth noting
that these fixpoints can be obtained from the fixpoints of extended causal operator
with respect to the extended program, that is, TP = λ(LP) and TUP = λ(UP).
Definition 27 (Provenance Information)
Given a normal program P , why-not provenance information is defined as a mapping
from literals20 into w-values satisfying:
WhyP (a)
def= TP(a)
WhyP (not a)
def= ¬TUP(a)
WhyP (undef a)
def= ¬WhyP (a) ∗ ¬WhyP (not a)
for each extended atom a ∈ Atext. 
Intuitively, each disjunct in the minimal disjunctive normal form of provenance
information corresponds to a justification about to why the atom does or does not
have the respective truth value w.r.t. the well-founded model. That is, the disjunct
in WhyP (a), WhyP (not a), and WhyP (undef a) respectively explain why a is (not)
true, false, and undefined w.r.t. the well-founded model. The actual truth value of a
can be spotted if a disjunct in the respective justification (WhyP (a), WhyP (not a),
or WhyP (undef a)) does not contain any negation ¬.
Example 42 (Ex. 41 continued)
Continuing with our running example, we have that P8 = P(P8) consists of the
following rules:
r1 : p ← not q
r2 : r ← not p
r3 : s ← not r
¬not(p) : p
¬not(q) : q
¬not(p) : r
¬not(s) : s
Since there is no fact q in P8, we have that (¬not(q) : q) belongs to P8. Further-
more, this is the unique rule inP8 with q in the head and, consequently, we have that
ΓˆiP8(0)(q) = ¬not(q) for all i ≥ 1. This implies that TP(q) = TUP(q) = ¬not(q)
and, thus, that
WhyP8(q) = ¬not(q) (34)
WhyP8(not q) = not(q) (35)
WhyP8(undef q) = 0 (36)
Note thatWhyP8(q) = ¬not(q) corresponds to the off-line justification of q consist-
ing of a unique edge (q−,⊥,−). On other hand, since there is no rule in P with q
in the head, there is no LABAS nor (extended) causal justification of q . Similarly,
to the computation shown in Example 41, we also have that
Γ˜iP8(0)(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1 ∧ not(q)
Γ˜iP8(0)(r) = ¬not(r) ∨ r2 ∧ not(p) ∧ ¬r1 ∨ r2 ∧ not(p) ∧ ¬not(q)
Γ˜iP8(0)(s) = ¬not(s) ∨ r3 ∧ not(r) ∧ ¬r2 ∨ r3 ∧ not(r) ∧ ¬not(p)
∨ r3 ∧ not(r) ∧ r1 ∧ not(q)
20 In this section, we use a more general notion of ‘literal’, where an atom a may not only be
proceeded by not, but also by undef .
for all i ≥ 2. This implies that TP(p) = TUP(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1 ∧ not(q) and that
WhyP8(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1 ∧ not(q)
WhyP8(not p) = not(p) ∧ ¬r1 ∨ not(p) ∧ ¬not(q)
WhyP8(undef p) = 0
Following a similar procedure, it can be checked that
WhyP8(r) = ¬not(r) ∨ r2 ∧ not(p) ∧ ¬r1 ∨ r2 ∧ not(p) ∧ ¬not(q)
WhyP8(not r) = not(r) ∧ ¬r2 ∨ not(r) ∧ ¬not(p) ∨ not(r) ∧ r1 ∧ not(q)
WhyP8(undef r) = 0
that WhyP8(s) is
¬not(s) (37)
∨ r3∧not(r)∧¬r2 (38)
∨ r3∧not(r)∧¬not(p) (39)
∨ r3∧not(r)∧r1∧not(q) (40)
and that WhyP8(not s) is
not(s)∧¬r3 (41)
∨ not(s)∧¬not(r) (42)
∨ not(s)∧r2∧not(p)∧¬r1 (43)
∨ not(s)∧r2∧not(p)∧¬not(q) (44)
Comparing the conjunction r1 ∧ r3 obtained in Example 41 with the conjunc-
tion (40), we can observe that annotations not(r) and not(q) have been added.
This can be informally read as “s is true because both r1 and r3 are in the pro-
gram and facts r and q are not.” Note also, that not(r) ∧ r1 ∧ not(q) is one of the
disjuncts of WhyP8(not r). This could be read as “r is false because of rule r1 and
the absence of facts r and q in the program.” 
The following definitions formalises the notion of why-not provenance justifica-
tion, i.e. a disjunct in the why-not provenance information, and the intuition behind
the meaning of each annotation in a justification. In particular, it expresses the idea
that each justification describes a modification of the program after which the atom
has the truth value of the respective justification.
Definition 28 (Why-not Provenance Justification)
Let P be a normal program, let a ∈ Atext be an extended atom and let l ∈
{a, not a, undef a} such that WhyP (l) = c1 ∨ . . . ∨ cn is the why-not provenance
information of l in minimal disjunctive normal form. Then, we say that each ci is
a why-not provenance justification of l w.r.t. P . 
Definition 29
Let P be a normal program, a ∈ Atext be an extended atom and l ∈ {a, not a, undef a}.
Let c be some why-not provenance justification of l w.r.t. P and C a set of anno-
tations such that
∧
C = c. Then, the following sets are defined, where b ∈ Atext
and r ∈ P :
KeepFacts(c) def= { b
∣∣ b ∈ C }
RemoveFacts(c) def= { b
∣∣ ¬b ∈ C }
MissingFacts(c) def= { b
∣∣ ¬not(b) ∈ C }
NoFacts(c) def= { b
∣∣ not(b) ∈ C }
KeepRules(c) def= { r
∣∣ ri ∈ C and label(r) = ri }
RemoveRules(c) def= { r
∣∣ ¬ri ∈ C and label(r) = ri } 
Intuitively, any disjunct cj in the why-not provenance information of some literal l
expresses a possible modification of the program such that l belongs to the well-
founded model of the resulting program. These modifications are captured by the
above sets.
For instance, MissingFacts(cj ) is a set of facts that would be necessary to
add to the program in order to justify l , while NoFacts(cj ) is a set of facts
that cannot be added in order to justify l . As a consequence, l will belong21 to
the well-founded model of any program resulting from adding any superset G of
MissingFacts(cj ) that does not contain any fact from NoFacts(cj ) (assuming that
RemoveRules(cj ) = RemoveFacts(cj ) = {}).
Example 43 (Ex. 42 continued)
Continuing with our running example, we have that not s does not belong to the
well-founded model of P8 and that c = not(s)∧¬not(r) is a why-not provenance
justification of not s, i.e. it is a disjunct (42) of the why-not provenance information
of not s. Then, we also have MissingFacts(c) = {r} and NoFacts(c) = {s}. This
expresses that not s would belong to the well-founded model of any program P ′ =
P8 ∪G with G any set of facts that includes r but does not include s. 
Similarly, KeepFacts(cj ) and KeepRules(cj ) point out facts and rules that
need to be kept in the program to justify the literal while RemoveFacts(cj ) and
RemoveRules(cj ) state facts and rules that need to be removed from the program.
Note that, if a conjunction cj contains no negation, then it does not imply any
change in the program and, thus, constitutes an actual justification for the actual
value of the literal.
Example 44 (Ex. 43 continued)
As a further example, let c′ = r3 ∧ not(r) ∧ r1 ∧ not(q) be a why-not provenance
justification of s (the conjunction corresponding to the disjunct (40) of the why-
not provenance information of s). Informally, this conjunction expresses that “s
is true because both r1 and r3 are in the program and facts r and q are not.”
Note that KeepRules(c′) = {r1, r3} and NoFacts(c
′) = {r , q}, indicating that
s remains true as long as we keep these two rules and we add neither r nor q ,
21 This has been shown in (Dama´sio et al. 2013, Theorem 3).
even if we remove other rules or remove or add other facts. Note also that there
is no negated annotation in c′ and, thus, RemoveFacts(c′)=MissingFacts(c′)=
RemoveRules(c′) = {}. In other words, c′ points out a that no modification is
required to make s true and, thus, it is an actual justification for the truth of s. 
The following example illustrates how why-not provenance captures justifications
of programs with even-length negative dependency cycles:
Example 45 (Ex. 4 continued)
Let us define the following labelling for program P3:
r1 : p ← not q r2 : q ← not p
As we have seen, program P3 has two answer sets, namelyM3 = {p} andM4 = {q},
and an empty well-founded model. The computation of the why-not provenance
information goes as follows:
Γ˜1P3(0)(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1
Γ˜2P3(0)(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1∧not(q)∧¬r2
Γ˜3P3(0)(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1∧not(q)
Γ˜4P3(0)(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1∧not(q)∧¬r2
Γ˜1P3(0)(not q) = not(q) ∧ ¬r2
Γ˜2P3(0)(not q) = not(q) ∧ (¬r2∨¬not(p)∨r1)
Γ˜3P3(0)(not q) = not(q) ∧ (¬r2∨¬not(p))
Γ˜4P3(0)(not q) = not(q) ∧ (¬r2∨¬not(p)∨r1)
Γ˜2P3(0) and Γ˜
3
P3
(0) respectively are the least and greatest fixpoint of Γˆ2P3 . The case
for q and not p are symmetric. Then, the why-not provenance information for p is
as follows:
WhyP3(p) = ¬not(p) ∨ r1∧not(q)∧¬r2
WhyP3(not p) = not(p)∧¬r1 ∨ not(p)∧¬not(q)
WhyP3(undef p) = not(p)∧not(q)∧r1∧r2
Note that the only why-not provenance justification without negation ¬ occurs
in WhywP3(undef p), indicating that the actual truth value of p w.r.t. the well-
founded model is undefined. The conjunction expresses that p is undefined in the
well-founded model of P3 because of the rules r1 and r2 and the absence of the facts
p and q . 
3.4.1 Answer Set Why-not Provenance
The why-not justifications reviewed so far explain the truth value of literals with
respect to the well-founded model. Why-not provenance information of a literal
w.r.t. the answer set semantics is defined in terms of the why-not provenance of
that literal being true in the well-founded model and the non-existence of undefined
atoms in it. In other words, a literal is justified w.r.t. the answer set semantics by
referring to modifications that make the literal true w.r.t. the complete well-founded
model, which implies that it becomes the unique answer set.
Definition 30 (Answer Set Provenance Information)
Given a normal program P , the answer set why-not provenance information of a lit-
eral l ∈ Litext is defined as: AnsWhyP (l)
def= WhyP (l) ∧
∧
b∈Atext
¬WhyP (undef b).
Definition 31 (Answer Set why-not Provenance Justification)
Let P be a normal program, let a ∈ Atext be an extended atom and let l ∈
{a, not a, undef a} such that AndWhyP (l) = c1 ∨ . . .∨ cn is the answer set why-not
provenance information of l in minimal disjunctive normal form. Then, we say that
each ci is an answer set why-not provenance justification of l w.r.t. P . 
Note that Definition 30 characterises the major difference between this justifica-
tion approach and the three previous ones: there is a unique provenance information
of a literal with respect to the whole program, not with respect to each answer set.
In the case of Example 45 the answer set provenance (Definition 30) for p, q , not p
and not q coincides with their respective provenance information (Definition 27).
Note that none of the disjuncts in the why-not provenance information of p (resp. q)
is without negation, which seems to point out that p is not true (can only be made
true through modifications of the program). The reason is that, even though p
(resp. q) is true in some answer set, it is not true in the well-founded model (it
could also be due to the well-founded model not being complete). The answer set
provenance thus points out modifications that would yield a complete well-founded
model (and, thus, a unique answer set) in which p (resp. q) is true.
The following example illustrates that even if an atom is true in the unique
answer set, the answer set provenance (as given by Definition 30) may still point
out that modifications are needed to make the atom true. This is because a unique
answer set may not be a complete well-founded model.
Example 46 (Ex. 45 continued)
Let P25 be the program
r1 : p ← not q r2 : q ← not p r3 : s ← p ∧ not s
obtained by adding rule r3 to program P3. This program has a unique answer set
M21 = {q}. Furthermore, adding rule r3 to program P3 does not change the why-
not provenance information of p or q . The computation of the why-not provenance
information for s goes as follows:
Γ˜1P25(0)(s) = ¬not(s) ∨ r3∧¬not(p) ∨ r3∧r1
Γ˜2P25(0)(s) = ¬not(s)
Γ˜3P25(0)(s) = ¬not(s) ∨ r3∧¬not(p) ∨ r3∧r1∧not(q)
Γ˜4P25(0)(s) = ¬not(s)
and we obtain
WhyP25(s) = ¬not(s)
WhyP25(not s) = not(s)∧¬r3 ∨ not(s)∧not(p)∧¬r1 ∨ not(s)∧not(p)∧¬not(q)
WhyP25(undef s) = r3∧not(s)∧¬not(p) ∨ r1∧r3∧not(s)∧not(q)
That is, s is undefined in the well-founded model because of rules r1 and r3 and
the absence of the facts s and q . It would also be undefined if we added the fact p
while keeping the rule r3 and the absence of s. Furthermore, AnsWhyP25(undef p) =
AnsWhyP25(undef q) and, thus, ¬AnsWhyP25(undef p) ∧ ¬AnsWhyP25(undef q) ∧
¬AnsWhyP25(undef s) = ¬AnsWhyP25(undef p) ∧ ¬AnsWhyP25(undef s) which
corresponds to
¬(not(p)∧not(q)∧r1∧r2) ∧ ¬(r3∧not(s)∧¬not(p) ∨ r1∧r3∧not(s)∧not(q))
We also have that
WhyP25(q) = ¬not(q) ∨ r2∧not(p)∧¬r1
This implies that the answer set provenance information for q is:
AnsWhyP25(q) = ¬not(q) ∧ ¬r3
∨ ¬not(q) ∧ ¬not(s)
∨ ¬not(q) ∧ not(p)
∨ ¬r1 ∧ r2 ∧ not(p)
The disjuncts represent different modifications of the program leading to the exis-
tence of a complete well-founded model (and, thus, a unique answer set), in which
q is true. 
Example 46 can be used to illustrate how the notion of assumption, as introduced
in Section 3.1, can be applied to why-not provenance justifications. In particular, the
disjunct ¬r1∧r2∧not(p) in AnsWhyP25(q) suggests removing all rules with p in the
head (just r1) and not adding the fact p to the program. This can be understood
as “p needs to be assumed to be false” in a similar way as done in off-line or
extended causal justifications. In order to make this informal reading about this
last disjunct, we need to know that p is actually false in the answer set that we are
considering, i.e. M21 = {q}, because AnsWhyP25(p) contains a symmetric disjunct
¬r2 ∧ r1 ∧ not(q) whose informal reading does not correspond to an assumption
but to an actual modification. This is not a surprise because why-not provenance
(as an unsimplified formula) can be computed in polynomial time, while deciding
whether some atom is true in some answer set of some normal program is, in general,
NP-complete. Hence, unless the polynomial hierarchy collapses, it is obvious that
why-not provenance cannot contain information about whether some atom is true
or false in some answer set. Note also that, though extended causal justifications
(as an unsimplified causal term) can be computed in polynomial time, they are
construed w.r.t. a program reduced w.r.t. the set of assumptions corresponding to
this answer set. Hence, they assume the information of true atoms in an answer set
as a given. The same approach used to define extended causal justifications w.r.t.
an answer set could be applied to why-not provenance as well.
3.5 Other Justification Approaches
In this section we informally review two other approaches that deal with justifi-
cations in answer set programming, namely justifications in rule-based answer set
computation (Be´atrix et al. 2016) and the formal theory of justifications (Denecker
and De Schreye 1993; Denecker et al. 2015). Despite sharing a similar purpose with
previous approaches, the formal definition of Be´atrix et al. (2016) heavily relies on
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Fig. 24: Off-line, LABAS, and causal justifications of p w.r.t. {p, t} and P26.
the concept of ASPeRiX computation (Lefe`vre et al. 2017) and is out of the scope
of this survey. On the other hand, the purpose of the works by Denecker and De
Schreye (1993) and Denecker et al. (2015) is to study different semantics of logic
programming from the point of view of justifications rather than to provide expla-
nations that are “intelligible and easily accessible” by humans, as required by the
new GDPR.
3.5.1 Justifications in Rule-Based Answer Set Computation
Be´atrix et al. (2016) study the notion of justification from a rule-based point of
view of answer set computation, that is, under the assumption that the inherent
non-determinism of answer sets is due to the guessing of the application or non-
application of rules rather than the guessing of the truth value of literals. Another
interesting point to mention is that justifications in this approach, called reasons,
are sets of rules instead of graphs. The following example illustrates these two
differences.
Example 47
Consider the following program P26:
r1 : p ← t ∧ not q r2 : q ← s r3 : s ← not p t : t
which has two answer sets: M22 = {p, t} and M23 = {q , s, t}. The rule-based reason
for the truth of the atom p with respect to the answer set {p, t} of the program P26
is the set {r1, t}. 
We may use Example 47 to highlight some similarities and differences with pre-
viously discussed justification approaches. It can be checked that the causal graph
justification (Figure 24c) for p in this example has precisely vertices t and rp1 , cor-
responding to the rule-based reason. Correspondences with the off-line justification,
shown in Figure 24a, are also easy to see: the application of rule r1 is represented
by the two outgoing edges from p+ to t+ and to q−, where assuming q− to be
false ensures that r1 is satisfied. Similarly, the answer set why-not provenance of p
includes the disjunct r1∧ t ∧not(q)∧¬r2, where not(q)∧¬r2 can be understood to
mean that q is assumed to be false. The LABAS justification, shown in Figure 24b,
further explains that the falsity of q depends on the truth of p, thus also using rules
r2 and r3 for the explanation. Interestingly, the answer set why-not provenance of
p has another disjunct r1 ∧ t ∧ not(q) ∧ ¬r3, which also uses rule r3 to justify p.
Note that the rule-based reason for the falsity of q w.r.t. M22 is a subset of the
reason for p, namely {r1}. This contrasts with off-line and causal justifications, in
which q is assumed to be false, and LABAS justifications, in which q is explained in
the same way as in the justification of p (flipping the justification in Figure 24b so
that q is at the top coincides with the LABAS justification of q), i.e. in terms of r3
(and implicitly r2) as well as r1 and t . The answer set why-not provenance of not q
includes the disjunct not(q) ∧ ¬r2 which, as mentioned before, can be understood
as assuming that q is false.
3.5.2 Formal Theory of Justifications
Denecker and De Schreye (1993) and Denecker et al. (2015) present an abstract
theory of justifications, suitable for describing the semantics of logics in knowledge
representation and computational and mathematical logic. In this theory, each pro-
gram induces a semantic structure called justification frame, which embodies the
potential reasons why the program’s conclusions are true. Interestingly, the authors
show that differences in various semantics can be traced back to a single difference,
namely the way in which justifications with infinite branches are handled. For in-
stance, p is justified w.r.t. program P3 = {p ← not q , q ← not p} by the following
infinite branch:
p → not q → p → not q → . . .
This is evaluated as undefined under the well-founded semantics (infinite branches
altering positive and negative literals are always evaluated as undefined under the
well-founded semantics). In contrast, it takes the value of not q under the answer
set semantics (under the answer set semantics infinite branches are evaluated to
the truth value of the first positive (resp. negative) literal whose predecessors are
all negative (resp. positive) literals), which is true w.r.t. answer set {p}, but false
w.r.t. {q}.
Contrary to the other approaches surveyed here, this work focuses on exploit-
ing justifications as mathematical objects to understand different semantics (and
propose new ones) rather than as a means to answer in a compact way, why a
conclusion has been reached. The complete justifications defined in the formal the-
ory of justifications are thus structures that contain information for all literals,
even those that are not directly related to the derivation of a literal in question.
As an explanation in the sense of the new GDPR, complete justifications are thus
not suitable as they are clearly not “concise” and likely not “intelligible and easily
accessible”, as they comprise information unnecessary for a user’s understanding.
Studying how concise and intelligible justifications can be obtained from this struc-
Table 1: Comparison of explanation approaches for consistent logic programs under
the answer set semantics.
justification
approach
type of logic
program
explanation
in terms of
derivation
steps
included
explains
off-line
justifications
normal LP literal
dependency
all one literal
(not) in
answer set
LABAS
justifications
normal
extended LP
literal
dependency
some one literal
(not) in
answer set
causal
justifications
extended LP
with nested
expressions in
the body
rule-literal
dependency
all one literal in
answer set
extended causal
justifications
normal
extended LP
rule-literal
dependency
all one literal
(not) in
answer set
why-not
provenance
normal LP rule
dependency
all one literal
(not) in the
complete
well-founded
model22
rule-based
justifications
normal LP rule
dependency
all one literal
(not) in
answer set
formal theory of
justifications
normal LP literal
dependency
all whole answer
set
tures is an interesting open topic as it would be directly applicable to several logics
and knowledge representation formalisms like argumentation.
3.6 Summary and Discussion
In Sections 3.1 to 3.5 we have surveyed the most prominent approaches for jus-
tifying the solutions to consistent logic programs under the answer set semantics.
Table 2: Comparison of explanation approaches for consistent logic programs under
the answer set semantics (continued).
justification
approach
computation
uses other
models
explanation
of negative
literals
infinite ex-
planations
infinitely
many expla-
nations
off-line
justifications
well-founded
model
assumed or
further
explained
no, if the
program is
finite
no, if the
program is
finite
LABAS
justifications
no further
explained
yes yes
causal
justifications
no assumed no no, if the
program is
finite
extended causal
justifications
well-founded
model
assumed or
further
explained
no, if the
program is
finite
no, if the
program is
finite
why-not
provenance
(do not need
answer sets)
further
explained
no, if the
program is
finite
no, if the
program is
finite
rule-based
justifications
no further
explained
no, if the
program is
finite
no, if the
program is
finite
formal theory no further
explained
yes no, if the
program is
finite
Note that throughout these sections, by referencing an answer set to justify, we
implicitly assumed that logic programs are consistent. While explaining the jus-
tification approaches, we already pointed out differences and similarities between
these approaches. Some of these are reiterated in Tables 1 and 2, which provide a
comparative overview of various features of the justification approaches.
Table 1 illustrates for which types of logic programs the different justification
approaches are defined, in which terms they explain answer sets (i.e. dependencies
between rules or literals), whether all parts of a literal’s derivation are included in a
justification, and what precisely is being explained, i.e. a literal in an answer set, a
literal not contained in an answer set, or a whole answer set. Table 2 complements
this comparison, by showing whether the justification approaches make use of logic
22 The why-not provenance corresponding to each answer set can then be obtained by forcing
programming models other than the answer set in question when constructing a
justification, whether negative literals occur in justifications and, if so, how their
truth value is explained, whether justifications may be infinite, and whether there
may be infinitely many justifications.
In the following, we discuss some of the differences between the justification ap-
proaches in more detail and highlight some of their advantages and disadvantages.
In particular, we focus on the philosophical ideas underpinning the different jus-
tifications approaches (Section 3.6.1), the problem of having exponentially many
justifications (Section 3.6.2), how different approaches deal with negation-as-failure
(Section 3.6.3), and the issues faced when dealing with large logic programs (Sec-
tion 3.6.4).
3.6.1 Explanatory Elements
Due to the usage of different definitions of answer set, the different justifications
embody distinct ideas. For instance, the intuition of off-line justifications (Sec-
tion 3.1) can be traced back to Prolog tabled justifications (Roychoudhury et al.
2000), LABAS justifications (Section 3.2) have an argumentative flavour and are
based on a correspondence between logic programs and their translation into argu-
mentation frameworks (Schulz and Toni 2015; Schulz and Toni 2016), while causal
justifications (Section 3.3) rely on a causal interpretation of rules and the idea of
causal chain (Lewis 1973). Despite their differences, these three approaches share
the fact that they explain why a literal belongs to some answer set using a “con-
cise” graph structure (in the sense that these graphs do not contain information
not related to the literal in question).
The why-not provenance (Section 3.4), which is based on the concept of prove-
nance inherited from the database literature (Green et al. 2007), shares with these
approaches the idea of building concise justifications for each literal. However, why-
not provenance justifications are set-based (instead of graph-based) and are built
without referring to a specific answer set, so justifications are answer set indepen-
dent. The justifications for a particular answer set can be obtained by “forcing” the
appropriate assumptions as done in extended causal justifications.
A similar point of view is also shared by rule-based justifications (Section 3.5.1),
which are based on the concept of an ASPeRiX computation (Lefe`vre et al. 2017).
Conceptually, the major difference between this and the previously mentioned ap-
proaches lies in what is considered as assumptions, i.e. as elements that do not need
to be further justified: rules in the case of rule-based justifications and literals in
the case of the other approaches.
Finally, the formal theory of justifications (Section 3.5.2) aims to explain the
differences between different logic programming semantics by identifying how their
conclusions are justified. Contrary to the other approaches, it provides justifications
for a whole answer set instead of concise justifications for each literal. This is similar
the atoms not in the answer set as assumptions, similarly as done done for extended causal
justifications.
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Fig. 25: Off-line, LABAS, and causal justifications of the truth of on1.
to debugging systems (which we will overview in Section 4), which explain why a
whole set of literals is not an answer set, rather than explaining a specific literal.
3.6.2 The Problem of Exponentially Many Justifications
As mentioned in the introduction, a key point for a human-understandable answer
to the question of why some conclusion is reached is its conciseness. Most justifi-
cation approaches reviewed here have tackled this issue and provide justifications
that only contain information related to the literal in question. However, a second
issue related to conciseness is how many justifications there are. In this section, we
show that the number of justifications is in general exponential w.r.t. the size of
the program. Let us start by continuing here the discussion about the light bulb
scenario introduced in Example 36 (page 38).
Example 48 (Ex. 36 continued)
Recall that the program P22 representing this scenario consists of the following
rules:
r1t+1 : ont+1 ← swat ∧ swbt
r2t+1 : offt+1 ← swct ∧ swdt
i1t+1 : ont+1 ← ont ∧ not offt+1
i2t+1 : offt+1 ← offt ∧ not ont+1
plus the integrity constraint ← ont ∧ offt for t ≥ 0 and the facts off0, swa0 and
swb0. Recall also that this program has a complete well-founded model and, thus,
a unique answer set, in which ont holds for every time t > 0. Figures 25a, 25b
and 25c respectively depict the off-line, the LABAS and the causal justification
explaining why the light is on in situation 1. We also have that the answer set
why-not provenance of on1 corresponds to the following propositional formula:
AnsWhyP22(on1) = ¬not(on1) ∨ ¬not(on0) ∧ not(off1) ∧ i12 ∨ swa0 ∧ swb0 ∧ r11
where swa0 ∧ swb0 ∧ r11 points out that on1 is true w.r.t. the unique answer set
(which, here, coincides with the complete well-founded model) because of facts swa0
and swb0 and rule r11. It is easy to see the similarity with Figures 25a, 25b and 25c,
in particular that swa0∧ swb0∧ r11 is precisely the conjunction of the three vertices
in these justifications. Informally, these justification can be read as “because both
switches a and b have been pushed in situation 0”.
Let us now consider the justifications for the atom on2, which is true w.r.t. the
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Fig. 26: Off-line justifications of on2 w.r.t. the unique answer set of Example 48.
unique answer set. Figure 26 depicts two of the six possible off-line justifications
for on2. Furthermore, by replacing swd
−
1 with swc
−
1 in Figures 26a and 26b, we
obtain another two off-line justifications. Similarly, by replacing swc−0 with swd
−
0
in Figure 26a, we obtain another off-line justification and, by replacing both swc−0
and swd−1 respectively with swd
−
0 and swc
−
1 , we obtain the sixth one. Figure 27
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Fig. 27: Off-line justification of on3 w.r.t. the unique answer set of Example 48.
depicts one of the off-line justifications of on+3 and, by replacing any subset of
{swc−1 , swc
−
2 , swc
−
3 } by its corresponding subset of {swd
−
1 , swd
−
2 , swd
−
3 }, we obtain
another 7 alternative off-line justifications. That is, the number of off-line justifica-
tions grows exponentially with the number of situations in which nothing happens.
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Fig. 28: LABAS justifications of on2 w.r.t. the unique answer set of Example 48.
i
on2
12
r
on1
11
swa0 swb0
Fig. 29: The unique causal justification of on2 w.r.t. the unique answer set of Ex-
ample 48.
Similarly, the number of why-not justifications23 (i.e. disjuncts in the answer set
provenance information) of ont grows exponentially, because the conjunction of all
atoms in an off-line justification plus the rules used to derive those atoms form a
why-not justification (Dama´sio et al. 2013, Theorem 4). The number of LABAS
justifications also grows exponentially. There are two LABAS justifications for on2,
displayed in Figures 28a and 28b. The reason for the exponential explosion is that
ont can be justified through any oni with i < t . On the other hand, as explained
in Section 3.3 (page 38) (extended) causal justifications are somehow preserved by
inertia in the sense that, at any situation t + 1, if nothing happens, then the jus-
tification of ont+1 can be obtained by adding to the justification of ont an edge
from iont1t to i
ont+1
1t+1 . For instance, Figure 29 shows the unique (extended) causal
justification of on2. 
23 Why-not information can be obtained in polynomial time and size w.r.t. the program. However,
rewriting it as a disjunction of minimal conjuncts may require exponential space.
Despite the fact that understanding negation-as-failure as a default allows to
exponentially reduce the number of causal justifications on some knowledge rep-
resentation scenarios as illustrated by the above example, there still exist logic
programs that produce an exponential number of causal justifications:
Example 49
Consider the following logic program adapted from (Cabalar et al. 2014):
p1 ← q1
p1 ← u1
pi ← pi−1 ∧ qi for i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}
pi ← pi−1 ∧ ui for i ∈ {2, . . . ,n}
qi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
ui for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}
whose unique answer set is {p1, q1, u1 . . . , pn , qn , un}. Note that p1 can be justified
using the facts q1 or u1; the atom p2 can be justified using the sets of facts {q1, q2},
{q1, u2}, {u1, q2} or {u1, u2}; and so on. It is easy to see that atom pn can be
justified using 2n different sets of facts and, thus, that the number of justifications
grows exponentially with respect to the size of the program. 
Although this logic program has no deeper knowledge representation meaning,
it points out a potential problem regarding the human-readability of the answers
provided by current justification approaches. The issue of an exponential num-
ber of justifications illustrated by Example 49 holds for any justification approach
that records minimal sets of facts used to derive the justified atom, in particular, all
justification approaches reviewed here. This does not mean that other kinds of poly-
nomial justifications can be used. For instance, for causal justifications or why-not
provenance, a non-simplified formula could be returned and, if we consider such a
formula as the justification, then it would be polynomial. In our running example,
we would have that pn is justified by the causal term (q1+u1)∗(q2+u2)∗. . .∗(qn+un)
or the why-not provenance formula (q1∨u1∨¬not(p1))∧ (q2∨u2∨¬not(p2))∧ . . .∧
(qn ∨ un ∨ ¬not(pn)). On the other hand, these non-simplified expressions are not
minimal and, thus, they do not adhere to the desired conciseness criterion for jus-
tifications. Another alternative is to provide simplified justifications, but selecting
only some of them in case a some imposed preferences (Cabalar et al. 2014). For
instance, approaches in databases (Specht 1993) and Prolog (Roychoudhury et al.
2000) implicitly impose such preferences by selecting only the first negative literal
of a rule that fails as its unique justification.
3.6.3 Interpreting Negation-as-Failure
Related to the above exponentiality problem is the way in which different ap-
proaches interpret negative literals. The definition of answer sets (Gelfond and
Lifschitz 1988; Gelfond and Lifschitz 1991) is inherently non-deterministic: a can-
didate set is (non-deterministically) selected and then checked against the program
to see whether it is the minimal model of the reduct with respect to this candi-
date. For normal logic programs, the checking part can be done deterministically
in polynomial time, for instance, by iterating the well-known direct consequences
operator introduced by van Emden and Kowalski (1976); but the non-determinism
is still present in the selection of the candidate. This non-determinism is handled
by most justification approaches by considering some part of the justification as as-
sumptions: negative literals in the case of off-line, LABAS and causal justifications;
and rules in the case of rule-based justifications (formal theory of justifications
takes a different approach, representing this by infinite branches). Regarding the
approaches that use negative literals as assumptions, a remarkable difference is
how they do or do not justify those negative literals. As the two extremes we have
LABAS and causal justifications: the former justifies all negative literals (intro-
ducing cycles in the justifications when even-length negative dependency loops are
present in the program), while the latter treats all negative literals as assumptions,
or rather defaults, that need no further explanation. In the middle, we have off-
line and extended causal justifications, which further explain some negative literals,
while treating others as assumptions (when the set of assumptions is minimised,
these approaches justify all negative literals that can be explained without intro-
ducing cycles in the justifications).
We have seen that treating negative literals as assumptions may help to (ex-
ponentially) reduce the number of justifications of some knowledge representation
problems in which negation is used to express defaults. Let us now illustrate the
opposite case, with the following example from (Schulz and Toni 2016), where jus-
tifications for negative literals are as important as those for positive literals:
Example 50
The logic program P27 in Figure 30 represents the decision support system used by
an ophthalmologist. It encodes some general world knowledge as well as an ophthal-
mologist’s specialist knowledge about the possible treatments of shortsightedness.
P27 also captures the additional information that the ophthalmologist has about
his shortsighted patient Peter. Program P27 has a unique answer set
M24 = { shortSighted, afraidToTouchEyes, student, likesSports, tightOnMoney,
correctiveLens, caresAboutPracticality, intraocularLens }
Focusing on the positive dependencies on facts and not considering dependencies
on negative literals, we can only say that Peter has been recommend to use an
intraocularLens because he is shortSighted. However, this reasoning could also lead
to the recommendation of other treatments that have the same positive dependen-
cies: glasses, contactLens or laserSurgey. Negative dependencies, on the other hand,
tell us that intraocularLens was recommended because all the other alternatives
were discarded for different reasons: glasses because Peter likesSports, contactLens
because he is afraidToTouchEyes and laserSurgey because he is a student without
richParents. 
The informal reading shown in the above example can be extracted from off-
line, LABAS, extended causal, why-not provenace and rule-based justifications, but
not from (non-extended) causal justifications. A general approach to justifications
should be able to effectively combine both interpretations of negation-as-failure,
tightOnMoney ← student ∧ not richParents
caresAboutPracticality ← likesSports
correctiveLens ← shortSighted ∧ not laserSurgery
laserSurgery ← shortSighted ∧ not tightOnMoney ∧ not correctiveLens
glasses ← correctiveLens ∧ not caresAboutPracticality∧
not contactLens
contactLens ← correctiveLens ∧ not afraidToTouchEyes∧
not longSighted ∧ not glasses
intraocularLens ← correctiveLens ∧ not glasses ∧ not contactLens
shortSighted ←
afraidToTouchEyes ←
student ←
likesSports ←
Fig. 30: Program P27 from Example 50.
something which to the best of our knowledge has not been studied in the litera-
ture yet.
3.6.4 Large Programs and Application-Oriented Considerations
Our comparison so far has concentrated on the theoretical, or even philosophical,
nature of justification approaches. Another important, and distinguishing, aspect
of justification approaches is their applicability when solving real-world problems.
In such situations, various challenges arise.
Firstly, representing a real-world problem may result in a large logic program,
where literals may have long derivations, i.e. their truth value depends on a large
number of rules. It is then not clear, which information a justification should com-
prise in order to be, on the one hand, succinct enough for humans to understand,
but, on the other hand, complete enough to provide all important information.
For example, justification approaches where all derivation steps are included in the
justification, that is all approaches other than LABAS justifications, may struggle
with the succinctness when explaining a large logic program, as explanations grow
with longer derivations. In contrast, LABAS justifications are independent of the
derivation length. However, a large logic program may also comprise more depen-
dencies on negative literals, thus increasing the size of LABAS justifications. More
generally, it is an open problem how to effectively deal with the growing size (as
well as the previously mentioned exponential number) of justifications.
In order to use justifications in real-world problems, they need to be automatically
constructed. Currently, only LABAS, causal and why-not provenance justifications
have been implemented in working prototypes.24 A related issue is which type of
logic programs can be explained. The only approach able to handle non-normal
logic programs, i.e. logic programs with disjunctive heads, is the causal justification
approach, which can also deal with nested expressions in the body.25 Furthermore,
in practice logic programs are rarely normal and often use additional language
constructs, such as weight constraints, aggregates, and choice rules, which extend
the syntax and/or semantics of logic programs under the answer set semantics.
Choice rules are handled by off-line justifications and in a limited way by causal
justifications (Cabalar and Fandinno 2016). Note that explanations of additional
language constructs have not been investigated so far.
As a last challenge, we mention variables. Even though the theory of most justi-
fication approaches can easily be applied to programs with variables by considering
the complete grounding of the program, it is questionable if this method yields
meaningful justifications in practice. The difficulty of handling variables in expla-
nations of inconsistent programs is a further indication that justifications involving
variables are non-trivial, and therefore an interesting consideration for future work.
4 Debugging of Inconsistent Logic Programs
In this section, we review the most prominent approaches for explaining inconsistent
logic programs. i.e. logic programs that have no answer set. Note that various
approaches discussed in this section are not only applicable to inconsistent logic
programs, but also to consistent ones. More specifically, they can also be used to
explain why a set of atoms of a consistent logic program is not an answer set,
or even why a set of atoms is an answer set, and are thus closely related to the
previously reviewed justification approaches.
Finding errors that lead to a logic program being inconsistent is often referred
to as debugging. Errors can be roughly divided into syntactic and semantic ones.26
The first category, comprising for example misspelled literals and wrong rule layout,
are handled by most IDEs (Integrated Development Environments) for ASP such as
SeaLion (Busoniu et al. 2013), ASPIDE (Febbraro et al. 2011), and APE (Sureshku-
mar et al. 2007).
Semantic errors are more difficult to identify due to the inherent declarative
nature of the answer set semantics. In procedural programming languages, the cause
of wrong program behaviour can be found by investigating the program procedure
step-by-step. This cannot be straightforwardly done for logic programs, as answer
sets are computed in a ‘guess and check’ fashion rather than procedurally. Various
approaches tackle this problem by searching for known error classes for inconsistent
logic programs, for example unfounded loops, unsupported atoms, and unsatisfied
24 There also used to be an implementation of off-line justifications (El-Khatib et al. 2005), but
this is not available anymore.
25 In this survey, we have limited ourselves to normal extended logic programs. For a the defi-
nition of causal justifications for logic programs with nested expressions in the body, we refer
to (Fandinno 2016b).
26 Note that we here use these terms differently than e.g. Syrja¨nen (2006).
rules. We review these approaches in Sections 4.1 to 4.3. Another approach makes
use of the unsatisfiable core feature of the ASP solver wasp, which we review
in Section 4.4, and Section 4.5 outlines an approach for finding semantic errors
that indeed applies a step-by-step procedure. Finally, Section 4.6 concludes the
section with a discussion about similarities and differences between these debugging
approaches. Throughout this section, we will use the term ‘debugging’ to refer to
the task of finding and explaining semantic errors in logic programs.
4.1 The spock System – Debugging with a Meta Program
The spock system explains why a potential answer set, i.e. some set of atoms, is not
an answer set of a the given program P . This is achieved by transforming P into
a meta (logic) program, expressing, for example, conditions for the applicability of
rules in P . Each answer set of this meta program contains the atoms of a potential
answer set of P along with special atoms indicating reasons why this potential
answer set is not an actual answer set of P . Thus, spock uses answer sets of a meta
logic program for explaining the inconsistency of a given logic program.
The spock system is a command line tool27 usable with either the DLV (Leone
et al. 2006) or Smodels (Syrja¨nen and Niemela¨ 2001) ASP solver.28 It implements
two different approaches to transform P into a meta-program, where the second
(Gebser et al. 2008) was developed as a successor of the first (Brain et al. 2007a).
Both transformations distinguish three types of reasons for explaining why a set
of atoms is not an answer set. These reasons are different ways of violating the
definition of answer sets as given by Lin and Zhao (2004) and extended by Lee
(2005). Note that this definition of answer sets is equivalent to the one given in
Section 2.
Definition 32 (Answer Set)
A set of atoms M ⊆ At is an answer set of a program P iff
1. each rule r ∈ P is satisfied by M , i.e.
• head(r) ∩M 6= {} if r is applicable;
2. each atom a ∈ M is supported w.r.t. M , i.e.
• there exists r ∈ P such that r is applicable w.r.t. M and head(r)∩M = {a};
3. each (positive dependency) loop L ⊆ M is founded w.r.t. M , where
• L is a loop iff for all a ∈ L there is a chain of rules r1, . . . , rn ∈ P (n ≥ 1)
such that a ∈ head(r1) ∩ body
+(rn), and if n > 1 then it holds for all ri
(1 ≤ i < n) that ∃bi ∈ body
+(ri) ∩ head(ri+1) with bi ∈ L, and
• L is founded w.r.t. M iff there exists r ∈ P such that r is applicable and
satisfied w.r.t. M , head(r) ∩M ⊆ L, and body+(r) ∩ L = {}. 
27 http://www.kr.tuwien.ac.at/research/systems/debug/index.html
28 Smodels is not maintained anymore and may thus not work on new systems. However, spock
should work fine on most systems using DLV.
The third condition defines a loop as a set of atoms that positively depend on
themselves, possibly via positive dependencies on other atoms in the loop. Such
a positive dependency loop is founded w.r.t. M if there exists an applicable and
satisfied rule that allows to derive some loop atoms without using other atoms in
this loop. An atom contained in an unfounded loop is said to be unfounded.
Both transformation approaches of spock generate reasons why a set of atoms M
is not an answer set in terms of violations of the three conditions in Definition 32.
These reasons are:29
1. a rule r ∈ P is not satisfied,
2. an atom a ∈ M is not supported,
3. there exists an unfounded loop in M .
In the following, we illustrate how the two transformation approaches generate
these three reasons and point out some differences between the approaches.
4.1.1 Transformation 1
The first transformation approach (Brain et al. 2007b; Brain et al. 2007a), defined
for normal logic programs, can be used to explain
1. why a set of atoms is an answer set, by referring to the applicability and non-
applicability of rules, and
2. why a set of atoms is not an answer set, by referring to the violation (i.e. non-
satisfaction) of rules, the unsupportedness of atoms, or the unfoundedness of
atoms.
To achieve the first, each rule r : h ← b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn ∧ not c1 ∧ . . . not cm of a
normal program P is transformed into two new rules30
applicable(r) ← b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn ∧ not c1 ∧ . . . not cm (45)
h ← applicable(r) (46)
They respectively express that r is applicable if the body of r is true and that the
head of r can be deduced if r is applicable. Similarly, rules expressing conditions
under which rule r is ‘blocked’ are added, namely if one of its positive body literals b
or negative body literals not c are false (c∗ /∈ At is a new atom).
blocked(r) ← not b (47)
blocked(r) ← not c∗ (48)
c∗ ← not c (49)
These transformed rules are added for each rule in the given program and each of
its body literals.
29 Lloyd (1987) discusses a similar idea for diagnosing errors in Prolog programs in terms of
incorrect rules (analogous to unsatisfied rules) and uncovered atoms (analogous to unsupported
atoms).
30 The transformed rules as originally defined also have body literals ok(r) and ko(r) for fine-tuning
the debugging process, which we omit as they do not play a role at this point.
The transformation given by rules (45)-(49) is called kernel transformation of
P and denoted Tk [P ]. For a consistent program P , the answer sets of Tk [P ] co-
incide with the answer sets of P , but additionally contain the new tagging-atoms
applicable(r) and blocked(r) (Brain et al. 2007a). This ‘explains’ why a set of atoms
is an answer set in the sense that it gives an insight into the rules that were used
to derive the answer set.
Example 51 (Ex. 36 continued, page 38)
The rules of the logic program from Example 36 can be grounded for the first time
step as follows, obtaining the logic program P28:
r1 : on1 ← swa0 ∧ swb0
r2 : off1 ← swc0 ∧ swd0
r3 : on1 ← on0 ∧ not off1
r4 : off1 ← off0 ∧ not on1
r5 : off0 ←
r6 : swa0 ←
r7 : swb0 ←
The only answer set of P28 is {swa0, swb0, off0, on1}. In comparison, the only answer
set of Tk [P28] is {swa0, swb0, off0, on1, applicable(r1), applicable(r5), applicable(r6),
applicable(r7), blocked(r2), blocked(r3), blocked(r4)}, pointing out that this answer
set was obtained due to the applicability of rules r1, r5, r6, and r7, whereas the
applicability of the other rules was blocked. 
For explaining the inconsistency of a logic program, three additional extrapo-
lation transformations are performed (rules (50)-(55)), denoted Tex [P ]. They al-
low to generate potential answer sets, i.e. sets of atoms, that violate Definition 32
and thus provide an explanation of the inconsistency. To generate potential an-
swer sets choice-rules are used, which allow to choose whether or not the head
of this rule should be true if the rule is applicable. These rules have the form
{head(r)} ← body(r) and are shorthand notation for
head(r) ← body(r) ∧ not x
x ← not head(r)
where x /∈ At is a new atom.
Concerning the first inconsistency reason – the violation of rules – a new abnor-
mality tagging-atom unsatisfied(r) is introduced and used to transform each rule r ,
where head(r) = h.31
{h} ← applicable(r) (50)
unsatisfied(r) ← applicable(r) ∧ not h (51)
31 We use the more intuitive naming unsatisfied(r) instead of the original abp(r) (Brain et al.
2007a) (similarly for the tagging-atoms described in the rest of this section).
When used for explaining inconsistent programs, rule (50) substitutes rule (46) from
the kernel transformation. This allows to exclude h from an answer set, even if r is
applicable. This choice rule allows to generate potential answer sets and rule (51)
derives a respective reason why they may not be actual answer sets. In particular,
this is the case if a rule is applicable w.r.t. a potential answer set but it head is not
contained in this set.
The second extrapolation transformation is concerned with the supportedness
of atoms. It introduces a new abnormality tagging-atom unsupported(a) for each
a ∈ At, used in a transformation as follows:
{a} ← blocked(r1) ∧ . . . ∧ blocked(rk ) (52)
unsupported(a) ← a, blocked(r1) ∧ . . . ∧ blocked(rk ) (53)
where r1, . . . , rk are all the rules with head a. Similarly to the first extrapolation
transformation, rule (52) allows to choose if a is or is not included in a potential
answer set being explained. Rule (53) derives unsupported(a) whenever a is in the
answer set without any rule to support it.
The third extrapolation transformation deals with unfounded atoms. A new ab-
normality tagging-atom unfounded(a) is introduced for each atom a ∈ At and used
as follows:
{unfounded(a)} ← not unsupported(a) (54)
a ← unfounded(a) (55)
This transformation gives a choice to include or exclude the abnormality atom
unfounded(a), given that there is no other reason for ato be causing the inconsis-
tency, namely being unsupported. This is different from the previous transforma-
tions, where abnormality atoms are only derived if there is an actual violation of a
condition in Definition 32. Here, the abnormality atom may be derived even if the
third condition in Definition 32 is not violated. This means that unfounded loops
cannot be identified with certainty.
Example 52
Consider the following inconsistent logic program P29:
r1 : a ← not b
r2 : b ← not b
The answer sets of Tk [P29] ∪ Tex [P29] (where rule (46) is not included since deriv-
ability of the head is expressed through rule (50) as previously explained) indicate
potential answer sets and explain why these potential answers sets are not actual
answer sets by pointing out violations concerning the definition of answer sets.
• M25 = {a, b, unsupported(a), unsupported(b), blocked(r1), blocked(r2)}
• M26 = {b, unsupported(b), blocked(r1), blocked(r2)}
• M27 = {a, unfounded(a), unsatisfied(r2), applicable(r1), applicable(r2)}
• M28 = {a, unsatisfied(r2), applicable(r1), applicable(r2)}
• M29 = {unsatisfied(r1), unsatisfied(r2), applicable(r1), applicable(r2)}
M25 expresses that {a, b} is not an answer set because neither of the two atoms are
supported by an applicable rule. This is because both r1 and r2 are blocked w.r.t.
{a, b}. In contrast M29 explains that w.r.t. {} both r1 and r2 are applicable, but
the head of neither rule is included in {}. M27 illustrates the guessing of unfounded
atoms. It states that {a} is not an answer set because a may be unfounded and
because r2 is violated. Note that this guess is redundant, since answer set M28
explains {a} by only referring to the violation of r2. In fact, a is not unfounded
here, as it is not part of an unfounded loop w.r.t. {a} (it is not part of a loop at
all). 
As shown by Example 52, there may be many explanations for the inconsistency
of a logic program and some of them may be redundant. It is thus advisable to only
consider explanations with a minimal number of abnormality tagging-atoms. This
also ensures that unfounded(a) only occurs if a is indeed unfounded (Brain et al.
2007a). In Example 52, minimisation narrows the explanations down to sets M26
and M28.
Example 53
Let P30 be the logic program P29 with the two additional rules:
r3 : a ← b
r4 : b ← a
These rules induce an unfounded loop w.r.t. the set {a, b}. Tk [P30] ∪ Tex [P30] has
three answer sets explaining why {a, b} is not an answer set: one in terms of a
being an unfounded atom (comprising unfounded(a)), one in terms of b being an
unfounded atom (comprising unfounded(b)), and one in terms of both atoms being
unfounded (comprising both unfounded(a) and unfounded(b)). Similarly to Exam-
ple 52, the last of these three answer sets provides a redundant explanation com-
pared to the first two. However, here the explanations in terms of unfoundedness of
atoms are correct, as there exists an unfounded loop. In addition, Tk [P30]∪Tex [P30]
has four answer sets stating the same reasons as M26 −M29. 
Note that spock does not suggest how to change an inconsistent logic program to
make it consistent. However, based on the abnormality tagging-atoms in an answer
set M of Tk [P ] ∪ Tex [P ] there is a straightforward way of turning the inconsistent
program P into a consistent logic program:
• if unsatisfied(r) ∈ M , then delete r from P ;
• if unsupported(a) ∈ M or unfounded(a) ∈ M , then add a ← to P .
If this is done for all abnormality-tagging atoms in M , the changed logic program
has an answer set M ∩At. Note that even though this change results in a consistent
program, there is no guarantee that this program captures the originally intended
meaning.
Example 54 (Ex. 52 continued)
Consider adding b ← to P29, based on M26. This turns P29 into a consistent
logic program with answer set {b}. However, the intended meaning of the program
may have been a choice between answer set {a} and {b}, with the programmer’s
mistake being that not b in r2 should have been not a. In this case, the change does
not capture the original meaning. 
In addition to giving explanations of inconsistent programs with respect to au-
tomatically generated potential answer sets, the spock system also allows for more
user-directed explanations. Among others, a user can specify a set of rules and
atoms from which the explanations are drawn (Brain et al. 2007b). For example, in
P29 we may be sure that rule r2 is correct and thus restrict
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atoms unsatisfied(r) to rule r1. This prevents the construction of answer set M28,
thus resulting in M26 as the only explanation (when using minimisation). Further-
more, an atom a that should be included in an answer set can be specified by adding
the constraint ← not a to the kernel transformation of the given logic program.
4.1.2 Transformation 2
In the first transformation approach of spock, an ASP solver is merely used to
compute the answer sets of the kernel and extrapolation transformations, thus gen-
erating explanations. That is, the kernel and extrapolation transformations are
constructed externally (from the ASP solver). In contrast, the second transforma-
tion approach of spock (Gebser et al. 2008) uses an ASP solver to both construct
a transformation and compute explanations. This is achieved by using a static
non-ground meta-program Pmeta , which expresses violation conditions that can be
instantiated with any given logic program. The second transformation approach
is furthermore defined for any logic program, i.e. the head of rules is a (possibly
empty) disjunction of atoms.
In order to instantiate the meta-program with the rules and atoms of a given
logic program P , an input transformation Pinp [P ] is generated, containing facts
that express which rules r and atoms a are contained in P . More specifically, for
every atom a ∈ At, every rule r ∈ P (where r is the label of the rule), and every
h ∈ head(r), b ∈ body+(r), and c ∈ body−(r) the following facts are included in
Pinp [P ]:
atom(a) ← (56)
rule(r) ← (57)
head(r , h) ← (58)
bodyP(r , b) ← (59)
bodyN(r , c) ← (60)
This input transformation Pinp [P ] is combined with the static meta-program Pmeta
to compute explanations for inconsistent logic programs using an ASP solver. The
meta-program uses a more explicit way of constructing potential answers sets than
32 In the spock implementation this is achieved by using flags exrules and exatoms for specifying
rules and atoms to be debugged. This restricts the transformations to these rules and atoms.
the extrapolation transformations, namely, for every atom(a) there is the choice to
include or not include it in a potential answer set.33
in(A) ← atom(A) ∧ not out(A) (61)
out(A) ← atom(A) ∧ not in(A) (62)
Thus, an answer set of Pinp [P ] ∪ Pmeta comprises for each atom a ∈ At either
in(a) or out(a). In contrast, an answer set of Tk [P ]∪Tex [P ] either does or does not
contain a ∈ At.
The other parts of the meta-program Pmeta are similar to the kernel and extrap-
olation transformations. The rule applicability conditions of the kernel transforma-
tion (rules (45)-(49)) are expressed in Pmeta as follows:
blocked(R) ← bodyP(R,B) ∧ out(B) (63)
blocked(R) ← bodyN(R,C ) ∧ in(C ) (64)
applicable(R) ← not blocked(R) (65)
In contrast to the first transformation approach, the applicability of a rule is here
expressed in terms of the rule not being blocked.
The following rules of the meta-program Pmeta generalise the extrapolation trans-
formations for rule satisfiability from normal rules to rules whose head may be
empty or a disjunction of atoms.34 In contrast to normal rules, here we check if at
least one of the head atoms of an applicable rule is satisfied.
headSatisfied(R) ← head(R,A) ∧ in(A) (66)
unsatisfied(R) ← applicable(R) ∧ not headSatisfied(R) (67)
For logic programs that are not normal, an atom may be unsupported even if
there exists a rule with a in the head that is not blocked. As stated in the second
condition of Definition 32, a is supported if some rule is applicable and a is the
only head atom that is in the potential answer set being explained. Thus, for an
atom to be unsupported, this condition has to be false.
oHeadTrue(R,A) ← head(R,A2) ∧ A 6= A2 ∧ in(A2) (68)
supported(A) ← head(R,A) ∧ applicable(R) ∧ not oHeadTrue(R,A) (69)
unsupported(A) ← in(A) ∧ not supported(A) (70)
The biggest difference between the first and second transformation approach
concerns unfounded loops. Just like the first approach, the second includes a choice
as to whether or not an atom that is part of the potential answer set being explained
is unfounded (see rules (71) and (72)). The difference is that if an atom is guessed
to be unfounded, there is a check (see rule (73)) of the foundedness condition in
Definition 32. That is, for an unfounded atom a it is checked if there is an applicable
33 Throughout this section, we use uppercase letters to denote variables.
34 The meta-program also contains rules explicitly handling unsatisfied constraints, tagging them
with a different abnormality atom. For simplicity, and since rule (67) also applies to constraints,
we do not report these constraint rules.
rule r with a in the head (if so, r is also satisfied since unfounded(a) only holds if
in(a)) that has no head atom that is founded (in the same loop) and no positive
body atom that is unfounded (in the same loop). If such a rule exists, a is by
Definition 32 founded, which is why this check is implemented as a constraint in
Pmeta (rule (73)). This ensures that unfounded(a) is only part of an answer set of
Pinp [P ] ∪ Pmeta , if a is actually unfounded.
unfounded(A) ← in(A) ∧ supported(A) ∧ not founded(A) (71)
founded(A) ← in(A) ∧ not unfounded(A) (72)
← unfounded(A) ∧ head(R,A) ∧ applicable(R)∧ (73)
not headNotinLoop(R) ∧ not BodyPInLoop(R)
headNotinLoop(R) ← head(R,A) ∧ founded(A) (74)
BodyPInLoop(R) ← bodyP(R,A) ∧ unfounded(A) (75)
Furthermore, there are rules ensuring that only one loop is considered at a time,
i.e. unfounded(a) and unfounded(b) only hold if a and b are part of the same loop.
Another main difference between the two spock approaches is that the second
transformation approach only explains sets of atoms that are not answer sets of the
given logic program, whereas the first also explains actual answer sets of the given
logic program (if any exist). This is due to the following rules in the meta-program
Pmeta , ensuring that at least one abnormality tagging-atom is part of an answer set:
noAS ← unsatisfied(r) (76)
noAS ← unsupported(r) (77)
noAS ← unfounded(r) (78)
← not noAS (79)
Example 55 (Ex. 52 continued)
Applying the second transformation approach to P29, spock computes the answer
sets of Pinp [P29] ∪ Pmeta , yielding the following:
• M30 = {in(a), in(b), founded(a), founded(b), unsupported(a), unsupported(b),
blocked(r1), blocked(r2), headSatisfied(r1), headSatisfied(r2),
headNotinLoop(r1), headNotinLoop(r2)}
• M31 = {in(b), out(a), founded(b), unsupported(b), blocked(r1), blocked(r2),
headSatisfied(r2), headNotinLoop(r2)}
• M32 = {in(a), out(b), founded(a), supported(a), supported(b), unsatisfied(r2),
applicable(r1), applicable(r2), headSatisfied(r1), headNotinLoop(r1)}
• M33 = {out(a), out(b), supported(a), supported(b), unsatisfied(r1), unsatisfied(r2),
applicable(r1), applicable(r2)}
Note that all answer sets also comprise the facts in Pinp [P29], such as atom(a),
head(r1, a), and rule(r1), as well as the atom noAS, which we omitted above for
readability. Since the second transformation approach does not generate explana-
tions containing unfoundedness as a reason when an atom is in fact founded, there
is no equivalent of answer set M27 from the first transformation approach. All other
answer sets of Tk [P29] ∪ Tex [P29] report the same reasons as the answer sets given
above. 
Example 56 (Ex. 53 continued)
For the program P29, which comprises an unfounded loop w.r.t. {a, b}, even more re-
dundant explanations are omitted when using the second transformation approach.
More precisely, as for P29 there is one explanation for each possible set of atoms, i.e.
{}, {a}, {b}, and {a, b}. The explanation as to why the last set is not an answer set
is given by unfounded(a) and unfounded(b). The explanations concerning the other
three sets are analogue to the explanations of P29 in Example 55. 
Similarly to the first transformation approach, the user can specify constraints
for debugging. An atom a can, for example, be forced to (not) be a part of an
answer set by adding the constraint ← out(a) (respectively ← in(a)) to the input
transformation of the given logic program. In the same way, constraints on the
abnormality tagging-atoms can be specified, e.g. ← unsatisfied(r) enforces that
rule r is satisfied.
In conclusion, the second transformation approach requires less processing of the
given logic program P performed outside the ASP solver than the first transfor-
mation approach. Furthermore, the two transformation approaches differ in the
number of explanations given, since the first approach may yield redundant expla-
nations and explanations where unfoundedness is given as a reason even though the
atom in question is founded.
4.2 The Ouroboros System – Debugging Non-ground Programs
The two spock approaches do not explicitly deal with variables occurring in the
given logic program. However, variables are important to consider for debugging
approaches, since, in practice, logic programs under the answer set semantics often
contain first-order predicates and variables. Handling variables when debugging
thus requires an efficient grounding strategy.
Building upon the second spock transformation, Oetsch et al. (2010) develop a
meta-program able to construct explanations of inconsistent extended logic pro-
grams possibly comprising variables. In contrast to the approach taken by spock,
which constructs various sets of atoms and explains why these are not answer sets,
Ouroboros requires an intended answer set. It thus assumes that the user already
has a solution in mind. An explanation is then constructed for this anticipated
solution.
Efficiently constructing explanations for logic programs with variables is non-
trivial as it requires grounding (i.e. substituting variables with constants). First
grounding a given logic program and then constructing explanations, for exam-
ple using the spock approach, requires exponential space and double-exponential
time. Instead, the Ouroboros approach requires only polynomial space and single-
exponential time, as it applies grounding to the input transformation and meta-
program during the solving process rather than grounding the given logic program
before transforming and solving it.
Similarly to the input transformation Pinp [P ] of the second spock approach,
Ouroboros constructs an input transformation ̺inp [P ] of a given logic program P ,
expressing which extended literals are part of the head and body of each rule.
Additionally, ̺inp [P ] includes facts expressing which predicates occur in P , what the
position of variables and constants is in each predicate, and which variables occur in
which rules. Since Ouroboros requires a given set of atomsM ⊆ At to be explained,
this set is also transformed to make it applicable to the input transformation and
the meta-program. The interpretation transformation ̺int [M ] includes facts in(a)
for each atom a ∈ M as well as facts stating which predicates occur in M and what
the position of constants is in predicates in M .
The meta-program ̺meta of Ouroboros follows the same ideas as spock, express-
ing conditions under which a rule is unsatisfied or a loop is unfounded. Note that
in contrast to spock, Ouroboros does not explicitly point out unsupported atoms.
Instead, unsupported atoms are handled as singleton loops that are unfounded. The
exact encoding of ̺meta with its more than 160 rules can be found online
35.
When applying an ASP solver to ̺inp [P ]∪̺int [M ]∪̺meta to compute explanations
as to why M is not an answer set, the automatic grounding of the solver allows for
the efficient computation of ground answer sets if P contains variables.
Just like spock, Ouroboros only gives explanations as to why a set of atoms is not
an answer set. The subsequent changing of the program to make it consistent is left
to the user. In addition to explicit negation, Ouroboros can also handle arithmetic
operations with integers (+ and ∗) and allows for comparison predicates (=, 6=, ≥,
≤, >, <). Polleres et al. (2013) further extend Ouroboros to deal with choice rules
and cardinality and weight constraints by translating these constructs into normal
rules (possibly containing variables). Fru¨hstu¨ck et al. (2013) integrate Ouroboros
into the SeaLion IDE.36
4.3 Interactive Debugging Based on spock
No matter which of the two transformations is used, the spock approach may
generate many different explanations, since for every set of atoms that is not an
answer set at least one explanation is constructed. Even for the small logic program
in Example 52, which has only two atoms, four explanations are generated using
the second transformation (see Example 55). Ouroboros tackles this problem by
requiring the user to specify an intended answer set. However, a user may not have a
truth assignment for every atom in mind. Shchekotykhin (2015) therefore proposes
an interactive method on top of the second spock approach, where the user is
queried whether or not an atom should be contained in an answer set. The user’s
answer narrows down the sets of atoms for which explanations are constructed to
the ones relevant to the user and relieves the user of the burden to specify the whole
intended answer set upfront.
As mentioned in previous sections, the user can force atoms to be contained or not
35 www.kr.tuwien.ac.at/research/projects/mmdasp/encoding.tar.gz
36 Note that a special setup of ASP solvers is needed to make this integration work.
contained in explanation answer sets of spock (using the second transformation) by
adding facts in(a) or out(a). In the interactive debugging approach, such statements
are explicitly used as test cases.
Definition 33 (Test Case and Background Theory)
Given a program P , its input transformation Pinp [P ], and the meta-program Pmeta
• Pos,Neg ⊆ { in(a), out(a)
∣∣ a ∈ At } are sets of positive and negative test
cases,
• B ⊆ P is a background theory. 
Positive test cases are atoms that have to be contained in (in(a)) or excluded from
(out(a)) all answer sets. In contrast, negative test cases are atoms that have to
be contained in (in(a)) or excluded from (out(a)) some answer set. A background
theory consists of rules in the logic program that are assumed to be satisfied.
In contrast to the spock approach, answer sets of Pinp [P ] ∪ Pmeta that con-
tain the same abnormality tagging-atoms are considered as the same explanation,
even if the atoms in the respective explained answer sets are different. The aim
is to find sets of abnormality tagging-atoms that satisfy all given test cases and
the given background theory. In other words, we want to compute all answer sets
of Pinp [P ] ∪ Pmeta containing only abnormality tagging-atoms satisfying the test
cases and the background theory. Sets of abnormality tagging-atoms satisfying this
condition are called diagnoses.
Definition 34 (Diagnosis)
Let Er(P) be the set of all abnormality tagging-atoms over a program P , that is,
Er(P) def= { unsatisfied(r)
∣∣ r ∈ P } ∪ { unsupported(a), unfounded(a) ∣∣ a ∈ At }
A set D ⊆ Er(P) is a diagnosis for the problem instance 〈P ,B, Pos,Neg〉 if
1. P∗ = Pinp [P ] ∪ Pmeta ∪ { ← d
∣∣ d ∈ Er(P) \ D } ∪ { ← unsatisfied(r) ∣∣ r ∈
B } ∪ { p ←
∣∣ p ∈ Pos } has an answer set and
2. for each n ∈ Neg, P∗ ∪ {n ← } has an answer set. 
Note that due to the constraints of the form ← d , any answer set of P∗ will only
contain abnormality tagging-atoms from D.
Diagnoses can be found by computing answer sets of the program Pinp [P ] ∪
Pmeta ∪{ ← unsatisfied(r)
∣∣ r ∈ B } and then verifying whether the respective sets
of abnormality tagging-atoms contained in these answer sets satisfy the conditions
for being a diagnosis. Usually, only (subset) minimal diagnoses will be considered.
Example 57
Consider the logic program P28 (see Example 51; page 67) with the additional
constraint r8 : ← not off1. This program, called P31, is inconsistent. Using the
second translation approach of spock, 256 answer sets are computed for Pinp [P31]∪
Pmeta , each explaining a different set of atoms that is not an answer set. Let us
now specify B = {r1, r2, r6, r7}, in other words, we are sure that the first two rules
are correct and that switches a and b are on in situation 0. This narrows down the
answer sets; program Pinp [P31] ∪ Pmeta ∪ { ← unsatisfied(r1), ← unsatisfied(r2),
← unsatisfied(r6), ← unsatisfied(r7)} has only 28 answer sets. Given positive test
cases Pos = {out(swc0), out(swd0)}, only eight out of the 28 answer sets satisfy
these, namely :
• M34 = {out(on0), out(off0), in(on1), out(off1)} ∪ {unsatisfied(r5), unsatisfied(r8)}
• M35 = {in(on0), out(off0), in(on1), out(off1)} ∪ {unsatisfied(r5), unsatisfied(r8),
unsupported(on0)}
• M36 = {out(on0), out(off0), in(on1), in(off1)}∪{unsatisfied(r5), unsupported(off1)}
• M37 = {in(on0), out(off0), in(on1), in(off1)} ∪ {unsatisfied(r5), unsupported(off1),
unsupported(on0)}
• M38 = {out(on0), in(off0), in(on1), out(off1)} ∪ {unsatisfied(r8)}
• M39 = {in(on0), in(off0), in(on1), out(off1)} ∪ {unsatisfied(r8), unsupported(on0)}
• M40 = {out(on0), in(off0), in(on1), in(off1)} ∪ {unsupported(off1)}
• M41 = {in(on0), in(off0), in(on1), in(off1)}∪{unsupported(off1), unsupported(on0)}
Note that each answer set also contains in(swa0), in(swb0), out(swc0), and out(swd0),
as well as the further tagging-atoms discussed in Section 4.1.2. Taking a closer look
at these 8 answer sets, each of them defines a diagnosis when Neg = {}, namely
the second part of each answer set. Only M38 and M40 induce minimal diagnoses.
Now consider that Neg = {in(on0), in(off0)}. This rules out half of the diagnoses,
leaving only the following four:
• D1 = {unsatisfied(r5), unsatisfied(r8), unsupported(on0)} (cf. M35)
• D2 = {unsatisfied(r5), unsupported(off1), unsupported(on0)} (cf. M37)
• D3 = {unsatisfied(r8), unsupported(on0)} (cf. M39)
• D4 = {unsupported(off1), unsupported(on0)} (cf. M41)
Even though in(off0) /∈ M35, D1 is a diagnosis of the given problem instance since
there are two answer sets of P∗ w.r.t. D1, namely M35 and M39, and in(off0) ∈ M39,
thus satisfying the negative test case in(off0) w.r.t. D1. 
As illustrated in Example 57, positive and negative test cases can considerably
reduce the number of diagnoses and, thus, of explanations as to why sets of atoms
are not answer sets of P . If the user does not specify any test cases, it is therefore
desirable to produce them automatically by querying the user. That is, the user is
asked whether an atom is expected to be contained in or excluded from all or some
answer sets. Ideally, the debugging system chooses an atom as a query that helps
to reduce the number of diagnoses as much as possible.
Definition 35 (Query and Diagnosis Splitting)
Let D be the set of all diagnoses of the problem instance 〈P ,B, Pos,Neg〉 and let
Q ⊆ At be a query. Q splits the diagnoses in D into three sets, where for each
D ∈ D:
• D ∈ DP if for all a ∈ Q, in(a) is in every answer set of P∗;
• D ∈ DN if for all a ∈ Q, out(a) is in every answer set of P∗;
• D ∈ D∅ if D /∈ (DP ∪DN).
This means that DP and DN contain all diagnoses that are still diagnoses if the
atoms in the query are added as positive test cases so as to force them to be,
respectively, included in or excluded from all answer sets. Thus, if the user’s reply
to a query is that the atoms should be included, then the diagnoses in DN can be
disregarded. Likewise, if the user replies that the atoms should be excluded, the
diagnoses in DP can be disregarded.
Example 58 (Ex. 57 continued)
Consider the two atoms that are not part of positive or negative test cases yet,
namely on1 and off1. For Q1 = {on1}, all four diagnoses are in D
P, so DN =
D∅ = {}. For example, the answer sets of P∗ w.r.t. D1 are M35 and M39, and both
comprise in(on1). This means that if the user replies to the query, that on1 should
be in the desired answer set, then no diagnoses can be disregarded. However, if the
user replies that on1 should not be in the desired answer set, then all diagnoses
would be disregarded and therefore no explanations given. This would imply, that
the test cases specified could not be satisfied. In contrast, for Q2 = {off1} we get
DP = {D2,D4}, D
N = {D1,D3}, and D
∅ = {}. Note that if one of the negative
test cases was used as a query, then D∅ 6= {}. For instance, for Q3 = {off0} we get
D1 ∈ D
∅ since out(off0) ∈ M35 but in(off0) ∈ M39. 
There may be a large number of queries, so queries that yield a large information
gain are desirable, i.e. queries that allow to disregard as many diagnoses as possible,
independent of the user’s answer, which clearly is not known when generating a
query. Thus, a useful query should at least yield a partition with DP,DN 6= {} so
that independent of the user’s answer, some diagnoses can be disregarded.
A straightforward selection method is the myopic strategy, which prefers queries
yielding setsDP andDN that have similar size and whereD∅ is as small as possible.
That is, a query that minimises
| | DP | − | DN | | + | D∅ |
Example 59 (Ex. 58 continued)
According to the myopic strategy, Q2 is preferable to Q1 since independent of the
answer of the user, the number of possible queries is reduced to two. 
The idea of this interactive debugging approach is that queries are generated and
presented to the user until only one diagnosis, or a specified maximal number of
diagnoses, is left.
4.4 The dwasp System – Interactive Debugging of Non-ground
Programs
The interactive debugging approach discussed in the previous section only applies
to logic programs without variables. Dodaro et al. (2015) and Gasteiger et al. (2016)
extend the idea, of querying the user to find relevant explanations of inconsistency,
to non-ground programs. Instead of using an elaborate meta-program expressing
possible reasons for inconsistencies as in spock, they use the solving process of the
ASP solver wasp (Alviano et al. 2013; Alviano et al. 2015) to find inconsistencies
in a logic program. Their ASP debugger is thus called dwasp.
Like Shchekotykhin (2015), dwasp allows to define a background theory. If the
background theory is not explicitly specified, the set of facts of the given logic
program P is used. Instead of applying abnormality tagging-atoms to indicate in-
consistencies, the dwasp system adds to each rule in P that is not part of the
background theory a debug atom, stating the name of the rule and the variables
occurring in it.
Definition 36 (Debugging Program)
Given a logic program P and a background theory B ⊆ P , the debugging program
is defined as:
Pdeb [P ] = B ∪ { h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hk ← b1 ∧ . . . ∧ bn ∧ debug(r ,varsr ) (80)
∧not c1 ∧ . . . not cm
∣∣ r ∈ P \ B, head(r) = {h1 ∨ . . . ∨ hk},
body(r) = {b1, . . . , bn , not c1, . . . , not cm} }
where varsr is a tuple consisting of all variables in body(r). 
When applying the wasp solver to the debugging program Pdeb [P ], atoms can
be assumed to hold when computing answer sets. That is, these assumed atoms do
not need to be derived from rules or facts, they are true by default. Assumed atoms
are thus similar to positive test cases in the approach of Shchekotykhin (2015).
If a debugging atom is not assumed to hold, this amounts to “blocking” the
respective rule specified in the atom, i.e. the rule is no longer applicable when
computing answer sets, since a debugging atom cannot be derived using the rules
in Pdeb [P ]. If all debugging atoms are assumed to hold, the answer sets of Pdeb [P ]
(minus the debugging atoms) coincide with the answer sets of P . If P is inconsistent,
it therefore follows that Pdeb [P ] is also inconsistent.
To find rules causing the inconsistency of a program, the wasp solver allows to
compute unsatisfiable cores, i.e. sets of atoms such that if they are assumed to hold,
no answer set exists. In the dwasp system, only debugging atoms are considered
for unsatisfiable cores. Thus, an unsatisfiable core points out a combination of rules
causing the inconsistency.
Definition 37 (Unsatisfiable Core)
Let PGdeb [P ] be the grounding of Pdeb [P ] and let Atdeb(P) be the set of all (ground)
debugging atoms occurring in PGdeb [P ]. C ⊆ Atdeb(P) is an unsatisfiable core iff
PGdeb [P ] is inconsistent when all debugging atoms in C are assumed to hold. 
Note that this definition does not make any assumptions about other atoms assumed
to hold. Therefore, an unsatisfiable core is such that, no matter which other atoms
are assumed to hold, PGdeb [P ] is inconsistent.
If P is inconsistent, clearly Atdeb(P) is an unsatisfiable core. However, there
may be other unsatisfiable cores, which are subsets of Atdeb(P), and thus more
useful for identifying the source of inconsistency. Therefore, only (subset) minimal
unsatisfiable cores are of interest in dwasp.
If there is only one unsatisfiable core, then deleting any of the atoms in the core
from the atoms assumed to hold results in the existence of an answer set. However, if
there are various unsatisfiable cores, only a combination of atoms from the different
cores will lead to the existence of an answer set. dwasp finds such sets of debugging
atoms that, when no longer assumed to hold, ensure the existence of an answer set.
Such sets thus express which rules need to be “blocked” to obtain an answer set.
Definition 38 (dwasp Diagnosis)
Let PGdeb [P ] be the grounding of Pdeb [P ] and let Atdeb(P) be the set of all (ground)
debugging atoms occurring in PGdeb [P ]. Ddwasp ⊆ Atdeb(P) is a diagnosis iff
PGdeb [P ] is consistent when none of the debugging atoms in Ddwasp is assumed
to hold. 
The dwasp system only considers minimal diagnoses. Even though the definition
of diagnosis does not reference unsatisfiable cores, diagnoses are computed from
unsatisfiable cores in dwasp.
Note the difference between the notions of diagnosis used in dwasp and in the
approach of Shchekotykhin (2015). In both cases, a diagnosis comprises atoms iden-
tifying the reason for inconsistency. The difference is that in dwasp a diagnosis is
a set of atoms such that the debugging program is consistent if the atoms are not
contained in answer sets. In contrast, a diagnosis according to Definition 34 is a set
of abnormality tagging-atoms such that the transformed logic program is consistent
if these are the only abnormality tagging-atoms contained in answer sets.
As in the approach by Shchekotykhin (2015), there may be a large number of
diagnoses and not all of them may be relevant to the user. Thus, dwasp uses the
same strategy for querying the user as discussed in the previous section for the
approach by Shchekotykhin (2015). That is, a query atom q ∈ At is determined,
i.e. a ground (non-debugging) atom, which partitions the set of all diagnoses into
DP, DN, and D∅, where:
• Ddwasp ∈ D
P if q is in every answer set of PGdeb [P ] when none of the debugging
atoms in Ddwasp is assumed to hold;
• Ddwasp ∈ D
N if q is in no answer set of PGdeb [P ] when none of the debugging
atoms in Ddwasp is assumed to hold;
• Ddwasp ∈ D
∅ if Ddwasp /∈ (D
P ∪DN).
The only difference in the usage of queries in dwasp as compared to the approach
of Shchekotykhin (2015) is that, rather than adding test cases, the user’s answer
determines if q (in case q should hold) or not q (in case q should not hold) is added
to the set of assumed atoms.
4.5 Stepping
The debugging approach of Oetsch et al. (2018), which extends previous work by
Oetsch et al. (2011) and Pu¨hrer (2014), tackles the problem of explaining why a
set of atoms is or is not an answer set of a logic program in a procedural manner.
Inspired by debugging in procedural programming languages, where the step-wise
Fig. 31: The first rule of P28 is chosen for stepping. The ‘truth assignment’ tab
shows the assignment of truth values to the atoms a and b if a step is performed
on the chosen rule.
execution of a program can be traced, the stepping approach allows to apply rules
and assign literals to be true or false with respect to a potential answer set step by
step. In contrast to the execution of a procedural program, the sequence of steps
in the execution of a logic program is not predetermined, due to the declarative
nature of the answer set semantics. Thus, the user chooses the step sequence in
the stepping approach. This debugging approach has been implemented in the
SeaLion IDE (Busoniu et al. 2013), a logic programming plugin of the Eclipse
platform.
Starting with the empty set as the potential answer set, in each computation step
the user is presented with all rules that are applicable w.r.t. the current potential
answer set. To satisfy the chosen rule, a head of the rule is then added to the current
potential answer set and any atoms that thus cannot be in the potential answer set
(because they occur in the negative body of the rule) are recorded as being false
w.r.t. the potential answer set.
Example 60 (Ex. 52 continued, page 68)
Recall the logic program P28:
r1 : a ← not b
r2 : b ← not b
The stepping starts with no atoms recorded as being true or false w.r.t. the potential
answer set. Thus, both r1 and r2 are applicable since b is not recorded as being in
the potential answer set, so not b may be true w.r.t. the current potential answer set.
The user can therefore choose which of the two rules to apply. Figure 31 illustrates
this scenario in the stepping component of SeaLion, where all applicable rules are
marked in blue. The user chooses r1 to proceed, so r1 is the only ‘active instance’ of
the chosen rule shown in the respective tab (if r1 contained variables, all applicable
grounded versions would be shown in this tab). The active instance r1 is then used
Fig. 32: After the first step, the second rule is active but a step cannot be performed.
for the ‘truth assignment’, which is performed by clicking the ‘step’ button. This
records a as being true and b as being false w.r.t. the potential answer set M ,
as illustrated in the ‘state’ tab at the bottom of Figure 32. After this first step,
rule r2 is still applicable, so it is chosen for the next ‘truth assignment’. However,
as indicated by the red X in Figure 32, the truth assignment that would satisfy r2
cannot be performed. Thus, the stepping computation fails before being completed,
indicating to the user that the assignment of truth values performed so far does
not lead to an answer set. Note that the reason why r2 cannot be used for the next
step is not pointed out to the user explicitly, i.e. that b is recorded as false, but
to satisfy r2 it would also have to be true. If r2 was chosen in the first step, the
stepping would fail straight away, i.e. the scenario from Figure 32 would apply, but
without the truth assignments shown in the ‘state’ tab at the bottom. 
As illustrated in Example 60, the stepping approach gives the user an insight
into the answer set computation in terms of truth assignments to atoms, rather than
providing an explicit explanation of the cause of inconsistency like the previously
discussed debugging approaches. It also does not make any suggestions on how
to change the logic program to make it consistent. Whereas in Ouroboros the user
needs to explicitly specify an intended answer set, the stepping approach indirectly
allows this but does not require it. In other words, if a user expects a certain answer
set, but the logic program is inconsistent or has different answer sets, the stepping
can be targeted towards the intended answer set, until it becomes clear why certain
atoms in the intended answer set are false or why atoms not expected to be in
the answer set are true. However, the stepping approach can also be applied if
a logic program is inconsistent and the user does not know what the answer set
should be. In this case, the user can simply step through applicable rules until the
stepping computation fails, thus providing an insight into how the inconsistency of
the logic program arises. Note that the stepping approach can also be used to find
out how consistent answer sets are derived, in line with the approaches discussed
in Section 3.
Like Ouroboros and dwasp, the stepping system can handle logic programs
with variables and supports language constructs such as constraints, choice rules,
and aggregates. Furthermore, it can easily be used with different ASP solvers.
The theory behind the stepping approach is based on an extension of the
FLP-semantics (Faber et al. 2011) by Oetsch et al. (2012), which coincides with the
answer set semantics. This guarantees that the computation of answer sets using
stepping is sound and complete, that is, any answer set can be reached through
the step-wise application of rules and truth assignment of atoms, and any success-
fully terminated step-wise computation results in an assignment of truth values to
atoms forming an answer set. Thus, if the step-wise computation does not termi-
nate successfully, the current assignment of truth values cannot be extended to an
answer set.
To speed up the step-wise computation, especially in large logic programs with
variables, where rules have various groundings that can be applied in different steps,
the user can perform jumps. A jump is the automatic application of various specified
rules in such a way that they are satisfied. This is useful if the user is not interested
in the exact workings of these rules and their influence on a potential answer set.
Note that it only makes sense to use a jump if the chosen rules can be satisfied given
the current truth assignment, so the user should be sure that the chosen jumping
rules do not pose a problem.
Fig. 33: The user chooses r4 as a rule for jumping.
Example 61 (Ex. 36 continued, page 38)
Consider again the logic program about a light bulb and the four switches to turn
the light on and off. We encode this in P32 for the time steps t = 0 . . . 3. Figure 33
illustrates P32 and the scenario where the user chose the fact off(0) in the first step
and now decides to perform a jump on r4 (see the ‘jump’ tab). Since the jump
only considers the current assignment of truth values and the chosen rule(s), it
makes off(1), off(2), and off(3) true and on(1), on(2), and on(3) false by repeatedly
applying r4. This automatic assignment is shown in the ‘state’ tab in Figure 34,
along with the grounded rules used in the automatic steps of the jump. As illustrated
Fig. 34: Truth assignment and applicable facts (highlighted blue) after the jump.
by the blue highlighting, at this point only facts swa(0) and swb(0) are applicable.
Performing steps on these two facts results in r1 being applicable, but the rule
Fig. 35: Failure of the stepping computation.
cannot be satisfied w.r.t. the current truth assignment, as shown in Figure 35.
The failure provides insights as to why there is no answer set in which the bulb is
turned off at t ≥ 0. Namely, the reason it may be turned off is inertia (application
of rule r4), however, since switches swa and swb are pushed, it follows that the light
bulb must be turned on at t = 1. This conflicts with the previous inertia assumption
that the light is not turned on (not on(1) in r4 when deriving off(1)). 
4.6 Summary and Discussion
In Sections 4.1 to 4.5, we outlined the most prominent approaches to ASP debug-
ging, i.e. the explanation of non-existence of answer sets in terms of semantic errors.
In contrast to the justification approaches discussed Section 3, where the truth value
of literals is explained in detail by referring to truth values of other literals used
in their derivation, the explanations provided by debugging approaches can seem
rather minimalistic. Indeed, debugging aims at providing a pointer to the cause of
inconsistency rather than a full-fledged explanation. Furthermore, we have seen that
these approaches follow different ideas as to what an explanation should encompass
and that they use different methodologies to achieve this. Tables 3 and 4 provide a
comparative overview of the differences and similarities of the surveyed debugging
approaches. In particular, Table 3 compares debugging approaches concerning the
type of logic programs that can be debugged, whether or not logic programs with
variables as well as with language constructs such as aggregates or arithmetic terms
can be debugged, and whether the approach can also be used to explain consistent
logic programs. Table 4 complements this by illustrating whether the debugging
approaches require an intended answer set, or rather, whether they detect mistakes
with respect to potentially intended answer sets, which types of errors in a logic
program the debugging approaches distinguish, and whether the user can or has to
interact with the debugger.
In the following, we discuss some of the distinguishing features in more detail, to
facilitate users to choose the appropriate debugging approach for their application.
4.6.1 Knowledge Representation versus Programming
As discussed by Cabalar (2011), logic programs under the answer set semantics are
seen as a pure knowledge representation and reasoning formalism by some and as
a programming language by others. It is therefore not surprising that explanation
and debugging approaches reflect this difference. Seeing ASP as a knowledge rep-
resentation formalism, a user represents knowledge in terms of a logic program and
uses the answer set semantics to find out which conclusions can be drawn from
this knowledge. The user may also represent a problematic situation and compute
answer sets to find a solution to the problem. Especially in the latter of these two
cases, the user most likely has no idea what the solution may be, in other words,
there is no answer set intended by the user. On the other hand, if ASP is seen as
a programming language, the user may well have an idea as to what the solution,
i.e. the answer sets, should look like.
Taking these considerations into account, the spock approach (Section 4.1) may
be more suitable for knowledge representation applications, as it does not require
that the user specifies an intended answer set. Sets of literals are generated au-
tomatically as potential answer sets, which are then justified as to why they are
37 The earlier version of the stepping approach (Oetsch et al. 2011) uses extended normal pro-
grams.
Answering the “why” in Answer Set Programming
Table 3: Comparison of explanation approaches for inconsistent logic programs.
debugging
approach
type of logic
program
variables
supported
additional
language
constructs
explains
consistent
LPs
spock
transformation 1
normal LP no no yes
spock
transformation 2
LP no no only non
answer sets
Ouroboros extended LP yes arithmetic,
comparison
only non
answer sets
interactive spock LP no no only non
answer sets
dwasp LP yes no no
stepping LP37 yes aggregates,
weight
constraints,
external atoms
yes
not actual answer sets. Similarly, the stepping approach (Section 4.5) does not
require the user to have an answer set in mind as applicable rules are automatically
determined and the user can then freely choose which one to use. However, both
approaches allow the user to guide the explanation towards specific literals that
may be expected in an answer set.
The interactive debugging approaches (Sections 4.3 and 4.4) take a programming
language rather than a knowledge representation view on ASP, as they assume that
the user has at least some idea as to what an answer set should look like, querying
the user about the expected truth values of some literals. The user can certainly
choose these truth values at random, making the interactive approaches applicable
even if the user has no answer set in mind. However, this is not their intended
usage. Note also that in order to know the truth value of a literal chosen by the
debugging approach, the user essentially has to have an answer set in mind, as the
user does not know upfront which literal will be chosen as a query.
The Ouroboros approach (Section 4.2) is clearly on the programming language
end of the spectrum as it requires the user to specify a complete intended answer
set. The user could of course choose an ‘intended’ answer set at random, but, again,
this is not the usage envisaged by this approach.
Table 4: Comparison of explanation approaches for inconsistent logic programs
(continued).
debugging
approach
intended answer
set
error types
user
interaction
spock
transformation 1
possible but not
required
(automatically
generated)
unsatisfied rule,
unsupported atom,
unfounded atom
possible
spock
transformation 2
possible but not
required
(automatically
generated)
unsatisfied
rule/constraint,
unsupported atom,
unfounded atom
possible
Ouroboros required unsatisfied
rule/constraint,
unfounded atom
required for
intended answer
set
interactive spock possible but not
required
unsatisfied
rule/constraint,
unsupported atom,
unfounded atom
required
dwasp possible but not
required
minimal
unsatisfiable core
required
stepping not required but
(indirectly) possible
unsatisfiability of
rules, conflicting
truth value of atoms
required
4.6.2 Error Classification
As in the case of justifications for consistent logic programs, the debugging ap-
proaches also differ regarding the elements used for explaining the inconsistency.
More precisely, they identify different types of ‘errors’ causing a set of literals to
not be an answer set. Broadly speaking, two different ideas towards errors can be
distinguished: the classification of errors into different classes or the reduction of
all errors two one ‘class’.
dwasp and the stepping approach do not use any named error classes, thus
following the latter idea. In dwasp errors are sets of rules that, when blocked,
make the program consistent. However, there is no further explanation as to why
this is the case. On the other hand, errors in the stepping approach are only
indirectly specified. They are indicated by (partial) truth assignments to literals,
which lead to a contradiction. Again, there is no further explanation, other than
the rule causing the contradiction. In contrast, the other approaches reviewed here
distinguish different classes of errors.
The spock system and the two approaches based on it (interactive debugging
and Ouroboros) use mostly the same classes of errors. As previously explained,
these are violations of the definition of answer sets by Lin and Zhao (2004) and
Lee (2005) (see Definition 32 on page 65), namely unsatisfied rules, unsupported
atoms, and unfounded atoms.
Interestingly, one reason for inconsistency of logic programs often discussed in the
literature (You and Yuan 1994; Syrja¨nen 2006; Costantini 2006; Schulz et al. 2015)
is not explicitly pointed out by spock, namely odd-length (negative dependency)
cycles. In Examples 52 and 55 (see pages 68 and 72), the odd-length cycle in r2
of P29 is only indirectly pointed out: M26 expresses that {b} is not an answer set
of P29 since all rules with head b are blocked by {b}. Taking a closer look at P29,
we realise that the only rule with head b is r2 and that the reason for it being
blocked is that not b is in the body of r2. However, if P29 was a large logic program,
it would be infeasible to check all rules with head b to find out that one of them
may comprise an odd-length cycle, causing the rule to be blocked. Similarly, M28
indirectly points out the odd-length cycle by stating that r2 is applicable but its
head is not contained in the set {a}. We then realise that the reason for r2 not
being satisfied is the odd-length cycle.
Example 62
Let P33 be the inconsistent logic program with:
r1 : a ← b r2 : b ← not a (81)
The answer sets of Tk [P33] ∪ Tex [P33] (when using minimisation) are:
• M42 = {a, b, unsupported(b), applicable(r1), blocked(r2)}
• M43 = {a, unsupported(a), blocked(r1), blocked(r2)}
• M44 = {b, unsatisfied(r1), applicable(r1), applicable(r2)}
• M45 = {unsatisfied(r2), blocked(r1), applicable(r2)}
None of the answer sets captures the fact that there is an odd-length cycle a ← not a.
For a similarly structured logic program with more rules and derivation steps be-
tween a and not a it would therefore be difficult to identify that the reason of the
inconsistency is an odd-length cycle. 
A debugging approach related to spock (Syrja¨nen 2006) explicitly points out
inconsistencies due to odd-length cycles. The approach also uses the input transfor-
mation Pinp [P ] of a logic program together with a meta-encoding of two types of
errors: odd-length cycles and violated constraints. However, all odd-length cycles
are considered as faulty, even though some odd-length cycles do not cause a logic
program to be inconsistent. In contrast to the spock system, faults are pointed out
independent of intended or potential answer sets.
Another class of ‘errors’ not considered in any of the debugging approaches are
those of contradictory answer sets. In fact, none of the debugging approaches re-
viewed here deals with contradictory atoms in an answer set. Schulz et al. (2015)
show that logic programs with contradictory answer sets include different types of
semantic errors than inconsistent logic programs. This is also taken into account in
the inconsistency measurements of Ulbricht et al. (2016).
4.6.3 Large and Real-World Logic Programs
We already hinted at the fact that the different debugging approaches require var-
ious levels of user interaction to obtain an explanation. In particular, some ap-
proaches require the user to specify an intended answer set before starting the
debugging process, especially the Ouroboros system. This can be difficult if faced
with a large logic program, potentially comprising hundreds of atoms. Furthermore,
using the stepping approach, the user has to step through every single applica-
ble rule, unless being sure that some rules are not problematic, in which case the
jumping feature can be used. Assuming that the user does not have any idea why
the logic program is inconsistent, thus ruling out jumping, the stepping approach
can take a long time and also be prone to errors for these large programs.
In contrast, for approaches requiring only little user interaction, first and foremost
the spock system, the amount of interaction does not increase when dealing with
large logic programs. However, note that the more literals occur in a program, the
more explanations are computed by spock, namely one for each potential answer
set. The user interaction is thus implicitly required after explanations are computed,
since the user then has to decide which explanations to take into account. It follows,
that, just like the Ouroboros and stepping approaches, using spock with large logic
programs may take a long time.
The two interactive approaches (the one based on spock and the dwasp system)
are the ones that require least user interaction when handling large logic programs.
This is because queries are determined in such a way that the user’s answer provides
maximal information gain. Consequently, the total number of queries generated is
as small as possible. From a user’s point of view, answering a query on the expected
truth value of a single literal may furthermore be easier than specifying the truth
value of all literals at once or choosing a meaningful explanation from all the ones
generated.
When using ASP in practice, logic programs often include additional language
constructs, make use of variables, and are seldom limited to normal rules. These are
important consideration when choosing a debugging approach. Currently, Ouroboros
and the stepping approach are the only ones to handle both negation-as-failure
and explicit negation, variables, and additional language constructs, where the
stepping approach supports more constructs than Ouroboros. dwasp supports
variables, but to the best of our knowledge no explicit negation or additional lan-
guage constructs. Nevertheless, is to be assumed that these will be supported in
the future since dwasp is implemented in terms of the ASP solver wasp, which is
able to handle these.
5 Related Work
In this survey, we focussed on justification and debugging approaches for logic
programs under the answer set semantics. Historically, the concept of justifications
can be traced back to the works of Shapiro (1983) and Sterling and Lalee (1986),
where they have been used as a means for identifying bugs in programs. Later, Lloyd
(1987) introduced the notions of uncovered atoms and incorrect rules under the
completion semantics (Clark 1978) while Sterling and Yalc¸inalp (1989) explained
Prolog expert systems using a meta-interpreter.
An important notion for understanding errors in ASP is the concept of a sup-
ported set of atoms, which was introduced by Pereira et al. (1991) and further elab-
orated by Pereira et al. (1993). Another important concept is the notion of assump-
tions, which was introduced for truth maintenance systems by de Kleer (1986) and
developed for logic programming by Pereira et al. (1993). Specht (1993) presented
one of the first techniques to compute complete proof trees for bottom-up evaluation
of database systems by means of a program transformation. Further techniques for
computing justifications or explanations for Prolog by means of meta-interpreters or
program transformations can be found in (Sterling and Shapiro 1994) and (Bratko
2001). Furthermore, explanation approaches have been developed for knowledge
representation paradigms related to ASP. For instance, Arora et al. (1993) present
explanations for deductive databases and Ferrand et al. (2006) for constraint logic
programs and constraint satisfaction problems.
Regarding justifications for logic programs under the answer set semantics, Brain
and De Vos (2005) were one of the first to tackle this issue, by presenting two algo-
rithms for producing natural language explanations as to why a (set of) literal(s)
is or is not part of an answer set. In the first case, applicable rules are provided
as an explanation, whereas in the second case contradictions (concerning the truth
values of atoms) are pointed out.
Off-line justifications (Pontelli and Son 2006; Pontelli et al. 2009), as reviewed
in Section 3.1, use graphs as justifications, expressing why an atoms is (not) con-
tained in a given answer set. This approach can be traced back to tabled justifi-
cations for Prolog (Roychoudhury et al. 2000; Pemmasani et al. 2003). Albrecht
et al. (2013) further show how off-line explanation graphs can be constructed from
a graphical representation of logic programs called extended dependency graph.
The root of causal justifications can be traced back to (Cabalar 2011), where an
extension of the stable semantics with causal proofs was introduced, and (Cabalar
and Fandinno 2013), where an algebraic characterisation of this semantics was de-
veloped. Argumentation-based answer set justifications (Schulz et al. 2013) are
a predecessor of LABAS justifications. They share the argumentative flavour of
LABAS justifications but use a slightly different way of constructing arguments
and justifications.
Erdem and O¨ztok (2015) use ASP to construct explanations for biomedical
queries. These explanations have a tree structure expressing derivations of a lit-
eral in question and have a close relationship with off-line justifications. Lifschitz
(2017) introduces a methodology that facilitates the design of encodings that are
easy to understand and provably correct. In addition to the implementations of
justification and debugging approaches reviewed here, Perri et al. (2007) integrate
an explanation and debugging component into the DLV solver.
As we saw throughout this survey, many justification approaches construct a
graphical explanation. Graph representations of logic programs have also been ex-
tensively studied for other purposes (Costantini et al. 2002; Costantini and Provetti
2010). Graphs can for instance be useful for the computation of answer sets, as is
the purpose of attack graphs (Dimopoulos and Torres 1996), rule graphs (Dimopou-
los 1996), and block graphs (Linke 2001) and their extensions (Linke and Sarsakov
2004; Konczak et al. 2006). Furthermore, Costantini (2001) and Costantini and
Provetti (2011) study desirable properties of graphs representing logic programs
and Costantini (2006) uses cycle graphs to prove conditions for the existence of
answer sets.
Various IDEs for ASP also make use of graphical representations of logic programs
or visualise dependencies between literals to help the user understand a problem
represented as a logic program. For example, for the DLV solver a visual computation
tracing feature (Calimeri et al. 2009) as well as a dependency graph feature (Feb-
braro et al. 2011) have been developed. Furthermore, the VIDEAS system (Oetsch
et al. 2011) uses entity relationship graphs of logic programs for model-driven en-
gineering in ASP and, in the ‘Visual ASP’ system (Febbraro et al. 2010), the user
can draw a graph, which is then translated into a logic program.
6 Conclusion
Lifschitz (2010) lists thirteen different definitions of the concept of answer set (and
points out that even more exist). These definitions are equivalent (at least for nor-
mal programs), but provide alternative points of view on the intuitive meaning of
logic programs or lead to different algorithms for generating answer sets. In this
sense, it is not surprising that there exist several ways of explaining the solutions
to consistent programs and the errors in inconsistent ones. In this survey, we have
reviewed and compared the most prominent explanation approaches for both con-
sistent and inconsistent logic programs under the answer set semantics and pointed
out their differences and similarities. These approaches try to answer important
‘why’-questions regarding answer sets, namely why a set of literals is or is not an
answer set, or why a logic program is inconsistent. Approaches aiming at answer-
ing the first question for consistent logic programs are referred to as justification
approaches, while explanation approaches trying to answer the second question for
inconsistent logic programs are referred to as debugging approaches. The latter
take a more global view than justification approaches: in debugging approaches the
explanation is w.r.t. a whole set that is not an answer set, whereas in most justi-
fication approaches the explanation is w.r.t. one literal that is (not) in an answer
set.
As we have seen in Sections 3.6 and 4.6, the different justification and debug-
ging approaches suffer from various issues. Building upon these observations, in
the following we suggest some considerations for future research that are mainly
independent of philosophical choices made by different approaches. These are partic-
ularly important in the light of the European Union’s new General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which states that explanations should consist of “meaningful
information about the logic involved” and be “concise, intelligible and easily accessi-
ble” (Goodman and Flaxman 2016). Since the approaches discussed here construct
explanations based on the logical connection between rules and literals leading to
the existence of a particular answer set or to inconsistency, at least the first part
of the first GDPR condition, i.e. “information about the logic involved”, can be
deemed satisfied by these approaches. The proposed directions of research are as
follows:
• Number of explanations (tackling the conciseness and intelligibility required
by the GDPR): As previously discussed, most justification and debugging ap-
proaches suffer from a large number of possible explanations when dealing with
large programs with, potentially, many (and long) dependencies between liter-
als. This is not feasible in practice, so a method for choosing the most suitable
explanation(s) is needed. This could for example be tackled by querying the
user as in dwasp and the interactive spock approach.
• Size of explanations (tackling meaningfulness of information, conciseness, intel-
ligibility, and easy accessibility required by the GDPR): A related problem is
the growth in size, from which many of the justification approaches suffer. Large
explanations are infeasible in many practical applications, since they make it dif-
ficult for the user to understand the explanation. The development of techniques
for collapsing less important parts of an explanation provides a challenging topic
for the future.
• Language constructs and variables: We have seen that, especially among the jus-
tification approaches, there is little support for logic programs that contain lan-
guage constructs such as aggregates, weight constraints, etc. Many approaches
are not even able to efficiently handle variables. In order to apply explanations
in practice, these issues will have to be addressed.
• Cross-fertilisation of justification and debugging: Most current approaches ei-
ther focus on justifying consistent programs or debugging inconsistent pro-
grams. A first step towards the cross-fertilisation of the two was made by
Dama´sio et al. (2015), who combine the second spock transformation approach
with why-not provenance justifications.
• Going beyond debugging: Current debugging approaches merely point out errors
in a program, leaving the fixing of these errors to the user. The automatic
revision of inconsistent logic programs is thus an interesting, and challenging,
topic for future investigations. A first step in this direction was made by Li
et al. (2015), who use inductive logic programming to achieve a semi-automatic
revision of logic programs.
Meeting the requirements of the GDPR will be a challenging task, especially since
conditions like meaningfulness and intelligibility of information may have to be re-
alised differently for ASP experts and non-experts. Applications of ASP explanation
approaches will thus determine whether or not they meet the required conditions. In
this sense, an exciting prospect for the future is the combination of the advantages
and minimisation the disadvantages of all the different approaches for answering a
‘why’-question in answer set programming.
Acknowledgements We are thankful to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable
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